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p. 393 - Howe
p. 390 - Bernard
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

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Jeffrey Levi

The Vietnamese Refugees

Interview with an Expert

Because it takes several weeks to "make up" and print Dissent, *we had to arrange the interview below for early August, perhaps two months before you will be able to read it. We hope of course that this interview will become "dated" through an improvement of the refugee situation; we fear it will not. In any case, the information here provided is urgent.*
— EDS.

It's been said that U.S. participation in the Vietnam war ended in part because the war was brought into American living rooms on the evening news; it became an immediate, horrible presence. Yet, despite regular and shocking reports on the plight of the Indochina refugees, there is still little public outcry in the United States. Polls show the American people opposing the minimal step of doubling the U.S. quota of refugees admitted each month. We are still trying to forget the Vietnam experience, and the plight of the refugees is too grim a reminder.

In an interview, Charles Sternberg, executive director of the International Rescue Committee, estimated that there are close to 1 million refugees, if those who went to China are included. The current rate of refugees is now 40,000 a month, though the number of boat people is down. At the end of July, according to Sternberg, there were 385,000 persons in refugee camps—220,000 boat people, and 165,000 who had escaped on land.

Most public attention has gone to the boat people—with thousands not surviving their escape. Those leaving by land face frightening hazards as well. And once they have successfully escaped, the refugees have hardly been welcomed, either by the countries of first asylum or any other potential havens. Sternberg says, "no exodus has ever had this accumulation of horror."

QUESTION: What common factors are there in the overall Indochina refugee problem? Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia—how do you distinguish among these countries?

STERNBERG: Common to all three Indochinese countries is a pervasive system of oppression, economic ruin, and widespread starvation. Common to all the Indochinese refugees is their flight from conditions they experience as being unbearable. The alternative in Vietnam is the removal to "new economic zones," or "reeducation camps," a contemporary version of the Gulag Archipelago. The Cambodians are driven by their experience in Pol Pot's charnel house. The Hmong, the hill tribe of Laos, are fleeing because their society has been obliterated. And Vietnam's tight control of Laos and Cambodia also feeds the desire to escape. Those who try to prettify the story by describing the refugees as people who seek to leave for economic reasons, or who cannot stand the idea of leaving the cities where there is no productive employment and of going to the new economic zones to learn farming, should be reminded that the very concept of the economic refugee was first applied to Germany's Jews. They were called *Wirtschaftsemigranten.*

QUESTION: Is the ousting of the "ethnic" Chinese from Vietnam a political decision by the Vietnamese Communists to "liquidate" an element—middle-class professionals and the business community—considered socially undesirable and unassimilable in the type of society the Vietnamese are trying to construct? Is it comparable in any way to the "social engineering" practiced by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia when it was in power?

STERNBERG: The evidence of an overt anti-Chinese policy in Vietnam is inescapable. It is, however, not related to Hanoi's desire to get rid of middle-class professionals or the business community. A good percentage of the Chinese refugees who managed to get out came from North Vietnam. They never were professionals or businessmen or, if they were,

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stopped being that long ago. What's involved, I believe, is deep-seated hatred of the Chinese, as there is deep-seated hatred of the Vietnamese in Cambodia, brought to the surface by the recent war with China. As for the Pol Pot regime, it was so monstrous that, with one or two exceptions, no comparison comes to mind. Yet it, too, has had its defenders in the United States.

QUESTION: Hasn't Amnesty International adopted a similar position?

STERNBERG: Oddly enough, it has. Shortly before the recent crisis, Amnesty International's Executive Committee drew up guidelines in which it maintained that the boat people were not really refugees because they did not individually suffer persecution: they may be unhappy with the change in social and economic circumstances in Vietnam, but that does not make them refugees by the standards of international agencies.

Any unusual obtuseness apart, this is factually incorrect. The international organizations, including the UNHCR, do recognize the boat people as refugees. It's the Thai authorities who insist on calling them "displaced persons," and the Malaysians who treat them as "illegal immigrants," precisely in order to deny them the protection to which, if called refugees, they are entitled under international covenants.

QUESTION: One magazine has referred to this tragedy as a "liquid holocaust"—can this be compared to what happened in Germany?

STERNBERG: The Chinese have called Hanoi's policy genocide and implicated the Russians. The Vietnamese have denounced Pol Pot's genocide and implicated the Chinese. This creates problems for those who are wont to speak of the development model of the "socialist world." It is the Chinese-Cambodian world they wish to defend or the Russian-Vietnamese. If holocaust stands for genocide, the word is applicable. And if drowning is a mass fate imposed on people trying to flee, one can speak of a "liquid holocaust."

QUESTION: What is your response to those on the American left who say we have no moral or other right to criticize the Vietnamese for their actions because of what we, the U.S., did in Vietnam during the war?

STERNBERG: Those who favored the Vietcong during the American war in Indochina were fond of picturing Uncle Ho as a benign father figure. His successors turned out to be as unconcerned about human life as any tyrannical government has ever been. Those who opposed the war in Vietnam without siding with Hanoi have no reason and do not now try to excuse what is happening in Vietnam. My Lai, tiger cages, defoliation—terrible

(continued on p. 467)

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
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In Memory of A. Philip Randolph (1889-1979)

Mr. Randolph was a successful and uniquely gifted labor and civil rights activist because of his human qualities. His leadership flowed from the depth of his humanity—and from his understanding of the human condition. His modesty, his integrity, and his dedication won for him the loyalty—and yes, the love—of his comrades and trade union brothers and sisters. We who worked for him never served out of a sense of coercion or fear, but out of a sense of love and our need to share his commitment.

His political philosophy also arose from his humanity. As a young man, he saw and felt the ugly realities of racial oppression that were to him an abomination. And early in his life, when he was a mere solitary and powerless individual, he swore to challenge this affront to humanity. He was also disturbed by the deplorable conditions of most American workers, white as well as black. He knew that powerless workers could uplift themselves only by uniting in democratic trade unions, the only effective instruments of economic liberation, then and now. He saw that industrial capitalism—an economic system motivated by insecurity, greed, and ruthless competition—debased society in a fundamental way.

He also understood the terror and depravity of absolute power wielded by a totalitarian elite. He saw men like Stalin and Hitler and he knew that systems based on total power constitute a threat to freedom and justice everywhere.

Thus, while rejecting religious and racial intolerance, worker exploitation, and unbridled capitalism, Randolph never embraced totalitarianism. Instead, he embraced democratic socialism, the political philosophy that was the foundation of his strategies and tactics in the trade union and civil rights movements and that—combined with his own intelligence, integrity, and complete lack of sentimentality—helped him reject the fads, the easy answers, and the separatist delusions that have all too frequently plagued liberation movements.

This philosophy provided as well a basis for universal moral concern, compelling his resistance to any tendency that defended unjust acts in the name of justice or that excused wrongdoings, by whites or blacks, because it was done in the name of freedom, or democracy, or racial liberation, or of any other cause. He had no double standards. Moreover, he always taught us that the struggle for any right is inextricably linked to the struggle for all rights.

The chief's boundless concerns are clearly seen in his world view. In 1942, he urged me and others to devote ourselves to the cause of Japanese-Americans who were detained during World War II. Later, he urged us to become involved with liberation movements in India and Africa. He helped establish the first American Committee Against Apartheid.

He asked us to join the struggle with Martin Luther King, Jr. in the South. He offered enthusiastic encouragement as we began the difficult task of organizing the Black Americans to Support Israel Committee. He urged me to go to Southeast Asia to assist the thousands of defenseless refugees fleeing the brutal, totalitarian regimes of Indochina. And shortly before his

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death, he emphasized the urgency of assisting the refugees from Haiti who are reaching our shores in search of freedom.

We who loved him feel a longing for his presence. But we must remember that A. Philip Randolph considered himself part of a living, vibrant movement—a movement that embraced thousands whom he regarded as equals, as his brothers and sisters.

Randolph lived simply. His most prized possession was a gold watch given to him by the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. That watch symbolized for him the appreciation and love of his union brothers, and he left it to brother Douglas Taylor, one of his most loyal followers.

I want to share with you a touching passage from a letter I received from my good friend and comrade, the author James T. Farrell. Jim recalled a conversation he had with a Pullman porter back in the 1960s. Referring to Mr. Randolph, the porter said to Jim: "The old gentleman took care of us when we needed it. Now he's old and he needs to be taken care of. And we'll take care of the old gentleman."

All of us here must recognize our responsibility to "take care of the old gentleman." That we can do by taking care of his unfinished work.

Bayard Rustin

I read these remarks at the Washington memorial service for A. Philip Randolph. — B.R. □

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369 THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: INTERVIEW WITH AN EXPERT *by Jeffrey Levi*

373 IN MEMORY OF A. PHILIP RANDOLPH *by Bayard Rustin*

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

377 *by Benjamin Ross, Leo P. Ribuffo, Sanford Gottlieb, Stanley Plastrik, Abba Eban, David Bromwich, Irving Howe*

ARTICLES

395 THE UAW: TOOLING UP FOR THE '80s *by William Kornblum*

406 THE PASTORAL RETREAT OF THE NEW LEFT *by Michael Walzer*

411 ORGANIZING AT THE GRASS ROOTS *by Susan Eaton and Karen Scharff*

BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE: V

414 TROUBLES OF THE WELFARE STATE *by Robert Lekachman*

GROWING PAINS OF SPANISH SOCIALISM

430 I: LEFT TURN, RIGHT TURN, OR WHERE? *by Benjamin Martin*

435 II: MAY DAYS OF A LIVELY MOVEMENT *by Patricia Cayo Sexton*

443 HOW NOW "THE NEW CLASS"? *by David T. Bazelon*

450 MARX AND THE JEWS *by Henry Pachter*

NOTEBOOK

468 MELTDOWNS AND IDEOLOGIES *by Murray Hausknecht*

471 CIVIL RIGHTS, 30 YEARS LATER *by Harrell Rodgers*

473 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA *by Odette Jankowitsch and Ellen Seidensticker*

COMMUNICATIONS

478 *by Tom Milstein*

MOVIES

480 ENGAGING NORMA RAE: A JOURNAL *by Nicolaus Mills*

BOOKS

484 REVIEWS *by Erazim Kohák, Robert F. Hall, Andrew L. Giarelli*

496 **LETTERS**

429 **AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS**

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Benjamin Ross

A Third Path for Energy

In the summer 1979 Dissent *we printed several articles on the energy problem, from various points of view. Below appears another article, in line with our policy of providing a forum for a range of opinions, within the spectrum of socialist and liberal thought, regarding major problems.* — Eds.

The energy crisis of the '70s may better be understood as two related social and technological collisions: a crisis of supply and demand, in which the ever-growing demand for oil exceeds the natural endowments of the earth, and a crisis of accountability created by the unchecked power of private energy corporations. These two collisions are linked by their political context. The political will necessary to match supply and demand is not going to be forthcoming in the absence of a popular movement to take control of energy away from the corporate elite.

The public debate on energy supply and demand has been conducted almost exclusively by corporate apologists and utopian dreamers, with both groups wedded to obsolete myths of individualism. On one side, the corporations argue for government intervention to subsidize the development of new energy sources while they continue to control and profit from these sources. The usual rhetoric of "competition" and indivdual initiative is used to explain why government should put the corporations in control of resources to be developed at public risk and expense. The environmentalist critics who dominate the opposition to the energy industry's plans do not criticize this individualistic rhetoric. We are asked by these critics to return to an imagined utopia of small, self-sufficient communities—in its essence a resurrection of the old dreams of Fourier and Saint-Simon.

How inadequate the myth of free enterprise is as a prescription for energy may be seen from even a cursory examination of the energy supply system. The replacement of individually controlled sources of energy by collective supplies has been a constant and inexorable component of technological development. From a dependence on wood cut nearby and water flowing through mills, modern society progressed to coal mined far away but burned in individual furnaces, and it now is utterly dependent on integrated continent-wide systems for the provision of electricity, oil, and natural gas. These changes have been an intrinsic part of the quest for economic growth, environmental cleanliness, and the maintenance of an increasing population with a diminishing supply of natural resources.

The *scale* of the operations required to supply energy is enormous. A complex net of electric transmission lines ties together nearly every home in the country. Oil and gas pipelines crisscross the continent. These networks have evolved—by the very force of technological progress—into entities larger and more significant than the private corporations that still control the pieces of which they are composed.

A good example can be seen in the way coal is burned. At the turn of the century, most coal was consumed by furnaces serving a single building or manufacturing operation. The soot and acid released by these processes were the main source of the air pollution that made cities of that day nearly unlivable. Today coal furnaces must be equipped with complex and expensive pollution-control devices. Automated equipment makes it unnecessary for workers and homeowners to shovel coal and ash. Because of this complex equipment, burning coal in a cellar is as absurd today as

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making pig iron in a backyard, and coal is consumed only in enormous electric plants and the largest factories.

THESE COLLECTIVIZING technological forces are coming increasingly to clash with the corporate institutions of private ownership. The contradiction is particularly evident in the activity known as electricity dispatching—so evident, in fact, that it has had to be resolved in a thoroughly collective manner. Dispatching is the not inconsiderable part of an electric utility's operations that consists of deciding what generating plants operate when, and whom they supply. As the transmission networks of the various utilities have become increasingly connected, it has become difficult for individual companies to dispatch their own networks efficiently, or indeed to dispatch them at all without unwittingly generating surges of electricity that black out neighboring systems. As a result, the individual companies have turned the dispatching function over to regional entities known as power pools. The management of the pools is chosen by the (mostly privately owned) utility companies, but to the day-to-day operations of a power pool the existence of separate utility companies must seem a legal fiction whose only real effect is to create irrelevant paperwork for accountants.

In other areas, however, the collective solutions required by modern technology have been blocked by the institutional structure of private ownership. A case in point is the supply of steam to cities from central boiler plants through district heating systems. This technology is cheaper and cleaner than the burning of oil in individual furnaces, and permits enormous energy savings when the steam is generated from waste heat otherwise thrown away by electric power plants. The large scale of district heating plants also offers the option of eventually eliminating the use of oil through the installation of a nuclear or coal system. But steam competes with electric and gas heat sold by the same utility companies that own the district heating systems, and the variable nature of demand makes district heating more difficult to manage and riskier than electricity and gas networks. Most utilities have therefore discouraged the use of steam and even tried to shut the systems down. By contrast, the well-planned urban growth of Sweden and other northern European countries has involved great expansion of district heating over the last 30 years.

Another area where private ownership has led to environmentally and economically damaging priorities is the choice of means for generating electricty. Oil and coal plants usually cost less to build than cleaner, fuel-conserving nuclear and hydroelectric plants. When choosing among these technologies, planners must balance the cost of fuel against the differences in capital costs. *Private planners consider, however, the cost of capital to their companies rather than the cost to society.* They include among the costs of building a plant such items as taxes (not really a cost, but money that has been transferred to meet other social goals) and the higher interest rates induced by the instability associated with private ownership. The result is that the clean, capital-intensive solar and nuclear technologies are overpriced by private decision-makers and, instead, the excessive use of coal and oil wastes money, squanders natural resources, and damages the environment.

The political and intellectual response to even these manifestly collective problems has been largely limited to the confines of free-enterprise economic theory. A typical proposal is the demand for antitrust action against the oil companies. If OPEC did not exist—and it is not likely to disappear soon—injunctions from American courts would still be powerless to restore competition to the interconnected world oil-supply system. Even for domestically produced oil, where one might think the efforts of lawyers and judges could be more fruitful, the price is set in the halls of Congress (with generous suggestions from various boardrooms) and not in the marketplace—a fact obvious to everyone except Mobil's advertising writers and those myopic liberals who would like to return to an imagined world of competitive pricing.

The free-enterprise myth has had its most pernicious effects on the discussion of energy supply alternatives. Fashionable advocates of "decentralized" energy supply discuss, for example, a return to the wood-burning stove. This at a time when dead leaves can no longer be burned in one's garden for fear of poisoning the air. More energy can, to be sure, be obtained from the forests. But even with wood, individual initiative is neither economical nor environmentally acceptable; it is far more practical to follow the Swedish example and burn bark, sawdust, and other forest wastes in large furnaces equipped with pollution-control devices.

The most articulate and thorough theorist of this sort of utopianism is Amory Lovins. Lovins is an advocate of the rooftop solar collector and the neighborhood coal furnace as the foundation of the future energy supply. He argues that such decentralized technologies could ensure a modest but

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adequate supply of energy into the indefinite future. (The definition of "adequate," it should be noted, turns out to be that people in solar-heated homes will just have to freeze when it stays cloudy too long.) This new organization of energy supply is to lead in some unspecified way to the breakup of the giant corporation and the revival of the small town and small business.

Another thinker of the same school, who has somehow managed to convince himself that he is a Marxist, is Barry Commoner, whose grasp of economics may be judged from his assertion that it is cheaper to wear wool than synthetics, has searched through the entire corpus of Marxism to winnow out a kernel of truth—the law of the falling rate of profit. Commoner argues that the roots of our economic and energy troubles can be traced to the displacement of labor by capital- and energy-intensive technologies, and the consequent decline in corporate earnings. This is to be remedied in his scheme by the advent of a socialist society based on labor-intensive production of solar energy.

In his study of Marxist economics, Commoner has somehow failed to come across the idea that capital represents an accumulation of past labor. He is therefore able to painstakingly demonstrate the large amount of labor required to build solar energy facilities. This proves, of course, precisely that by the Marxian definition solar energy is very capital-intensive.

The difference between labor and capital is not the only aspect of Marxism that Commoner has revised (or perhaps misunderstood). Instead of administering the machine of modern industry in its own interest, he would have the proletariat more or less dismantle it. Socialist society will be based on not the abolition but the intensification of labor. "Progress" will consist of the search for even more labor-intensive ways to produce so that people can work even harder. The important point here is not whether Commoner knows Marxism, but that his thought on this matter is, despite his obvious good intentions, socially retrograde.

The popular reflection of Lovins's and Commoner's thinking is the Jerry Brown ideal of a solar-heated swimming pool in the backyard. That this style of life is available only to a privileged few; that solar-heated suburbanites actually use more fuel than inner-city apartment dwellers; that the very existence of suburban neighborhoods is inextricably tied to rapidly disappearing supplies of gasoline—all this escapes the self-indulgent governor. As in so many other areas, he is concerned more with soothing the feelings of the affluent than with resolving social and economic difficulties.

These individualistic utopianisms can provide no permanent solution to the contradictions that are making our energy system unworkable. The response of the left to the crisis of accountability will only be effective if it addresses as well the issue of supply and demand. More is needed than a vague bow in the direction of conservation and solar energy. A realistic program must follow a third path, avoiding both the corporate fixation on expansion of the present energy system (which has seduced many trade unionists as well) and the retrograde obstructionism that has become typical of some environmentalists.

A CREDIBLE PROPOSAL for energy policy must, first of all, face up to the need for maintaining adequate supplies. With oil disappearing, natural gas supplies limited, and solar energy economically feasible only for a few very limited uses, more energy will have to come from either coal or nuclear power. The widespread death and environmental destruction caused by coal make a rapid expansion of the availability of nuclear energy far preferable. The hazards of nuclear power are far better understood than those of other energy technologies; in particular, nuclear reactors cannot cause a destructive worldwide climate change like the "greenhouse effect," which might—no one really knows—result from burning coal and oil. Unlike the pollutants that other energy technologies spew into the air and water, the noxious substances associated with nuclear power are almost entirely contained in a few centralized facilities. The wastes from nuclear plants are in such concentrated form that they can be safely buried deep underground and need not be dumped on the surface like coal wastes. Even with its present privatized and overly decentralized organization, the nuclear industry has established a record as one of the safest of heavy industries. Operation of nuclear power plants by large publicly owned organizations could, as Alvin Weinberg has pointed out, further improve this safety record by increasing the depth of technical support and eliminating the exclusive focus on profits.

An equally important element of a program to avoid energy shortages must be the reduction of demand through conservation. The energy conservation measures that have been undertaken in the past, such as building insulation, more efficient cars, and better housekeeping in factories, are

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important but insufficient. Such incremental actions can save enormous amounts of energy, but they do not end dependence on rapidly disappearing oil reserves.

TO DEAL WITH the long-range problems of the exhaustion of the world's oil supply, it will be necessary to move beyond incremental conservation to what may be called *structural energy conservation*. This type of conservation involves the replacement of individual oil-burning facilities with collective services that can use alternative fuels. Mass transit, district heating, and electrification of industrial processes are prominent and worthwhile examples. Changes of this sort will involve enormous alterations in the nation's economic and social infrastructure. They will have to begin now (even when, as in the case of replacing buses with trains, they do not always save fuel at first) if the dependence on oil is to be ended before all reasonably priced reserves are exhausted.

Because President Carter's energy program fails to address this issue, it will probably not succeed even in assuring an adequate energy supply, let alone in restoring "national confidence." The President has chosen to avoid structural changes and instead to continue fueling the present system of consumption with synthetic oil and gas. Development of synthetic fuel technologies is, to be sure, a wise investment for the purpose of allowing ourselves additional choices in the future. Synthetic fuels are particularly likely to be needed if political opposition and administrative delays continue to slow down and raise the costs of such heavy construction projects as nuclear power plants and mass transit systems. But their enormous economic and environmental costs make the Carter program's reliance on them to support the current mix of energy uses most unwise.

We should not, however, be surprised that Carter and his advisers fail to understand the need for a change of direction, for what structural energy conservation ultimately requires is a collectivization of energy demand to match the collectivization of supply that has already occured. Let us consider for a moment the institutional changes that would be required for a program attempting no more than to imitate what Sweden has done over the last few decades. New housing would have to be laid out in corrridors to allow efficient use of mass transit and district heat. Apartment buildings would replace single-family homes. Industry would be required to locate where energy could be most effectively made available. Transportation by rail, bus, and auto would be planned in a coordinated manner. Evidently, such massive changes would require nothing less than a comprehensive system of economic planning and land-use controls

The obvious reasons why such a radical program is not being considered bring us back to the second energy crisis, that of accountability. The present system of collectivized production and individual consumption accommodates the interests of the energy corporations all too well. A program of structural energy conservation will become politically possible only if there is a direct assault on their concentrated power.

Any such attack on corporate power will naturally begin with the oil companies, arguably the most antisocial segment of big business in the world today. It would be counterproductive even to propose to nationalize the oil companies all at once, because the current private management structure monopolizes the expertise needed to run the industry. Even if a nationalization movement were somehow to be successful, the companies would have to be administered by the same people that are managing them now. A proposal that is both more effective and politically realistic is the establishment of a publicly owned oil company to operate in competition with the private companies while developing a corps of competent, socially oriented managers. Such a company, which has been proposed in Congress in the form of a Federal Oil and Gas Corporation, would at the very least serve as a benchmark by which to judge the performance of its private competitors.

In the electricity industry, on the other hand, decades of public power have already operated in this way to train many effective managers. Private ownership of electric utilities has meanwhile reached the point of patent absurdity, illustrated most graphically by the collectivization of the dispatching function. It is therefore entirely appropriate to advocate the public ownership of this industry. Local campaigns for municipal ownership offer a good opportunity to raise this issue. But municipal control cannot mean complete autonomy for a single city's power supply. Indeed, the process of collectivization has already gone so far that the forms in which a socialized electricity generating industry would ideally be administered have come into existence. These are the power pools, which should be transformed into regional publicly owned power production companies on the model of the British electricity generating boards. The management of the distribution of

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electricity to individual customers can, at the same time, properly be decentralized into the hands of community controlled organizations operated at the municipal level. The effectiveness and responsiveness of municipal distribution systems has been amply proved by years of experience.

In the present context of American politics, the program here sketched out seems utterly audacious. Yet, a policy of this sort has been proposed almost invariably by those European socialist parties with the responsibility of guiding their countries' economies. Leaders with such disparate outlooks as Bruno Kreisky, Olaf Palme, and Tony Benn have all opted for a program of collectivizing energy demand, expanding nuclear power production, and increasing public control over energy corporations.

Such an attitude could serve equally well for us. With it, a left buoyed by the tide of popular anger at the greed of the oil corporations would be armed with a realistic response to legitimate popular concerns about future energy supplies. Arguments over energy supply would no longer be limited to a monotonous debate between greed and inanity, but would open up to confront corporate America with a serious and practical alternative program. □

Leo P. Ribuffo

The Energy Crisis and the Analogue of War

When President Carter called us onto the "battlefield of energy," he was only the latest leader to suppose that peacetime problems can be solved by applying the alleged wartime virtues of unity, productivity, and sacrifice. As early as the 1820s, Americans feared that national idealism was dying along with the generation of Valley Forge. From the 1880s to the early 20th century, preachers, teachers, and politicians tried to revive Civil War heroism as an antidote to Gilded Age greed and class conflict; in this context, William James coined his much abused phrase, the "moral equivalent of war." During the Great Depression, as William E. Leuchtenburg has shown, President Hoover waxed nostalgic about cooperation during World War I, and President Roosevelt based the National Recovery Administration on Wilson's War Industries Board (much as Carter now offers a version of FDR's War Production Board).

In every case the war remembered only marginally resembled the war fought. Conjurers of the spirit of conflicts past rarely mention the bloodshed, bitterness, and enforced conformity; they invariably exaggerate the unity, productivity, and universality of sacrifice. While heroes sacrificed at Gettysburg, for example, J. P. Morgan hired a substitute to take his place in the draft, leaving him free to speculate in gold. More recently, while heroes died at Normandy, Philip Wrigley convinced rationing panels that chewing gum was an asset to national defense. Indeed, most civilians during World War II enjoyed safety and prosperity as well as Wrigley's gum.

Although the United States never fully mobilized, it still produced an impressive 45 percent of the world's munitions. But this total included tanks inferior to their German counterparts and torpedoes that failed to explode. Despite Carter's fond memories, the War Production Board created as many "roadblocks" as it dismantled. Lucrative "cost plus" contracts enlarged major corporations at the expense of small business. With warrant on both sides, conservatives accused FDR of using the war to expand presidential authority and New Dealers charged conservatives with using the war as a pretext to halt social reform. Furthermore, tensions on the homefront produced bloody race riots and bitter strikes.

Since Americans continued after an air raid on Pearl Harbor to compete for goods, services, and power, they are unlikely to forsake self-interest when the most dramatic sign of crisis is a long gasoline line. Thus, in ways comparable to our biggest and favorite hot war, Carter's "energy war" will be marked by partisanship, technical snafus, and opportunism. Yet the President probably thinks that he can inspire the country down the "path of common purpose." Like turn-of-the-century progressives who saw expert public service as a "moral equivalent of war," he believes in both the gospel of efficiency and in a national consensus among all classes, regions, and ethnic groups.

WHILE PROMOTING TEMPORARY EUPHORIA, Carter's rhetoric will backfire by encouraging expectations of relatively quick and total victory; unlike the Axis, the amorphous energy enemy is not likely to

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surrender unconditionally in 45 months. Moreover, at least since Hoover's time presidents who make analogies between domestic crises and foreign wars often begin to confuse disagreement with disloyalty. Hence, when criticism of specific programs succeeds euphoria, Jody Powell may echo FDR's aide Donald Richberg, who declared in 1933 that there was "no honorable excuse for the slacker who wastes these precious moments with doubting and debate."

Yet, there are good reasons to doubt and debate. Like blood-and-guts wars, metaphorical wars on poverty, crime, or energy produce winners and losers. Sacrifices are borne disproportionately by citizens who take the rhetoric most seriously—the poor, ill-educated, and unorganized. In this instance, the danger is particularly acute. Although Carter condemns "interests" in typical progressive fashion, he seems unaware that some interests are better than others. He lacks even the fitful commitment to redistribution of income that characterized FDR and Harry Truman. Moreover, afflicted by their latest failure of nerve, some welfare-state liberals may not point out that a 5 percent loss of real income, for instance, hurts more if a family makes $10,000 annually instead of $100,000. All Americans do not in fact walk a "path of common purpose."

Significantly, when Carter uses the analogy of war, he thinks of World War II, which, despite more mistakes and divisions than we choose to remember, was largely successful. But other wars have been less effective, wise, and moral than the battle against Hitler. Amid the current enthusiasm, Carter's July 15 speech may sound like FDR's call to the colors after the "day of infamy," but in retrospect it might look like Lyndon Johnson's fantasy about incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. A just victory in the "energy war" ultimately requires changes in the structure of power within American society. And to achieve that victory, doubt, debate, and thought are at least as necessary as presidential appeals to the "American spirit." □

A Neo-Conservative We All Can Love

I think that the free-enterprise system is absolutely too important to be left to the voluntary action of the marketplace.

—Representative Richard Kelly, quoted in the *Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1979.*

Sanford Gottlieb

Two Cheers for SALT II

The two-way Soviet-American negotiations on SALT II have ended and the three-way negotiations that will determine the outcome of the treaty are under way. The 100 members of the U.S. Senate have become the third side in the bargaining. Whether and under what conditions at least 67 senators coalesce for ratification will greatly influence the choice between arms racing and arms reduction in years to come.

The SALT II hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee have revealed a broad consensus for more arms racing—at least for more military spending. Moved by the perception that Soviet power is waxing and American power is waning, many senators appear more interested in keeping up with Ivan than in the potential benefits of SALT. Jacob Javits, one of the few Republicans usually considered dovish, asserted during the hearings that the United States has been "goofing off" for the past ten years. One is forced to wonder what this veteran legislator was thinking of when he voted funds during that period enabling the Pentagon to build and deploy multiple warheads (three a day added in recent years) and Trident submarines, and to develop the Trident I, the cruise missile, and the MX mobile missile. The arms race has been just that—a race—although some officials blithely ignore the U.S. contributions to it.

Senator Sam Nunn, an influential member of the Armed Services Committee, promised his vote for SALT II on condition that the Administration increase the military budget by $7 billion. The military budget is already scheduled to increase, but Nunn wants real hikes of 4-5 percent after inflation in the $122.7 billion target for Fiscal 1980, and wants the increases to continue indefinitely.

Majority Leader Robert Byrd called Nunn's conditions "a plus on behalf of the treaty," because in the short run "the country's going to have to spend more money for defense whether we have SALT II or not." Byrd also said that we would spend more money without SALT. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance committed the Administration to an increase in the Fiscal 1981 budget during the hearings.

Why spend more money? Inflation aside,

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because the conventional wisdom in Washington and across the country sees a steadily growing Soviet threat. In reality, the two superpowers have reached a rough equality in nuclear overkill and neither can use these weapons of mass annihilation to political advantage. After World War II, the United States was not only Number One, it was Number Only. That monopoly has been lost, and the United States now shares a complex world with other power centers, in the Soviet Union as well as in Western Europe, China, Japan, and the OPEC countries.

For many Americans, the loss of the war in Vietnam, the nonintervention in Angola, and the "giveaway" of the Panama Canal have transformed their nostalgia for past glories into angry frustration. Some senators experience this same frustration, and they vent it on the SALT II treaty. Others, less emotional, nonetheless strongly support "modernization" of U.S. strategic forces, which today can deliver 9,200 strategic nuclear warheads on the Soviet Union from land-based and submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers. Modernization in the present context signifies pursuit of the arms race into the dangerous channels of mobile missiles (MX) and cruise missiles. Unfortunately, SALT II permits deployment of the MX and air-launched cruise missiles. We'll return later to the question of whether SALT II is worth the effort.

Few senators or witnesses challenged the conventional wisdom during the hearings. Senator George McGovern and Admiral Noel Gayler (U.S. Navy, Ret.) are among those who raised basic questions about the political and military value of nuclear weapons at today's levels of mutual overkill. After all, despite the 5,000 Soviet nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union could not prevent Pope John Paul II from visiting Poland and electrifying the Catholic faithful, could not prevent Hua Kuo-feng from earlier visiting Bucharest and symbolically thumbing his nose at the Kremlin, could not oblige Romania to accept an increase in military spending agreed by the Warsaw Pact, and could not pressure the Japanese into rejecting a peace treaty with China.

While the Soviets' massive military power can be applied any time their leadership is prepared to risk national suicide, the Soviet's economic, political, and diplomatic power is sharply limited. The CIA has told Congress that the Soviet economy will slow to a growth rate of less than 1 percent by the mid-1980s. Within three years, says the intelligence agency, the Soviet bloc will become an oil-importing area. The Soviets already import grain and technology from the West. This dependence will increase.

Politically, Leonid Brezhnev will be tottering to his last hurrah at a time when ethnic minorities—largely Muslim—are approaching half the size of the Soviet population. There have been reports that the minorities resent their lack of representation at the top, a condition that is unlikely to change in the struggle for succession. Nor is this struggle likely to reverse Moscow's loss of status as a role model for the have-nots almost everywhere in the world.

Diplomatically, the U.S.S.R. is quite isolated. It has no big-power allies, one small ally (Vietnam) and a number of client states (Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, and South Yemen). Some of these client states are strategically located, but some are impoverished and torn by civil war. The growth of their conventional forces has enabled the Soviets to engage in one new use of military power: transporting Cuban troops to Africa. On the other hand, the Soviets have been expelled from more African countries (Egypt, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan) than those in which sizable numbers of their Cuban surrogates are now stationed (Angola and Ethiopia). The recent discovery of Soviet combat troops in Cuba raises political rather than military questions, and greatly complicates the ratification of SALT II.

Despite the mixed bag of Soviet strengths and weaknesses, few voices in the SALT debate are raised to suggest that the Soviets are less than ten feet tall. Henry Kissinger claims there has been a "shift in the strategic balance." He worries about our "perceived impotence" and supports an expansive, and expensive, five-year military program. Senator Richard Stone of Florida fears that the Soviets are "gnawing away" at other regions. Some spokesmen have questioned the U.S. "will to respond" and suggested that SALT II would become a "tranquilizer" for the public unless accompanied by more military muscle. No one, however, asks them whether they would trade U.S. problems for Soviet problems—or U.S. weapons for Soviet weapons. And there is virtually no discussion of how deployment of new weapons systems would complicate future arms negotiations, especially the ability to monitor mobile missiles and tiny cruise missiles.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND of a debate skewed toward global armed competition, is SALT II worth its salt?

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Yes; both because its implementation would bring modest but tangible gains and its rejection would create an appalling situation. The treaty would oblige the Soviets to scrap 250 missile launchers or bombers in order to come down to the mutual ceiling of 2,250 delivery vehicles. Moreover, the Soviets would be limited to placing 10 nuclear warheads rather than 30 or more on each of their heavy missiles. Together, these two provisions would slow Soviet momentum. For those sincerely concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to Soviet attack, this should be seen as an important achievement. For the first time, the two superpowers would exchange data on the numbers of weapons limited by the treaty, then compare the figures with the conclusions gleaned through the "national technical means of verification." These numbers, as of November 1, 1978, actually appear as a "memorandum of understanding" attached to the SALT II treaty.

A protocol lasting through 1981 would ban the deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 375 miles and the testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs. There will be enormous pressure to remove the barriers to deployment of cruise missiles after 1981 and the Carter administration has already made a commitment to the MX mobile missile. However, negotiations for SALT III are to begin soon after the ratification of SALT II. These talks offer another opportunity, provided there is the will, to limit these new weapons. Moreover, since SALT II would provide the base upon which follow-on agreements can be written, it should take much less time to negotiate than in the past. The time period can be further telescoped by trying to reach agreement on one item at a time and ratifying it as a protocol to SALT II.

Ratification of SALT II would also open the door to consummation of a number of other negotiations, now "on hold" awaiting Senate action. Among them are a comprehensive nuclear test ban, an agreement on anti-satellite weapons, and perhaps progress toward mutual force reductions in Europe.

IF SALT II IS REJECTED or even delayed, Soviet-American relations would be sorely strained. Since Brezhnev has invested much political capital in the SALT process, his more militaristic collegues and would-be successors could use such Senate action to further their own ambitions. If the treaty is delayed and Brezhnev becomes incapacitated, at the very least Soviet decision-making would be slowed, further protracting any response to senatorial moves for alternatives of language. In such a case, these trilateral negotiations would take place during the U.S. presidential primaries—a condition not precisely geared to delicate diplomacy.

Outright rejection of the treaty would undoubtedly spur an arms race with no agreed limits. President Carter has said he would unilaterally apply the SALT II provisions in such an eventuality, but he would have little hope of succeeding in the jingoist political climate that would ensue. In such a climate, on both sides, an unlimited arms race would be more dangerous and more costly.

Outright rejection would have damaging effects on NATO and nuclear non-proliferation policy. NATO depends on the United States for leadership in both defense and detente. The shock to detente resulting from Senate defeat of SALT II could persuade the West Europeans to work out their own approaches to the Soviets, just as it might persuade the Soviets to look to Western Europe rather than the United States for negotiating partners. As for the non-nuclear weapon states, they would see defeat of SALT II as a formal repudiation of the bargain reached in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. In return for a pledge of abstinence by the non-nuclear weapon states, the United States and the U.S.S.R. committed themselves in Article VI of the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." SALT II is the key test of this superpower commitment. If the Senate rejects this treaty, the United States would have no moral or political authority to urge other nations not to pursue their own nuclear weapons. The green light would flash for the pursuit of atomic bombs throughout the world.

SALT II WILL NOT END the arms race. It will not make the Soviets into saints. But it will, if implemented, sustain the process of negotiated arms limitation, open the door to significant reductions in SALT III, and improve the world's political climate.

The only effort in the Senate to turn the ratification process into something other than a boost for military preparedness comes from senators who are threatening to vote against SALT II from the left. Senators McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire have been negotiating among themselves to see if they can adopt a common resolution proposing a moratorium on new weapons produc-

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tion and successive annual reductions in strategic arms. Hatfield insists on an amendment that would require renegotiation of the treaty; the others do not. This common effort may founder, but at least one resolution—in the form of instructions to the SALT III negotiators—will be advanced to rally the supporters of real arms reduction. Ironically, amidst the burgeoning consensus for "more is better," such conservatives as Jake Garn and Jesse Helms are saying they want arms reduction, but not SALT II. George McGovern plans to offer them a legislative vehicle to let them prove their bona fides. □

Stanley Plastrik

French Socialism Entangled in Factions

The fortunes of political movements change rapidly these days. Consider the French Socialist party, which could boast at the beginning of this year that it was France's "largest party": it had a membership of 200,000, the highest percentage of the electoral vote, and was clearly outstripping the Communists in popularity and media attention.

Early in April, as if to consolidate this strength, the SP staged an impressive congress with 1,500 delegates, reinforced by 500 invited representatives from fraternal parties abroad, and 500 observing journalists. The congress convened in the city of Metz, chosen for its location in the heart of the steel-producing Lorraine region, where the ills of the French economy (outdated industrial plants, wide unemployment, a discontented and aging labor force) are on full display. After three days of often heated discussion, the party emerged under the continued leadership of François Mitterand, who had revived the SP a few years back but is often accused by his critics of exercising a proprietary control. Many claim that this was a Pyrrhic victory, based on his (minority) faction's alliance with what remains of the "leftist" faction known as CERES, which, until Mitterand made his pact, had shown clear signs of decline. The Mitterand-CERES alliance now dominates the SP, replacing his former loose alliance with the groups of Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard, two young democratic-socialist leaders who now are a part of an opposition within the SP.

The political malaise that has struck all of France is reflected in the life of its parties, including the SP. The only one who thrives on this internal disarray is President of the Republic Giscard d'Estaing, for it reinforces his role as arbiter "above the battle."

The left, starting with the Socialist party, seems particularly affected by the state of inner paralysis. In the June 1979 elections to the European parliament, the Socialists lost several percentage points as compared with their gains in the earlier cantonal and national parliamentary elections. Communist leader Georges Marchais expressed his satisfaction over this Socialist "retreat" (the Communists just about held their own). Yet, he could not ignore the fact that the heaviest losses on the left were caused by abstentions of working-class and young voters, who stayed away from the polls in droves.

So recently a source of great hopes, the Socialist party now seems increasingly victimized by internal conflicts between ambitious leaders. Mitterand, calling for tighter party discipline and acceptance of the resolutions of the Metz congress, is up against a large, activist minority within the party that is reluctant simply to obey. On June 24, Mitterand convened a special national convention—which the minority proceeded to boycott. Mitterand fumed, charging the absentees with dishonoring the party. But he ended his attack on Rocard and Mauroy by saying, "Come back. You are not facing judges. We need to be together, all of us." Though the party atmosphere is embittered, it seems there will be no immediate split.

The SP minority, consisting of the Rocard and Mauroy factions (the differences between them seem infinitesimal), justifies its abrasiveness by claiming to be deeply worried about the party's future. It accuses the Mitterandists of following a "suicidal policy" by refusing to admit candidly the reality of recent electoral setbacks, by refusing consequently to analyze the reasons for these defeats, and by refusing to grasp the nature of the economic crisis in France. Its attitude seems increasingly to be that of sullen and silent non-participation.

The intensity of the quarrel between the

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Mitterand leadership and the minority far exceeds that of the former struggle between the Mitterandists (who then included both Rocard and Mauroy) and the leftist CERES of a year or two ago. Mitterand's youthful, hard-nosed supporters talk of the need for a "pure and tough" party in response to the growing nervous tension of the rank-and-file membership: the party must present a unified face to the public. Implicit here is a reduction in the rights of the opposing minority—a suggestion that can only fuel the flames. And the party's militants are better informed about this *"combat des chefs"* by the general press than by their own party media. Serge Barcellini, party secretary in the Moselle region, put it most clearly:

> There has always been a majority and a minority confronting each other in the Socialist party. We must live with that. What is new and regrettable is to have made a personal issue of it. It is true that the approaching presidental campaign is exacerbating matters. . . .
>
> [*Le Nouvel Observateur*, June 25, 1979]

Gaston Defferre, mayor of Marseille and the party's chief "baron" in Southern France, has offered his services as peacemaker, inviting the three top leaders to smoke a peace pipe in his tent. Whether one and a half years of mutual suspicion and name-calling can be eradicated is uncertain.

In 1971, at the Epinay party congress, the Socialist party was reborn with François Mitterand presiding. For eight years now an uneasy coalition of three groups (Mitterand, Mauroy, and Rocard) has run the party, following a policy of "left unity" with the Communists for electoral and other purposes. This coalition became unstuck with the breakup of "left unity" under CP initiative, ending with the election defeat of March 1978. At Metz this year, Mitterand emerged as victor within the SP, with 47 percent of the votes (an absolute majority always seems to elude this man); the Mauroy and Rocard groups accounted for 38 percent; and the ideological leftist faction (CERES), organized by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, held the 15 percent balance. Mitterand remained as leader, in control of the party machinery, but beholden to CERES.

BUT WHAT ISSUES are at stake? The personal differences are real enough, even though Socialists may be a little ashamed to stress them. Still, there really are significant divergences of political opinion, hard as it may be to pin them down. Hard, because they are still in the process of emergence, still insufficiently formulated.

At stake, nevertheless, is nothing less than varying evaluations of socialism and how to achieve it.

- Mitterand comes as close to an orthodox Marxist as a leader of a French Socialist party can come—class struggle, a sharp break with capitalism if the Socialists come to office, a program for nationalization of industry, centralized state planning of the economy, etc. It was only in late middle age that Mitterand reached this position, and his standard French rhetoric, studded with abstractions, still seems rather uncomfortable when employing Marxist language. But employ it he does.

- Rocard, by contrast, comes out of a militant leftist background but has moved rapidly toward a social democratic—or, if you prefer, democratic socialist—point of view. He sees the construction of a socialist society as a slow organic process over the years, with market forces (though not of course an unregulated market) allowed to play a major role. For, as he writes, "a society from which there would have disappeared that elementary freedom of the consumer provided by the market is a society in which freedom would no longer be rooted in the economic order and would therefore be endangered." He is also much concerned about bureaucratic growth in a socialist society, for he sees bureaucratism as a major threat to personal liberties, no matter what the nature of the society in which it develops. As a result, Rocard is what the French call a "devolutionist"—that is, he supports the idea of devolving authority, locally, regionally, and geographically, with a functional workers' self-management *(autosuggestion)* in industry.

- To some of Mitterand's supporters all of this is mere equivocation, a refusal to move ahead toward a transition to a full-fledged socialist society. To CERES leader Chevenement, Rocard is an "apologist" for the market and lacks faith in the capacity of the socialist "plan" to transform French economic life. In turn, Rocard accuses the other of clinging to outmoded leftist formulas, pointing to the evident failures of nationalization in various countries and to the equally evident fact that even with large amounts of nationalization the actual conditions of the working class do not necessarily change in any radical fashion. Rocard has been much influenced by the experience of the Swedish socialists, and he stresses the fact that in Sweden, while no "full socialism" has been reached, the life of the working class (and of others too) has been significantly improved under Socialist

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governments, even though without much nationalization.

We thus have a curious situation. Mitterand and Rocard seem to cross each other as they go in opposite directions politically, the former moving "left" and the latter "right." But are these terms still of much use here? Suffice it to say that these divergences of opinion can be found in every socialist or social democratic party in Europe, perhaps elsewhere too.

• There are also significant differences with regard to *l'union de la gauche*—the Union of the Left (which means primarily electoral pacts with the Communists). Mitterand, at least in his speeches, continues to place great emphasis on this strategy and has never withdrawn his famous remark that it is out of the question to try to govern France without the Communists. Rocard, while not rejecting in principle *union de la gauche*, does not place it at the center of the SP perspective. For Rocard the main thing is to build the SP organizationally and intellectually, so that it can take the lead as advocate for a new, *modernized* France, mobilizing both the workers and the growing professional classes that want a more egalitarian society but are repelled by Marxist dogmatism. If, says Rocard, there can again be an electoral pact with the Communists, it is important that the SP be the stronger element.

But how real are the differences on *l'union de la gauche*—unless, of course, as the Communists often charge and some observers farther right suspect, Rocard and perhaps even Mitterand have in mind a new political bloc between Socialists and a moderate center? At this point, it is clear, the Communists, who keep up a tremendous barrage of attacks on the SP, haven't the faintest intention of recreating *l'union de la gauche*. In fact, there is something amusing, though quite characteristic of CP behavior: the Communists do reserve their fiercest polemical shafts for . . . Mitterand. So the talk about relations with the Communists and the apparent differences in strategy between Mitterand and Rocard have, at least for the moment, a somewhat abstract character. Would we propose if the lady were willing . . . but the lady makes it perfectly clear she is not willing . . . and besides, there is much doubt that she is a lady. . . . At the Metz conference, which I attended, the phrase "Eurocommunism" was not heard once in three days!

• Paul Thibaud, editor of the monthly *Esprit*, was the first to point out that "Rocardism" represents another "culture," another tradition in the history of French socialism. He chooses to call it Bernsteinian "revisionism," a rejection of "orthodox" Marxism centering on the key role of the centralized bureaucracy in running the state and economy. The SP, Thibaud writes, is more

> than any other party in France a party of professionals. It is not a place where militants may find their happiness in serving some transcendent cause. It is a place in which ambitions, partly rival, partly in solidarity, meet one another; where networks of party "big shots" [notables] join together; a grouping of elected representatives, of candidates, and candidates to become candidates.
>
> The SP is the opposite of those mass parties, some of which still have a nostalgia for the past, but which have been instruments of political alienation, intellectual dictatorship, and exploited emotions. The professionalization of a political party such as is indicated in the SP is a healthy phenomenon. It indicates that the party, by defining and proposing a strategy for elections, selects its candidates for the exercise of power. It puts an end to a long-standing nonsense that had us believing the political party was a magic place that produced through the workings of ideology a mystical fusion of leaders and followers in one great "Us". . . .

FRANCE TODAY is the only major industrial nation of the West in which the working class is still deprived of all influence on the government. The gap between state power and the nation's popular forces remains as wide as ever. Rigid, authoritarian, highly unequal, French society resists change. "The franc holds solid, while France slowly decomposes" (Alain Touraine). Great enterprises earn monopolistic profits at the expense of the workers. Whole regions (Brittany, Lorraine) are drawn into economic stagnation, unemployment grows steadily, the educated youth is increasingly desperate for jobs and careers. The situation cries out for modernization based upon new productive forces, but the present government is unresponsive; its vision is limited to a focus on the next election. A French "New Right" is about to enter the political arena.

A smug Giscard sits in the presidential palace, and peace appears to reign. But all this is misleading. As in the past, new explosions could occur at any point. Whether the situation is resolved in a socially progressive direction—toward egalitarian modernization, toward a greater role in society for the working class— will depend upon the ability of the French Socialist party to resolve its current crisis. That will not happen overnight. □

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Abba Eban

A View of the West Bank

The following is taken from a quite remarkable article by Abba Eban that appeared in the American Jewish magazine, Moment. *It's reprinted here with permission.* — Eds.

Let us look at the mechanism of the agreement. Within a month of signing and ratifying the treaty, we are committed to announce the date of an election in the West Bank and Gaza. The election will be for a self-governing Arab authority, replacing the Israeli administration.

Now let us assume that this happens—and some time in the next few months, we will announce a date for elections. The Arabs of Gaza and of the West Bank will vote, and there will be established a national Palestinian Arab authority. This will be the first institutional expression of Palestine Arab nationhood. Now in my view, such an institution has its own dynamic, which is completely independent of the intentions of those who establish it. Mr. Begin's intention might be Israeli control, but the consequence has no necessary relationship to the intention. All history tells us that an institutionalized expression of nationalism in that form moves toward a secessionist situation.

Our world is full of paradox—there's a book called *The State and Nation* by a Professor Akzin of the Hebrew University, one of the leading ideologists of the Likud movement, and he objectively analyzes conditions in which autonomy leads to secession. And he works out an equation: autonomy, when it is united with a distinctive ethnic group plus concentration in a visible piece of territory, plus a separatist psychological tendency, equals secession. It's almost a law.

In other words, all the conditions for secession exist. I raised this problem once in the Knesset. Let us assume that the self-governing authority is established, and it enters into jurisdictional conflict with the Israeli occupying force. In that jurisdictional conflict, sympathy is invariably with the indigenous self-government and not with the occupying force. And one day the authority meets in a museum in Ramallah, and all they have to do is read out the American Declaration of Independence, unilaterally, saying, "It's been very nice to know you but we've now decided to separate, and we set forth the reasons wherefore we separate from the union wherein we were held, and out of a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, we set forth the reason for which such separation is hereby enacted"—and 130 countries will recognize them the next morning. When I asked in the Knesset why this wouldn't happen, there were two replies: Mr. Begin produced a document and said that the honorable member has not noticed—it's not possible. It definitely says here "autonomy," it does not say independence. Dayan, a little less attached to semantic exactitude, said that it could very well happen, but then we would simply send in the Israeli Army and stop them—in other words, stop them in the act of proclaiming their independence. This is as close to a Rhodesian kind of situation as you could imagine.

In short, the dynamic leads to a Palestine state in the area of the autonomous jurisdiction, which is the area of the pre-1967 boundary. Although the Israeli government can rely upon the text to point out that autonomy will apply to people and not to territory, if the territory is almost totally occupied by that people, this becomes a distinction and not a difference. If there were 35 percent of non-Arabs in the territory, then you might define autonomy in personal terms, as in the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire. Actually, I believe the origin of Mr. Begin's recourse to autonomy is in the demands of the Jewish delegation to the Peace Conference of 1918, when the Jews of Poland demanded individual autonomy, just as in the Middle East Jews, Moslems, and Christians had autonomy according to their personal status. But that can't exist when you have a national movement that happens to occupy all the territory concerned.

In candid moments, not from the Knesset rostrum, I think the Israeli advocates of the autonomy would say, "Look, it's not going to happen at all." In other words, they are gambling on Palestinian extremism, and, in all frankness, it's a pretty good thing to gamble on. I would imagine, on the Likud side, the assumption is that the Palestine Arabs can always be trusted to do what is against their own best interests. After all, they rejected the Chamberlain White Paper, they rejected Bevin's enactments, they rejected the 1947 partition, they rejected the Peale report, they rejected the 1947 boundaries, they rejected the 1967 lines which they now hold up as their highest ideal—they have always rejected today that which they would long to have tomorrow, and they come out of every situation with a new nostalgia, but not necessarily with a new

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wisdom. And there is therefore an assumption that because their approach to problems is revolutionary and not evolutionary, because they deny the concept of gradualism, because they insist that it has to be all or nothing, that they will save us by their intransigence, just as they have in the past. And we, therefore, will be in the position of having offered them a solution that could well be a prelude to Arab independence, which they, in their all-or-nothing mentality, will have rejected. I would say that of all the calculations in the Israeli government's mind, that is probably the most prominent. It's also the most well-founded; at any rate, there is nothing on the horizon that refutes that scenario.

But once the treaty is in force, it seems to me dangerous to gamble on the Palestinian-Arab intransigence. There are some pragmatic as well as ideological forces at work here. There'll be an intense effort by the United States and Egypt, and by some of their own Palestinian intellectuals, to warn against the all-or-nothing syndrome, telling them, "Take this institution, ignore the rhetoric. Once you've established an Arab self-governing authority, you're halfway home." And I'm not certain that they will not be cooperative; they went to the ballot box and elected new mayors, all PLO enthusiasts.

If that turns out to be the case, then we shall confront the paradox that an Israeli government, by this time rejecting partition, by insisting on a unitary solution, has put itself in a position of preferring an Arab unitary solution to a partition in which we would get at least our marginal but crucial adjustments. And if you believe, as I do, that Camp David has for these reasons made an Arab destiny inevitable in the West Bank and Gaza, then we ought to be considering how Israel should rescue its basic interests, which are modest but crucial territorial change, demilitarization, military balance, mutual accessibility—those things that would make an Arab West Bank feasible for Israel.

What, then, is the current Israeli predicament? On the question of the West Bank, those who deny any kind of surrender of territory don't care whether you surrender it to Hussein or Arafat; in other words, the official Israeli position is that we're not going to give it up to either of them. It's effectively going to stay under Israeli control, with autonomy construed in rather modest municipal terms. Now those of us who have a view that the partition principle is inexorable, and that no country can possibly ignore the principle by which it came to birth—those of us who believe in partition, who believe that liberation means that Israel should be liberated from the million Arabs and from jurisdiction, controls, and responsibility for them—are caught up in the paradox of demanding a Jordanian solution. . . . The only people who want the Jordanian solution are the Israeli Labor party. Jordan doesn't.

Hussein's rejection of a West Bank claim is authentic, and it makes sense. He was always ambivalent about the Palestinians. And now the spectacle of Iran must make him think, why does he need a million people who can start marching through streets and bring about the downfall of a monarchy? What's the matter with his present situation, in which his legitimacy is universally recognized, in which he has the loyalty of his population, in which he is embraced by Arafat and Assad, in which he is nationalistically respectable? Why should he go back to his burden? He is rolling in wealth; there is tremendous political and economic development in Jordan these days. I cannot build a model of incentives that would explain why he, if he is in his right mind—and he is a lucid man indeed—should want the West Bank. I'm unable to understand why Israel should want it, except from the viewpoint of preventative security. We should be interested in what happens there, but not in having it. He is in exactly the same position. He's very interested in the West Bank being demilitarized, because it could be a threat to him, but that's all he wants. So this is our predicament: in Labor we have said that we will give up most of the West Bank territory provided it's taken over by Jordan. But what do we say if Jordan refuses to take it over?

My own view is that we ought to reenact our ideology and say that we will give up the West Bank to *any* regime that will not be hostile to Israeli security. We are not, after all, committed to the Jordanian monarchy. And how can and why should we, a Social Democratic movement, tell the million Palestinian Arabs who have been separated from that monarchy for 11 years that they've now got to go back to that monarchy?

Perhaps we must now look for other examples. Western Europe was not prepared for unconditional German independence. What made Western Europe prepared for German independence was the community idea. Germany alone, no; Germany as part of a community, yes. And I wonder whether the community idea is not the answer—a Benelux relation between Israel, the West Bank and Jordan, in which the community duties defuse the national militance of the West Bank, just as the EEC Doctrine was meant to defuse the national intensity of Germany, and successfully did so. The West Bank would be under certain limitations arising from such a community, and would perhaps therefore not be a danger to Israel. This, at least, is one way of thinking through a dilemma that might be insoluble if we stick to a Jordanian alternative. □

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David Bromwich

Joan Baez and Jane Fonda

Both Joan Baez and Jane Fonda are to some extent public figures *in* their art because they are public figures outside it: Ms. Baez for her marches against the H-bomb and the war, her marriage to a draft resister, and her songs about all of these things; Ms. Fonda for her marriage to Roger Vadim and the movies she made with him, her trip to North Vietnam and tour of the GI coffee houses, and finally for her more recent movies, which have given an impulsive energy to the women she portrays. They have enemies in common, and we might expect to see them often on the same side. But Joan Baez's letter denouncing the "relocation" and "reeducation" policies of Vietnam brought a shocked reply from Jane Fonda, who was dismayed by the "negative" tone and wondered aloud if Ms. Baez found communism a fate "worse than death." Also arrayed against Ms. Baez are William Kunstler, once an attorney for the Chicago Seven, and Leonard Weinglas, another lawyer for the Seven, who has described the Baez letter as "a national slander."

Ms. Baez's accusers treat any conclusion drawn from the reports of Vietnamese atrocities as *premature*, and thus accord it the treatment that a generation earlier they would have found appropriate to reports of Stalin's purges. Of the figures named above, Kunstler strikes us as an old and practiced hand at this game: interviewed on the CBS news, he gave a fine lesson on the worth of "reeducation," which made it sound like a refresher course for a suburban physician. Ms. Fonda, on the contrary, is a genuine innocent, and employs the threadbare phrases without betraying the slightest awareness of their history. Ms. Baez for her part knows enough history to use the word "Stalinist," and, with dozens of old allies clamoring for *her* reeducation, she shows no signs of changing her mind. So a routine letter of protest, of the sort filed by Western intellectuals several times each day, has become a *cause célèbre* of the America left; and an act that Ms. Baez assumed would require only decency has turned into an act that required courage.

The world is a complicated place. One nation may do evil, the nation to which evil was done may do evil in its turn; and yet the first may look no better in retrospect, when its victim has failed to be morally superior; and yet the second may not be excused on the ground that it was once a victim. We understand this sort of complexity as a fact of personal life. It is harder to understand in our judgment of politics, where other things, our ideals and past opinions, appear to be at stake. But are they? Those who condemn the Baez letter have acted as if the United States would be somehow exculpated if the Vietnamese government could be proved guilty of atrocities. As there are many on the other side who feel this way, and who draw the emotionally satisfying conclusion—Vietnam is wrong, therefore the United States was less wrong—Ms. Fonda finds herself in a curious handshake with those of the new right who prefer their welfare rolls trim and their memory short.

Ms. Fonda reminds us of nobody so much as

On "Reeducating" The Vietnamese

On October 5, 1978, *Le Monde* published a long report from Vietnam by R. P. Paringaux detailing "La violation des droits de l'homme au Vietnam."

Told of the report by Joan Baez, some long-term-American peace activists asked her, "How do you know you can trust *Le Monde*?"

"If this information were about Chile," she said, "would you ask the same question?"

Actually, during the early years of the American antiwar movement, *Le Monde* was not only trusted by the peace movement but was often greatly depended on for accurate information on the war because at that point much of the printed press and all of television here had swallowed each administration's "preserving-the-free-world" line. During that period, *Le Monde*'s Jean Lacouture in particular provided invaluable ammunition to those of us then skewering this government's lies wherever we could.

In 1976, Lacouture made his 11th trip to Vietnam since 1945, this time for *Le Nouvel Observateur.* He was stricken by what he saw of the processes of reeducation in the new Vietnam. Writing of an apolitical doctor to whom he had talked in one of the camps, the journalist noted: "He is here, in his black pajamas, thin, intimidated, his eyes lifeless. Reeducated? Yes in the precise sense of the word." And Lacouture, who for so many years had used precise reporting to help win worldwide support for the new government, now said sadly, "It is always more difficult to be the friend of the conquerors."

—From an article by Nat Hentoff,
Village Voice, May 28, 1979

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Henry James's Princess Casamassima, with the same "clear faculty of completely ignoring things of which she wished to take no account; it was not in the least the air of contempt, but thoughtful, tranquil, convenient absense, after which she came back to the point where she wished to be." Let us hope for a remission of her latest absence, and in the meantime bear in mind a too easily forgotten difference between the positions of Ms. Baez and Ms. Fonda a decade ago. It was Joan Baez who pleaded for an end to the war, while Jane Fonda deprecated any outcome except a victory for North Vietnam. Wait long enough, and words usually do bring forth their proper actions. □

Irving Howe

The Crucifixion of Cambodia

The question nags, gruesomely: Is the fate of the Cambodian people as dreadful as that of the Jews and gypsies in Europe? It isn't a question one need finally answer; a modest distinction will hold us. The Jews and gypsies were victims of Nazi design, a planned total destruction, while the Cambodians have been destroyed "casually," because they happened to stand in the way of both sides of the Vietnam war.

Reading William Shawcross's overpowering and meticulous study of American intervention in Cambodia from 1960 to 1975,* one is struck first of all by the thought that the men holding office in Washington, notably the half-mad Nixon and the intellectual toady Kissinger, acted with a cynicism that finally must be judged indistinguishable from criminality. Shawcross says at the end of his book: "Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime." Crimes are committed by criminals.

By the late '60s Cambodia remained a "backward" but attractive country, ruled by Prince Sihanouk in a benevolently autocratic style. Shawcross calls him a "petulent showman," but he was also a clever politician and, in his own way, a patriot. Aware of his country's weakness, Sihanouk managed to keep Cambodia in a state of precarious neutrality through the years of fighting in nearby Vietnam. It was not a complete neutrality, for the North Vietnamese Communists had established military "sanctuaries" on an eastern chunk of Cambodian soil. Sihanouk lacked the forces to expel them; the U.S. tacitly agreed to tolerate these "sanctuaries." President Lyndon Johnson, to his credit, several times rejected military proposals to bomb them.

It was different with Nixon. By March 1969 the U.S. began secretly to raid the "sanctuaries" with B-52s. Missions over Cambodia were officially recorded as having taken place in Vietnam, for as Shawcross remarks, "The bombing was not merely concealed; the official, *secret* records show that it had never taken place." Even the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General John Ryan, was not informed, perhaps in accord with the high dictum of Henry Kissinger who in 1968 had written: "The only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decisions all those who are theoretically charged with carrying them out." The first raid got the code name of BREAKFAST, and was followed by a MENU of other raids: LUNCH, SNACK, DINNER, DESSERT, and SUPPER. (Appropriate terms . . . for cannibals.)

The raids were begun under the prompting of the U.S. commander in Vietnam, General Abrams, who proposed to destroy "in a single blow" the Communist "central headquarters" in the portion of Cambodia overrun by the North Vietnamese.

*_Sideshow_, by William Shawcross. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.

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This idiocy, worthy of the Strangelove tradition, can be explained only as a result of extreme U.S. frustration in Vietnam, where massive attacks and bombings were proving of small value against guerrilla troops. In fact, there was no Communist "central headquarters" in Cambodia (all guerrilla commands avoid such hazardous concentrations), nor would there have been a possibility of wiping it out if it had been there (though Cambodian peasants were killed by the bombs).

Predictably, one result was that the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia, seeking to disperse their bases, pushed much deeper into that hapless country and thereby imperiled Sihanouk's neutralist policy.

Within Cambodia itself there followed a coup overthrowing Sihanouk and replacing him with a junta of right-wing generals led by Lon Nol. As far as Shawcross can determine, the U.S. was not directly implicated in this coup, though it must surely have been undertaken with an expectation of U.S. support. That support soon appeared, in the form of military aid the Cambodians were poorly equipped to use, economic material and advice that sharply twisted the fragile economy of the country, and high-powered advisers who saw the whole Cambodian venture as no more than a convenience in behalf of the Vietnam war. In 1970 Cambodia was invaded by large American and South Vietnamese forces, thereby bringing both the destruction and the politics of the Vietnam war to a people who had not asked for it and could not cope with it. The American action was undertaken by presidential fiat, without the approval of Congress that, supposedly, is required for starting a war. In characteristic Nixonian fashion, the matter was disposed of rather simply: start the war but don't declare it.

The invasion, as we now can see, proved to be a military blunder, a political disaster, and a moral outrage. Among its results were:

(1) soon the Vietnamese Communists had taken over large segments of Cambodia;

(2) the Cambodian Communists (Khmer Rouge), until then a tiny ineffective sect, now recruited thousands of young people by proclaiming themselves defenders of the fatherland against foreign spoliation;

(3) the U.S. became entangled with the inept general Lon Nol, who enjoyed less popular support among his people than even his equivalents in Saigon.

Shawcross describes a wrenching moment when even Lon Nol has come to recognize the plight into which he has helped drag his country—realizing that his policy is leading to its virtual destruction. He breaks down weeping before the American representative, General Alexander Haig, though what ministrations this dull militarist offered the Cambodian we do not know. Between April 1970 and August 1973 Cambodia suffered massive bombing raids, including many on heavily populated areas, with more tonnage being dropped than was used on Japan during the whole of World War II. In this "sideshow" millions of people were driven from the countryside to swell the handful of cities; the economy was ravaged; a nation torn to shreds.

> Younger and younger boys [writes Shawcross] were being drafted to fill the ranks of Lon Nol's army. When Australian officers in Vietnam refused to accept one Cambodian unit sent for training because they were only children, an American officer explained: "The little fellas were so anxious to fight that unit commanders didn't have the heart to turn them down."

• To a large extent, the Cambodian action repeated the failures of Vietnam: large-scale sweeps that never swept up guerrillas, massive bombings that did more damage to Cambodian civilians than to Communist troops. But what seems most appalling is that, in justifying the Cambodian adventure by claiming it would help the policy of "Vietnamization" (withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam and allowing the South Vietnamese to do the fighting themselves), there seems to have been no serious consideration, either in political or simply human terms, of the consequences for the people of Cambodia. A sideshow . . .

By 1973, when there were no more U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, the B-52s nevertheless kept bombing Cambodia, not with any discernable military goal but for metapolitical or metastrategic reasons. Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to make a display of our national "strength," our national "will." Or as William Colby, the CIA man, said with admirable candor, Cambodia was now "the only game in town."

At this point, realizing that Lon Nol could not defeat the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield,

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Kissinger apparently decided that Hanoi might be prodded into forcing the Cambodian Communists to negotiate and that we might thereby avoid the complete "loss" of Cambodia. (But when was it given to us to "lose"?) At work here was a simplistic theory of Communism, simplistic not so much because it regarded Communism as evil but because it failed to recognize how deeply national rivalries could cut across claims of ideological solidarity. Kissinger simply did not grasp that there were very strong feelings of hostility between the Hanoi people and the Khmer Rouge, even though both were Communists. Perhaps the one chance to have kept the brutal Khmer Rouge from total power was to recall Sihanouk, then waiting uneasily in Peking. The Chinese seemed to favor this course, the French were secretly negotiating for it. But Kissinger kept refusing to deal with Sihanouk as the U.S. continued the futile, bloody policy of trying to prop up the unproppable Lon Nol. Sihanouk, no fool, predicted that in consequence the Khmer Rouge would take over Cambodia and that the resulting regime would resemble Albania far more than Yugoslavia. He was right.

The rest is common knowledge: a military victory for the Khmer Rouge, their appalling totalitarian regime that seems to have been founded on the belief that *1984* was a prescription rather than a warning. As for the U.S., it fought to the last Cambodian willing to die for Lon Nol. Shortly before the fall of the Cambodian capital, some deadly words were spoken by Um Sim, the Cambodian ambassador to Washington:

> Let's face it. You took advantage of us, of our inexperience. As you are much cleverer than we are, you could induce us into this fighting. . . . If the United States had respected our neutrality then the fighting, the killing and things might not have happened.

• Even in the blood-stained history of Stalinism, this Khmer Rouge was something new. It blended a kind of primitive national rage with a fanatic ideology of total "reconstruction" in which human beings were utterly expendable. Its policy represented an egalitarianism of terror, a wish to reduce everyone to cogs. But even the martyrdom of the Cambodian people at the hands of the Khmer Rouge—who, be it remembered, would never have approached power but for the American invasion—did not put an end to the story. The Hanoi government, soon to distinguish itself by driving hundreds of thousands of people into the sea, declared in the middle of 1978 that the Pol Pot regime (Khmer Rouge) consisted of "the most disgusting murderers in the latter half of this century." Whether this constitutes a slight exaggeration is not for me to say.

The entire Nixon-Kissinger strategy has been incisively criticized by Stanley Hoffman in a few paragraphs meriting reproduction:

> First, we had the wrong hierarchy of ends; we gave priority to the destruction of the sanctuaries over the preservation of Cambodia's fragile neutrality. In other words, our goal *in Cambodia* was to fight the North Vietnamese, not to limit North Vietnamese influence and control—and the goal we selected would have made sense only if disrupting North Vietnamese operations in Cambodia could have made a decisive difference to the outcome in South Vietnam, which it could not and did not.
>
> Secondly, as in Vietnam, we gave ourselves ends that were both unreachable and contradictory. We could not prop up Lon Nol forever just as we could not perpetuate Thieu without staying fully in the war *ad infinitum*. . . .
>
> Thirdly, the means we used toward such ends were, as Shawcross puts it, "not merely disproportionate but counterproductive and destructive of the values they were [supposedly] meant to defend . . . ." Our methodical destruction of Cambodia and the swelling of the cities (once called "force draft urbanization") prepared the ground for the savage execution, by the Pol Pot regime, of the anti-city policy that Khieu Samphan, the future chief of state of that regime, had recommended in his Paris thesis of 1959.

As its necessary domestic correlative, the Cambodian policy required the methods of Watergate. Kissinger, in one of his strange ventures into humor, had once said: "The illegal we do immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer." Many a true word . . .

The entire Nixon-Kissinger strategy had to be undertaken in secrecy, by a sort of para-government consisting of a small clique that half-detested, half-admired Kissinger. There were endless lies, there was a systematic falsification of military records, there was the wiretapping of members of the government suspected of critical thoughts. Within the framework of a democratic

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government, Nixon and Kissinger established a sort of junta acting in violation of both the Constitution and the customary democratic norms.

In all this, the picture that emerges of Kissinger is peculiarly squalid. When William Watts, on the staff of the National Security Agency, told Kissinger that he was resigning because he objected to the Cambodian policy, Kissinger replied: "Your views represent the cowardice of the Eastern Establishment." Watts, writes Shawcross, had been in a state of nervous tension for some time and now impulsively "strode toward Kissinger, who retreated [our hero, no Eastern Establishment coward]—behind his desk."

Or there is this passage from Shawcross:

> One evening the President called to discuss the plans [for the Cambodian invasion]. As usual, Kissinger had one of his staff on the extension to take notes for history. . . . Nixon seemed drunk and said, "Wait a minute—Bebe [Rebozo, Nixon's special pal] has something to say to you." Rebozo came on the line: "The President wants you to know that if this doesn't work, Henry, it's your ass." "Ain't that right, Bebe," slurred Nixon.

A FEW WORDS MORE:

• During the late 1960s and early 1970s some of us opposed to the war tended to play down the effort to "prosecute" the Nixon regime for having acted illegally. We felt it was important to stress the political and moral issues, since, after all, the Supreme Court might rule that the war was not illegal, and surely that would not make the Cambodian invasion any more palatable. That there was a danger in placing too much hope on this legal strategy seems still true. But I now think we were wrong in an important way, for the argument that the Nixon regime was prosecuting an illegal war came to the heart of the issue of what a democratic society is or should be. Our "realism" in depreciating this argument was a mite too shrewd for our own good.

• Seen in long-range historical perspective, as a world struggle between two camps, the conflict between the bourgeois democratic West and the totalitarian Communist nations requires from democrats, be they socialist or not, a clear decision to support the West, no matter with what criticism and qualifications. Yet this overall choice can leave one with agonizing difficulties in particular circumstances. With regard to Cambodia, a victim of the brutalities of both sides, the least (and perhaps the most) that decent people could do was to cry out: *shame, the devil take all of you!*

• Conservative writers, troubled by the upheavals of the late '60s, have written at solemn length about the decline in respect for authority. They see this as a symptom of peril for the survival of democracy. Perhaps; but might they not also consider—say, after scrutinizing the Shawcross book—that the beginning of moral decency in recent years was to show *dis*respect for the authority that engineered the Cambodian invasion?

• We have recently been hearing outcries that the fate of "the boat people" in Southeast Asia, caused by the shameful policies of the Hanoi government, should lead to a reconsideration of our opposition to the Vietnam war. I fail to see why. Only those who in opposing the war also gave support to the Communist regime in Hanoi or favored the Vietcong have any reason for repentance. They might follow the admirable example of Jean Lacouture, the French journalist whose writings on Vietnam were very influential; he has since admitted honestly his mistake in having praised the Vietnamese Communists. But opposition to the war in Vietnam and American involvement never, for us, rested on any delusions regarding the significance of a Communist victory. We opposed the war because we believed, as Stanley Hoffman has written, that "Washington could 'save' the people of South Vietnam and Cambodia from communism only at a cost that made a mockery of the word 'save'. . . ."

Coda

SIHANOUK: "There are only two men responsible for the tragedy in Cambodia today, Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. Lon Nol was nothing without them and the Khmer Rouge nothing without Lon Nol."

NIXON: Cambodia was "my best investment."

KISSINGER, when asked about the 500,000 people killed in Cambodia as a consequence of American intervention: "I may have a lack of imagination, but I fail to see the moral issue involved." □

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William Kornblum

The UAW: Tooling Up for the '80s

As we enter the 1980s it seems certain that working people in the auto towns will suffer the full impact of the latest round of recession and regional depression. With all their press puffery, the auto executives cannot hide the plain facts: they have glutted the domestic market with a product neither the society nor the individual consumer has been able to afford. Chrysler is in deep trouble and GM and Ford admit that their profit futures depend as much on sales in the uncertain international market as on "downsizing the American fleet." With one in six American workers dependent on the auto economy, perilous times are ahead for our banana republic on wheels.

There is also uncertainty about the future leadership of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), consistently the nation's most progressive industrial union. By 1983 almost all of the union's CIO-era leaders will be retired. The union's friends on the democratic left will be saddened by the departure from leadership of UAW President Douglas Frazier, Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey, and Vice-Presidents Irving Bluestone, Ken Bannon, and Martin Gerber. Under their leadership the UAW has compiled a remarkable record in civil rights, income redistribution, Southern organizing, urban affairs, and support for disarmament. Given the recent trends toward electoral conservatism in the U.S. and Western Europe, and the gathering strength of the multinationals, any faltering by the UAW could be a serious blow to the hopes of democratic socialists in North America.

Allies of the corporations fear the "succession crisis" in the autoworkers' union will lead to dissention in the ranks and a decline of authority at the union's top. Writers in *Fortune* and *Business Week* quote corporate executives who fear the end of relative "labor peace" in the vast automotive empires. These articles in the business press are merely topical expressions of a dominant view of organized labor's role in contemporary America. Daniel Bell's analysis of the "encapsulation" of organized labor is perhaps the most sophisticated recent statement of this position.

In his writing on labor in "post-industrial society" Bell argues that the union leaders are structurally bound to corporate managers by a network of legal precedents and bureaucratic procedures. Under collective bargaining, class conflict is constrained; "negotiations have become institutionalized." From this perspective, problems of leadership succession, such as the UAW faces, naturally produce transient tensions and perhaps local disruptions in productivity, but these are not likely to lead to fundamental changes or to result in ideological divisions based on class conflict. In "post-industrial society" the industrial labor force accounts for an ever-declining proportion of the overall labor force. Besides, the economic gains of workers result in blurred class lines in which "managers may be managers by day and swingers by night." Presumably the culture of this emerging society creates its own separate rhythms; the managers swing with children of the working class in cultural institutions that

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develop their own memberships based not so much on class solidarity as on common lifestyles and preferences for music, sports, and sex. In short, in this technocratic and automated postindustrial society, the industrial working class and its political institutions are seen as fighting a rearguard action. Additionally hampered by racial divisions, apathy, and declining influence in public arenas, unions like the UAW have had their brief moment as "architects of the future."

MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE UAW as it enters the 1980s is more optimistic. I too am concerned whether the union's emerging leadership will be inclined to carry forward the UAW traditions of progressive unionism and social activism, but I believe that much of the more extreme criticisms from left and right entirely miss the implications of the struggles the autoworkers and their union are involved in at every level of their 1.4 million-member organization. Bell's arguments with Marx's ghost are particularly troubling in this regard. The declaration that ours is a postindustrial society excuses the continued separation of intellectuals from the political institutions of the working class. It forgives the continued propensity of the press to dismiss evidence of working-class consciousness and political action as mere holdovers from an outdated epoch when labor and capital were true antagonists. In the hands of ideological conservatives the theory of postindustrial society becomes a weapon in the armory of corporate power; it indirectly legitimates the myth that the top corporate executives actually deserve their bloated salaries and bonuses, and it supports the apolitical musings of social scientists who think the only remaining task of the American labor movement is to create more "humane" workplaces.

I side with those who understand that industrial democracy will not emerge either as a by-product of technological change or from the partially articulated yearnings of affinity groups. Only through efforts of working-class leaders ready to lead coalitions of workers, urban poor, and the progressive middle class will we ever see new limitations on the "rights" of private property and the insane calculus of profit. Even the potential power of American collective bargaining, given worker solidarity, has not been nearly tapped.

These and other, more specific issues were on my mind as I undertook a brief pilgrimage to auto country. I arrived in Detroit just as the UAW bargaining committees opened their 1979 contract negotiations with the Big Three auto makers. This was also only a few days before the critical union representation election at the new General Motors plant in Oklahoma City. My goal in Detroit was not to "cover" reactions to what would be a stunning, two-to-one victory for the UAW in Oklahoma, nor was it to obtain exclusive interviews about the course of union bargaining with the Big Three. And even had this been possible to find, "inside dope" on which individual UAW officials are most likely to be sponsored in the coming union elections was only of passing interest. My more modest intention was to listen to autoworkers and their less celebrated leaders discuss what issues they expect their union to face in the coming years.

Detroit on the Balance

YOU WOULD HAVE a difficult time convincing anyone in metropolitan Detroit that ours is a postindustrial society. The auto, tire, and steel plants dominate almost every aspect of life in this city; with layoffs and the fear of unemployment daily in the news, one gets the strong sense that much of the urban progress and eased race relations, which has marked Detroit in the past few years, is threatened. Yet for the moment, despite the oppressive heat of mid-summer, Detroit is calm. In the inner city's parks and other public gathering places, and in all but the poorest neighborhoods, there is a tangible feeling of well-being and even goodwill. But everywhere I also hear worried expressions about the possible meanings of economic downturn.

One of the best places to observe Detroit's climate of class and race relations is on Belle Isle in the Detroit River. This great Olmsted

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park was the scene of bloody racial rioting in 1943, and since the riots and burnings of the late 1960s it has been mainly used by inner-city blacks and a few wealthy business executives or officials who keep their yachts in its marinas. But now white, working-class families are returning to the park. A hot summer Sunday brings them by the hundreds to Belle Isle's magnificent beach, where one swims in cool river water in front of the commercial buildings and industrial plants of downtown Detroit. The casual mixing of black and white fun-seekers, along with the occasional mixed couple, is an encouraging sign. Still, most of the large gatherings are black affairs, with from fifty to a hundred or more members of an extended family gathered for a weekend reunion. One sees the signs announcing these joyful gatherings: "The Coombs Family Picnic by the Band Shell," "The Williams Family Reunion Today," and so on. These picnics are also reminders that Detroit has become another "black metropolis," and that to an important degree its future depends on the energy, confidence, and skills of its black leadership.

Here and there on Belle Isle one sees large picnics organized by other groups like "The Retirees of the Detroit Teachers Union," or "Les Bridgettes"—a large multiracial organization of bridge players. Although autoworker picnics are more likely to be held in suburban locations, in this autoworker city there are invariably a few of them at Belle Isle. On a Sunday walk through the park I stop for a moment at the "Action Group Picnic" and chat with some of the autoworkers and their families there. This is an informal social group of black UAW activists who have been through the previous ten years of militancy and union activism. "We're here to have fun and spend a day in the park," Bobo, a stocky foundry worker from Detroit Forge, tells me. "We've all been through a lot together and it's made us close. The way I see it, we are the union, people like us. And with things like they're starting to go, you never know how much more you're going to need each other. . . ."

I hear the same kind of calm pessimism later the same Sunday afternoon in the Square Deal Tavern, a workers' stopping place in the blue-collar suburb of Ecorse. The Square Deal is near the gates of Midwest Steel's 80-inch rolling mill and next door to the headquarters of UAW Local 2, whose members work at a nearby plant of the Dana Corporation, fabricators of large truck bodies. This Sunday afternoon the bar is packed with steelworkers just off the day shift, but it also has its share of autoworkers from the neighborhood. Down the bar from where I am sitting with a group of autoworkers, the rolling-mill gang is carrying on a joking review of events on that day's turn. Black and white workers appear at ease in the rough teasing. "They roll more steel in this bar than they do in the mill," claims one of my autoworker companions. But when I steer the conversation toward current negotiations in auto, the mood thickens. "Sure it would be great to have a shorter week and things like flex-time," observes a veteran Dana millwright. "But these days the union has to bargain like hell and maybe take a strike just to keep up with the cost of living. These companies don't give anything away without a big fight."

In Hamtramck, the famous Polish-American enclave on Detroit's East Side, the mood is even more gray. Now increasingly the home of working-class black families, Hamtramck is bordered by important Chrysler Corporation plants, including the giant known as Dodge Main. Dodge Main was always a center of autoworker struggle. In the late 1960s it was known for the militancy of its black workers and as the birthplace of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM). Now the Chrysler Corporation has announced that the plant will close after the 1980 "model year." Actually, the phase out has been going on for some years; soon even the remaining 2,000 workers will become sad statistics in the toll that corporate capitalism inflicts on blue-collar towns like Hamtramck. But many of the shopkeepers and middle-class people with whom I speak along Joseph

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Campau Boulevard in Hamtramck feel something will come along to rescue their local economy.

"Besides," as Werner of Werner's Bar explains to me in his empty tavern one afternoon, "these layoffs aren't the terrible thing they used to be. Now they get SUB (Supplemental Unemployment Benefits) and that almost equals their full pay. Since they have less to do with their time, we do plenty of business." I doubt Werner actually believes what he was telling me. He knows there is a world of difference between the effects of closing Dodge Main and the routine layoffs for model changes. Or perhaps he and so many others whose livelihoods depended on the spending of autoworkers will not be able to believe that the plant is closing until it finally shuts down for good. This is a common response in dying industrial towns. After all, for so many years the company assured the good merchants and political brokers of Hamtramck that their community was an ideal location for automobile production. In 1953 a newly appointed president of Chrysler's Dodge Division told the Hamtramck Rotary Club:

> As I drive through the community I can't help but note the small 30-foot lots, but everybody seems to take pride in keeping his small patch of lawn in top shape. Obviously, Hamtramck is made up of solid hard-working citizens—the kind of folks who are the core of a great industrial nation.
>
> These are the same folks who are so important to Dodge, and the entire Chrysler Corporation, too. Out of 36,000 persons employed by Dodge, a large percentage of them are from Hamtramck. The best available figures show that approximately 5,000 residents of Hamtramck are employed by some segment of the Chrysler Corporation. . . . Hamtramck has always provided a reliable labor market, and there seems to be a strong affinity and allegiance between the citizens of Hamtramck and the Chrysler Corporation.

Is there any question who the executives and their Rotarian allies will blame for the shabby look of the yards in front of the narrow frame houses of increasingly black Hamtramck?

IF THE FRUSTRATION the darkened hulk of Dodge Main evokes is strong, imagine what it must be for people like Douglas Frazier, the UAW president, and Mark Stepp, the UAW vice-president for Chrysler bargaining. Their union reputations were won through difficult bargaining with the same Chrysler executives whose cause they must now carry to their congressional allies. A good sense of how UAW officials who deal with the Chrysler situation feel comes from Joe Davis, recent president of Local 3 at Dodge Main. Joe is now in charge of the UAW's political action programs in the Detroit metropolitan area and is clearly a rising young leader:

> At Dodge Main they make the Aspen and Volare, which were going to bring Chrysler out of the red, except cars got smaller and now these are not small cars or fuel-efficient cars. These cars are not moving toward the market they need. Also, Dodge Main is an eight-storied plant. Under present guidelines it's a pink elephant—you don't build plants on multiple levels—it doesn't meet the modern standards. Still, at maximum running we put out 2,000 cars a day or better in 1975 and 1976.
>
> Before my time there were more than 30,000 at Dodge Main. We also had between 1,500 to 1,800 women there, mainly in the sewing room. We did all the sewing for Chrysler before the operation was taken out and put in Detroit Trim in Highland Park. It still is true that almost 90 percent of Chrysler facilities are on the East Side of Detroit, but our beef is that the new facilities they are building are elsewhere. They never made any additions or modernization at the Hamtramck plant. They've shown no concern for the people who did all that production.

Shortly before my arrival in Detroit, thousands of UAW members demonstrated in the streets o Hamtramck to protest Chrysler's closing of Dodge Main. This demonstration was led by Frazier and other top union officials. It high-lighted the union's claim that while federal auto production standards may have contributed to the company's financial

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plight, the chief culprits, in the union's view, are Chrysler's managers. Joe Davis actively supports this position:

> President Frazier is focusing a lot of attention on Dodge Main. Two years ago we had 9,000 there; now we have 2,000 and in less than six months the entire operation will be phased out. So one of the things Frazier is saying is that we are going to have to have legislation in this country that prevents this sort of thing, so people don't just get thrown aside like some rag dolls.
>
> We're losing plants all over the city. Dodge Main is a landmark, but the way it looks there may not be many plants left in the inner city at all. The Mack Avenue Plant, Local 212, has lost half its people; it's down from 6,000 to about 3,000. The Jefferson Avenue plant went from 5,000 to 2,700. Chrysler is just playing checkers with its workers.
>
> When Doug asks that there be a union member on the Chrysler Board, its's really for us to have a sane person to deal with their insane ideas. The Jefferson plant was building the big Chrysler; they moved that to the Lynch Road plant and put vans in. Now they're taking the vans out and putting them back in the truck plant and they'll take the Volare and Horizon production to the Jefferson plant. You know that each of these changes closes the plants for weeks while we re-do the lines. And with everyone else downsizing their cars, Chrysler takes its most potent plant, the Lynch Road facility, and closes it for six months to be able to produce the Chrylser Fifth Avenue, and now they can't get rid of it on the market.
>
> We think that bad management at Chrysler has put us in the fix we're in today. Three years ago Chrysler had 17 percent of the domestic market; now it's down to 11 or 12 percent. At first we were glad to hear that Iacocca was coming to Chrysler because he has a reputation as a go-getter. But the first thing he did was wield a bloody ax at Hamtramck and any other plant he saw as another liability. He says the company has two times more capacity than they need or can sell cars for. But Chrysler has always been the most cautious, pessimistic corporation in the industry and this hasn't changed. The new Omni, for example, is an extremely hot product. The company can't keep up with demand. They bought 300,000 motors for it from Volkswagen, but they should have had at least an option for another 200,000. Their business stupidity has put us in the position we're in today.
>
> This is the only industrial country in the world where plants can move as they see fit. In Canada they need permission, in Germany, too. The government has some say-so—they protect the people. I spoke to some guys from England who were doing an article on the Hamtramck plant. One of them tried to make me feel better. He said that in England they've only had authority over plant movements for 20 years. So here we are only 20 years behind England, and 50 years behind the others. We can build Skylabs and do open-heart surgery; we can put computers in pencils with our technology. But we've lost sight of human needs; we've lost sight of the people.

I hope Joe does a lot of work in the streets as well as the office. And how forthright he is on the issue of racial politics in the plants and in the union's future:

> Sure, ten years ago Dodge Main was the home of DRUM. We had some troubled times. I was never a member, but many of my constituents were and if it hadn't been for the young militant leaders in '67, '68 . . . well, blacks were just not electable before then. I was one of the few stewards, and the militants felt that if you didn't identify totally with them you were an uncle Tom. I resisted this effectively. I personally told Doug Frazier that we couldn't be out-unioned by a rump group; I had to get fired a couple of times and lead walkouts. We just couldn't leave all the discontent to the rump group to exploit. Now Chrylser UAW has had more black presidents than any of the other companies. But when I got to Dodge Main in 1964, in the trim department, there were only 5 black guys on my whole floor out of 500. In fact, blacks weren't allowed in the plant in any significant numbers until around 1959. There had been walkouts in the early '50s because blacks were placed there by management. Dodge Main was an ideal place for the inception of DRUM.
>
> The problems are still there, of course. The assemblers, particularly the young blacks, are blamed. The expectations placed on them by the older white foremen are not based on compassion and the supervisors often can't get the quality of work out of them that they'd like

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because it's still much easier for them to communicate with the middle-class white kids who are there for the summer or for a short time. But there is no serious talk that the problem with Chrysler is due to poor quality. We've been launching new products for the past years and despite this our quality record has been excellent.

As head of the union's South East Michigan Community Action Program, the UAW's political arm in the metropolitan region, Joe Davis is concerned with the affect of recent events in the auto industry on the future of race relations in the communities. I share my perceptions with him that, unlike other Northern cities with large black populations, Detroit's black leadership seems to have more control over events in the city. There is not, for example, the obvious despair of high-rise public-housing ghettos and open drug markets one sees in New York and Chicago and East St. Louis. He agrees but is also quick to point out the obvious problems that remain:

We've still got a disproportionate number of HUD foreclosures. We've got to make more dollars available for out-neighborhood services agencies. The pride of home ownership is not something a guy wakes up with; it takes time to instill this. We still have terrible problems with red-lining and with discrimination in insurance. But there's no question that things are starting to turn for the better. We have an effective black mayor, a black police chief, and good community control over the police force. Now white families are starting to see this and are beginning to move back into the city.

We are seeing whites move into communities that were all black after the riots. This is happening in Northwest Detroit and other areas. In the Schaefer Puritan area whites are moving back in. In the Russell Woods area there hadn't been a new white family in years; now they are moving in. Blacks and whites can't live in two separate worlds. The white suburbanite can't have concern for Detroit if he thinks it's a jungle only black people can live in.

The future commitment of the UAW? Well, that will not happen in the natural flow of things. *The commitment will have to be sought after.* I don't think blacks can afford to wait around till someone with liberal ideas bubbles to the surface. We are going to have to be vocal and let blacks in the plants know that the progressive issues are to be fought for. I think the loss of Frazier and Bluestone will cause problems, but we can't just wait till a Reuther comes around. We're going to have to take an active role. With the corporations scattering to the four corners of the country it could be a disaster for us.

I hope the UAW never becomes an organization that muffles the voice of dissent. I am sure that if this union turned too far to the right, black people would never lie down and take what they did in the past. President Frazier has said that one of his largest tasks is to see to it that the union goes through the transition in a way that recognized the UAW was built by whites and by blacks.

CONTRARY to what one reads in *Fortune* and other business organs about the inexperience of the UAW's potential new leaders, or of the presumed gulf between its middle-level staff and the ranks, I found or heard about any number of young men and women who like Joe Davis promise the union a solid future. There is plenty of evidence, and not only in Detroit, that these young activists are continuing to push the union in progressive directions. In Missouri UAW personnel were leaders in the bitter 1978 fight against right to work legislation. In Cleveland the UAW gave its full support to the fight against corporate takeover of the publicly owned power company. At Solidarity House, Gary Brynner, the bright and capable former president of the militant Lordstown, Ohio, local, serves on Frazier's staff; and in Lansing, Michigan, Joe Finkbeiner, an active democratic socialist, is president of the huge Oldsmobile local. But there are also many important segments of the UAW domain where the leadership seems more involved in the routine activities of day-to-day unionism and less capable of forming a coherent picture of its direction in the 1980s. One such place is Flint, Michigan, the birthplace of General Motors and home to some 65,000 active and 20,000 retired autoworkers.

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Flint: The Dream Delivered?

THIS DAY THE HEADQUARTERS of the Flint's Buick UAW Local 599 is crowded with hundreds of retirees who have come for their monthly chapter meeting. Outside the spacious hall is a temporary waiting room for city and state politicians anxious to make an appearance before the retired autoworkers. Joe Conroy, state legislator from Flint, explains to me that without the continued support of retired and active autoworkers it would not be possible to be elected in this town. "You've got to stay in constant touch with them. Now the main thing they want to know is what you're doing to help them with inflation."

This 16,500-member local is the second largest in the UAW. In the immense two-and-a-half square-mile Buick complex, only blocks from the Local 599 hall, workers assemble most of the Buick cars made in America. This summer many of the assembly lines are down either for model changes or because of slack demand for the energy-inefficient Buicks. In the offices of the union officials and shop committeemen the phones never stop ringing with questions from autoworkers on layoff. They have questions about their SUB benefits, their insurance, their vacation pay, their hospitalization. . . . These benefit plans are won in national negotiations, but in big locals like 599 so many problems arise with delivery of benefits to individual members that at times it's hard to distinguish the elected union officials from insurance agents. In a plant the size of Flint Buick, the complexity of local issues and the pressures of day-to-day labor management relations may indeed blur the lines between manager and labor leader. For instance, in an article that appeared in a recent *Headlight*, Local 599's paper, the president of the local writes about the energy problem quite as if the only need is to get more gasoline, regardless of the social costs involved, and without much sense of the role that the big corporations have played in creating the problem. But in another article inserted in *Headlight* by the paper's young editor, Doug Frazier explains why UAW members will soon stage a brief work stoppage and "write in" on energy:

> Exxon and Gulf and Mobile didn't put that oil in the ground in the first place; about 16% of the oil drilled in the U.S. is on public land that belongs to the American people. We need to establish a federal corporation to start producing it. . . . At the root of our inflation problem is the fact that corporations have too much power and people too little.

This position is supported in another article by Local 599's recording secretary, John Lukes. He attacks a *Flint Journal* editorial that accuses Frazier of "indulging in demagoguery with his plan to have workers 'stop the line and drop a line.'" The recording secretary writes that "they [*Flint Journal*] read their GM bosses' right and so now it's a waste of energy (get that) to send Washington a message to get off their dead fannies."

If there are important differences in how Buick's labor leaders approach issues that the UAW's top leadership is pressing, it is also true that most seem to be overwhelmed by GM's power to give jobs and to take them away. I think these comments from Bond French, vice-president of 599, convey a sense of this condition:

> This year we were the first GM local to settle our local agreement. We had some issues about seniority and transfer rights. We felt that if we could clear them up fast we'd get back to work quickly. This year it looks like the target will be GM. People around here get awfully anxious when there is a strike and so we're even more swamped with phone calls.
>
> This energy situation also causes us plenty of worry, but what we got into—and it's one reason why we didn't have as many layoffs as we might have—is that we build a great many important component parts, especially for the new X car GM is developing. We've also lost about 1,600 people from our foundry. By 1981 that foundry operation will be closed. In August we have a meeting with Mr. McPherson of GM. We're hoping for extra work and we think that our early settlement will help us with that. It's not that we're giving anything away. But we've had so many strikes in the past—now we've decided to do it another way. And the 1978

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Quality of Work Life page in the agreement led us to a series of meetings with management, to restore trust.

In the Local's Shop Committee Department, elected shop stewards handle the grievances of units of about 250 workers. Above them are district committeemen who are responsible for resolving conflicts in production units as large as 3,000 persons. I speak with Rudy Cardwell, chief of all committeemen. Cardwell is the highest elected black official in this plant. There are about 4,000 black workers at Buick. From the time he was first elected shop committeeman it has taken Cardwell about 14 years to achieve his strategic position in the local's leadership. He does admit that racial issues surface from time to time, but he attributes his success to skill in union work, not racial politics. In the same key as 599 other officials he is interested in talking to me about his administration's view of relations with local GM management:

Discipline problems are at a minimum and drugs are not a big issue. What we are trying to do is make the work better for our members instead of treating them like robots. We want them to use their brains so they can help improve the quality of the product. This improves security for all of us. And in a few cases just recently our people have done a fine job on this. We had problems with inflating tires and a few guys have come up with a system that greatly lessened the amount of repairs needed.

There are some in the plant who say management and the union are in bed together but I don't agree. I think employees should have some say-so. They should be part of that operation. So now they're better informed about scheduling and some new jobs are coming in. We really have been in good shape, are absorbing people from other plants, and we think our membership appreciates it.

As far as the future goes, I think the UAW has qualified personnel to handle all types of negotiations and I don't think any of 'em are radical. Right here you're looking at the local that pioneered in early retirement. This year we got together with other GM locals and made cost-of-living increases for retirees our top demand. We influenced the union executive board to make that demand their top priority.

These expressions of a desire to maintain good relations with management are hardly surprising. They come from men whose years of human relations work in the factories convince them that the adversary relationship built into collective agreements is sometimes an artificial barrier to the realization of larger, community interests. In essence they say, "Let the union bargain with GM at the national level for wage gains, cost-of-living increases for our retirees, and earlier retirement rights, so our older members can leave the plants sooner and our kids can get work. We can run our other affairs with management here in Flint to make the workplace more tolerable and to keep our jobs here." And in what I think is another version of the same position, Morris Janowitz, the pragmatic liberal sociologist at the University of Chicago, advises me to "write about why even a progressive union like the UAW has been so reluctant to press for some form of codetermination in the auto plants."

AS BLUE-COLLAR TOWNS GO, Flint is extremely well-to-do. There are no blighted and dying commercial neighborhoods such as one finds in most of America's auto, steel, and mining towns. There are excellent recreation and educational facilities, and with their increasing leisure time the workers delight in driving their big cars out into the fishing and hunting grounds of Northern Michigan. Flint's population is now about 40 percent black. It might seem—as much for these newer arrivals to the town as for the more suburbanized white population—that what is good for GM is good for the families of Flint. The black retirees rock comfortably on the front porches of their modest private homes just as their white union brothers and sisters do on theirs. Memories of the Klan marches and the tense open-occupancy demonstrations of the 1960s are dim. A white incumbent mayor and a popular black politician are competing in the Democratic primary, but few blacks or whites view the contest in racial terms. The UAW is recognized as the single most potent political power in the community, as GM is its economic force. So why not

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encourage extensions of this "community interest" between GM and the Flint autoworkers into the daily relations of plant production?

One answer is that despite superficial appearances, Flint's class divisions remain firm. The GM executives generally do not live in the town. Their residential community is located in Grand Blanc, an affluent suburb outside Flint city limits. And their commitment even to that community is minimal. "They hope to do their stint here," one local journalist tells me, "and then get promoted elsewhere in the GM system." Any blending of the classes that postindustrial futurologists suppose exists in America is almost impossible to find in Flint. Children of the auto executives, who play tennis and golf at the posh Warwick Hills Country Club, often refer to the young autoworkers who gather at the Camaro Lounge on Flint's East Side or at Bill's Still on South Saginaw as "shop rats." Similar expressions can be heard from young autoworkers. "If a supervisor has a kid who's too dumb for college," more than one autoworker claimed, "they send them here in town to the General Motors Institute to become foremen." These rather benign expressions of class conflict are heightened in bad times. With plant closings, the sense of community is effaced.

Industrial democracy in auto will never develop from local initiative, because plant conditions rarely allow such cooperation for very long, and power invariably remains a management monopoly. Local officials who adopt a conciliatory stance toward management will soon find themselves vulnerable to challenge from more militant aspiring leaders. Thus I was sure that the expressions of goodwill and cooperation that I heard at the Buick local would not be echoed uniformly in other Flint GM plants. Marge Van Kirk, a veteran production worker who is now the recording secretary at GM's large AC Spark Plug and Parts Plant in Flint, immediately confirmed my opinion:

> It's true that most of our concerns are with the national level demands—raises and benefits, you know—but we have issues here too, in the plant. We're up to 10,000 in the plant now and we have been for the past few years.
>
> About 50 percent of our members are women. And this is a family place. Three of my kids work here, including my daughter who is an apprentice toolmaker. Women weren't allowed in the skilled trades years ago. We'd be stuck on the production lines watching the men working as stock pullers or inspectors, or in the skilled trades. Now you should see how far we've come thanks to affirmative action.
>
> GM in Flint is all there, is where a person can make a decent living and have something to live on in retirement. My dad sat in at Fisher I for 45 days, but that sense of closeness and struggle was bound to change as we got bigger. Recently our local elections haven't drawn as much interest as they used to. But now the younger ones are much more dissatisfied. They're going to get active. Of course, they don't always know what to get active about. Take our SUB benefits, for example; sure it's a good deal, but some of them raise heck if they don't get laid off, and don't get the benefits. . . .
>
> Our big problems, though, are with management. They just don't respect the rights of workers. Now we have a serious local issue because some of these plant nurses think they're God and a lot of our people want the supervisor of the medical department fired. We're not in any hurry to settle our local contract because of these problems. Our people think most of the supervisors spend most of their time going out to lunch with the vendors. If our people took their sweet time going out on lunch the way some of these general foremen do there'd be hell to pay.

Marge Van Kirk was not aware of it, but almost as she was speaking to me about the excessive privileges taken by management in her plant, Irving Bluestone, in Detroit, was claiming that "The corporation doesn't trust workers to come to work when they're supposed to. We think if workers are trusted to do the right thing," he asserted, "they'll do it. If you treat people like adults, you'll find people react differently." The UAW Vice-President's remarks explain a bargaining demand that GM drop the standard requirement of American industry that employees must work the day before and the day after a

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holiday in order to collect premium pay. The irony here is that the expense of Flint GM workers' demands for cost-of-living escalators on pensions is likely to force the loss of this and other important workers' rights issues at the GM bargaining table. Workers' pleas for protection of their dignity and their rights on the shop floor (the substance of industrial democracy) rarely generate as much solidarity as demands for material benefits. This will be a constraining legacy for any UAW leader in the 1980s and beyond.

Up Front and Still Climbing

JOURNALISTS' TALK of a "succession crisis" in the UAW is at least premature; most likely it is entirely misplaced. Granted, the motives and actions of the union's leadership in Solidarity House are crucial. This point is rapidly made clear in such provincial auto towns as Flint. But few of the thoughtful union activists with whom I spoke were worried by the pessimistic, "top down" assessments of their union's future. "I have no idea who the new executive officers will be," Marge Van Kirk told me, "But I have a lot of faith that our union will put in the kind of people who've always made it the greatest." If this comment sounds politically naive, it should be remembered that it comes from a local union leader who must run for office in her large plant every three years. In this union of some 1.4 million members, who labor not only in auto plants but in almost every conceivable work-setting throughout North America, there are cherished traditions of democratic competition, political debate, and worker education. Behind the alarms of the moment, the succession question, or the Chrysler salvage operation, deeper issues are being resolved by the fitful logic of this living institution.

The Chrysler situation once again raises the basic issue of how far the union can go toward cooperation with management without sacrificing the interests of its members. As soon as Chrysler announced its need for a $1 billion federal infusion, Doug Frazier was ready with a subtle demand from the union's side. The UAW would support a major federal role in the Chrysler salvage, in order to protect its members' jobs—but the corporation should be required to place a number of citizens, including UAW members, on the company's board of directors. The corporation almost immediately countered this move with a demand that the UAW forgo raises in the coming contract. The UAW's Chrysler negotiating committee, at an August 1979 emergency meeting in Chicago, rejected this demand pending the settlement of contract talks with GM and Ford, but it did suggest that special sacrifices by Chrysler workers might be required. In the meantime, the Carter administration hastily offered to seek almost half of the needed capital. GM and other domestic investors were quick to offer immediate cash in return for safe Chrysler receivables.

In the heat of the corporate and government negotiations, the significance of the UAW's original demand may have been lost. Just as the Reuthers' 1949 pamphlet, *A Small Car Named Desire*, began the union's long struggle to get the companies and the government to support small-car production, so may Frazier's demand for representation on the Chrysler board have begun a new chapter in the union's approach to industrial democracy. It is unlikely that the Chrysler Corporation will give in to this demand, especially with GM offering cash to forestall the exercise of government and union leverage. But the fact that the demand was seriously made is evidence that the UAW is moving away from its historic reluctance to seek power over corporate management and planning.

The recent victory for the UAW at the GM assembly plant in Oklahoma City is another important example of the union's vitality as a living institution. No matter which leaders assume top-level union posts, plant organizing in the South will continue to be a major priority. Each year in the last decade the union has conducted an average of about 330 plant-level organizing drives in the South and elsewhere—and it wins from 55 to 60 percent of these elections. This is an excellent record, but it shows how difficult is the course of basic

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union organizing. And such representational election victories as the one in Oklahoma City are only the beginning of unionism for the workers there.

It may take years of education and further organizing before the traditions of democratic unionism are accepted as part of the local blue-collar culture. Here, too, the UAW has a formidable record of past achievement and present practice. The union's major publications, *Solidarity* and *Ammo*, are two of the nation's best sources for information about corporate irresponsibility, industrial pollution, energy policy, and plant closings. The union's extensive educational programs, including seminars for UAW members and their families at the Black Lake, Michigan, retreat and regional seminars for rank-and-file leaders, are models for combining substance and open debate. Materials for these sessions stress background for the union's goals at the bargaining table and in civil politics. In characteristic UAW fashion, discussion leaders are told, "Remember, we don't have all the answers. You must stimulate debate and discussion."

As the union enters the 1980s these traditions of aggressive plant organizing, class conscious publishing, and open debate will very likely continue in the ways that have been established for the previous generation. Alliances with nonlabor groups may prosper or falter, the union's power in Washington decline, or grow rapidly, and recession and regional depression in the auto industry may result in short-term curtailment of the union's broad social goals. But despite these pitfalls and momentary setbacks, the UAW's preeminence among the nation's industrial unions seems secure for at least the 1980s. □

Q&A ON OIL PRICES

Q. I'm paying nearly a dollar a gallon for gas—when I can get it. And the lines are getting longer. Why?

A. Three main reasons: U.S. refineries cut back their production this spring, causing "shortages," in order to pressure Congress into deregulating oil prices. Second, big oil firms raised their profits and prices, with the government charging many of them with violating price controls on old oil. Finally, there was widespread overcharging by gas stations. The average gas retailer, who made 6.7¢ per gallon sold in 1977 now gets about 10.8¢ per gallon.

Q. Will things get worse?

A. Under President Carter's oil-deregulation plan, yes. Gasoline prices will rise sharply—perhaps 12 to 20 cents a gallon—along with anything else made from petroleum.

Q. Will decontrol mean more U.S.-produced oil?

A. Not substantially. Production might go up, but no more than 2.5%. Decontrol, despite what the oil companies say, offers little incentive for exploration, because it primarily affects "old" oil, discovered before 1974.

Q. Well, won't oil companies use their higher profits under decontrol to look for "new" oil?

A. They've already been exploring—without any incentive. In fact, exploration budgets were higher in 1977 than in 1972 and Big Oil still had enough profits left over to buy up Montgomery Ward's, the London Observer, Anaconda Copper Co., the Container Corp. of America, and other non-energy companies. With this record it's clear Big Oil doesn't need higher profits for exploration costs—although that's what they want you to believe.

Q. Just how much does it cost to produce oil here?

A. According to the Citizens/Labor Energy Coalition, production costs for domestic oil in 1978 were $1.83 a barrel. But the average price was pegged at $8.94 a barrel. Under decontrol, most domestic oil would rise to $18 a barrel or more by 1981, a price comparable to OPEC prices.

Q. It sounds to me like we need to fight back against Big Oil. What can we do?

A. Across the country, UAW members have been organizing coalitions with other unions and community groups to lobby and demonstrate against decontrol and for government limits on oil prices. The UAW and the Progressive Alliance also have been sounding a call for creation of a national publicly-owned energy corporation.

Q. What would such a corporation do?

A. It could explore for oil on public lands, refine it, and market it. Because it would be owned by the public, there'd be no private shareholders demanding high profits, and prices could be kept down. That would stimulate competition with Big Oil and, perhaps, bring down their prices. As UAW Vice-President Irving Bluestone recently said, at a rally against high energy prices:

"Oil is in the earth to benefit the many, not to profit the very few. It's time for the government to begin drilling and refining the oil on public lands, to provide the competition to the private profiteers that will put a stop to their plundering the pocketbooks of the people."

Q. Anything else?

A. We've also got to re-think our long-range energy policy. In 1977, the U.S. used 1,850 billion metric tons of oil compared to 1,280 billion metric tons in all of Europe, which has 50% more population. Our dependence on oil has to begin to give way to other energy sources—solar, wind, coal. America needs a massive drive to explore such alternatives. □

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Michael Walzer

The Pastoral Retreat of the New Left

What has happened to the young men and women of the New Left? The movement is invisible these days, a specter regularly invoked only in neoconservative writings. Where have all the "kids" gone? Many of them are simply burnt out, exhausted (long ago) by sectarian infighting, corrupted by the revolutionary visions, lost in the ruble of the counter-culture. It is an old American story. The flames of the political left don't burn steadily in this country. They flare up; the young are consumed. And all that remains, afterward, are the ashes of political withdrawal, cultic and sectarian conversions, and personal opportunism.

But that's not the whole story. Apocalypse never is the whole story. Even in capitalist America, there are ways of growing up on the left; there is interesting work to do. In the universities, for example, where the New Left began: today old New Leftists constitute a significant intellectual current among younger faculty members (with little influence, ironically, among undergraduates). Many of them are trapped by the academic depression. Some of them are trapped too, at least for the moment, by the rather scholastic Marxism, Francophile or Germanic, which they first discovered in their flight from the Leninist orthodoxy of 1969 and 1970. But theirs is a serious intellectual discipline; they are not burnt out or mad in the streets; and one has only to read their articles to realize that they stand at a great distance from the politics of instant satisfaction. I am often amazed by the strength of their professional commitments. This is a form of adaptation and survival, however, available only to a small number of activists in a movement that wasn't by any means scholarly or intellectual in character.

There is a second pattern of survival that is more important, I think, and more revealing of contemporary American life. A large number of the activists of a decade ago have found their way back into politics, or at least into a subpolitics of small-scale worker and consumer organizing. They have moved from *revolution now*! to good works, and this movement is also a return, though everything is different now, to some of the original projects of the New Left.

Across the country there exists today an extraordinary network of schools, day-care centers, food cooperatives, tenants' unions, consumer organizations, neighborhood alliances, locally run newspapers, union organizing committees (aimed mostly at service and clerical workers), women's groups, and so on. Devoted to the politics of everyday life, locally organized, many of these groups are financed with government, foundation, or church money; they employ VISTA volunteers; they have trade-union connections; they run successful campaigns; they have achieved, as the *New York Times* recently reported, "a major realignment of urban political forces." Taken together, the local groups represent a new kind of interest or pressure politics, or a radical extension of the old kind, and some of them are already incorporated into the institutional structures of the welfare state. Nevertheless, their leaders, their staffs, their organizers-in-the-field are recruited, to a significant degree, from among the radicals of a decade ago,

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many of them from the once-terrible SDS. They know one another, keep in touch, and are guided by an ideology that has a familiar ring to anyone old enought to remember the *early* 1960s. This is the New Left in pastoral retreat.

They are, as they ought to be, a chastened group. Locked into small and mostly precarious organizations, they have learned the art of making do, and they have acquired a sense of limits. Certainly, their current activities fail to realize what seemed to be the major opportunities of the '60s. Except for some union work, the new organizers don't reach into the black community at all. And theirs is not, by any means, a "poor people's movement." They have not done very well among welfare recipients, tenants of public housing projects, unemployed men and women. The groups they are able to form and sustain mostly involve (relatively small numbers of) better-off workers and members of the lower-to-middle middle class. And the politics of these groups is clearly reformist; the neighborhood alliances often take on a kind of "community uplift" character. Self-help against crime, the defense of old residential areas, improvement of local services, beautification: these are their goals, to which the organizers too must stand committed. In their late twenties or early thirties now, these middle-class militants have found a place for themselves closer to home than some of the places they experimented with in the early days of SDS community organizing.

They are not *narodniks* anymore, and yet the impulse is the same: to begin locally, to work in neighborhoods. And so, by and large, are the issues with which they deal. Overwhelmingly, they are concerned with consumption: housing, utilities, recreation, safety, taxes—far more than with wages, working conditions, or work itself (though the forms of their politics easily reach to questions of safety at work or discrimination in hiring).

Their values are the same too. The organizing strategies taught in schools like the Midwest Academy, the principles formally endorsed or informally defended by groups like Massachusetts Fair Share and Arkansas' ACORN are still those of participatory democracy and anticapitalism (the latter blurred these days into a kind of populist anticorporatism). The organizers are not interested in building constituencies of passive members; they still hope to teach the men and women they organize the skills necessary for a politics of self-assertion and the knowledge necessary for a radical understanding of social structure. This is their version—it is a Protestant version—of the cure of souls. They dream of a priesthood of all believers; they are committed, still, to the abolition of their own ministerial roles. And yet the modern welfare state, like organized religion, seems to require that people be ministered to—represented, defended—in the face of state and corporate power. The ministry of the left is made necessary by the administration of the welfare system. I want to try to explain why that is so and how the roles into which these old/new activists have fallen are both very important and very constraining.

II

The peculiar difficulties of participatory democracy as an organizing strategy were much discussed in the '60s and are well known today, certainly to contemporary organizers. Their own commitment is made in the teeth of their knowledge, with considerable sophistication, and they meet the difficulties, I think, with more grace and less hypocrisy than their predecessors. I remember attending a meeting of the Newark Community Union with an SDS organizer in the mid-'60s. "Local people" presided; the organizer, resolutely self-effacing, placed himself in the back row; and the participants had to sit sideways on their chairs so that they could make sure of the reactions and opinions of the real chairman of the meeting. No doubt, the problems are the same today. Fewer local people come forward than the organizers hope for; few of them are

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willing to take on leadership positions; the leadership they provide is hesitant and uncertain; the organizers can't go away.

Insofar as local people learn organizational skills and come to understand the uses of militancy (and there has been a lot of learning in the last decade), other sorts of problems arise. Members take a firmer hold, insist on a voice in shaping policy, and reveal in their political positions some of the immediate effects of inequality and its accompanying resentments. Some of the new consumer groups, for example, were steered away from Proposition 13 politics only by the most energetic interventions of their (leftist) staffs. There is, then, a certain tension between political education and participatory democracy. But the day-to-day difficulties of organizing have more to do with time and competence than with policy. This kind of politics, like every other, is a routine; its success depends upon one small victory after another—getting a new playground, forcing acceptance of an affirmative action program, stopping a hike in utility rates, winning an NLRB election in a hospital or office. These victories require professional and semiprofessional skills, and it is my sense, though I have only watched them from a distance, that contemporary organizers are, mostly, willing to display these skills and to reap the organizational benefits that go with them.

Hence they drift, inexorably though always reluctantly, toward a kind of advocacy politics. They are more likely to identify and represent a constituency than to mobilize its members for active struggle. Or, they mobilize a relatively small group of men and women who then provide them with a kind of warrant to act on behalf of similar people in a particular neighborhood or city. And action on behalf of others, once revolutionary adventures have been foresworn, imposes a new pattern of political work. The organizers aspire to be representatives of the unrepresented, but they are also, inevitably, bureaucrats without offices. Though their political line is populist in character, focused on landlords, utility companies, and corporations, their practical activity quickly brings them into a complex adversarial relationship with public officials. Swinging freely at capitalism, they find themselves in a clinch with the welfare state.

What happens is simple enough. Social conflict in the U.S. today has few direct forms. Everywhere, it is mediated by the state. Municipal housing codes, rent control, affirmative action, NLRB regulations: all these shape the course of particular struggles, and they shape it in ways that make advocacy and legal representation as important or more important than political mobilization. Anyone trying to work with tenants, for example, quickly finds himself entangled in the rules that govern the repairs that landlords have to make and the rent that tenants can withhold. The rules are complex, and they require interpretation. Soon the organizer is negotiating with city officials; soon he has to bring in lawyers. It will sometimes be useful to organize a demonstration at a city council meeting. Equally often, it will be useful to go to court. And a single tenant withholding rent makes as good a court case as a thousand tenants withholding rent. Once the negotiations and the litigations begin, there is little, in any case, that the tenants can do for themselves. A few of them, like prison lawyers, become experts on the housing code. The rest sit and wait, while the organizers and the lawyers do their work. The longed-for confrontation between a citywide tenants' union and the big holding company that owns hundreds of apartment buildings never takes place.

This is a reiterated pattern. Even in union organizing, where constituencies are clearly marked out and it is necessary ultimately to win a majority vote, the day-to-day activity of the organizers, and of their opponents too, is closely regulated, and crucial decisions are made by courts, commissions, and appeal boards. If old New Leftists turn up in law school, this is not necessarily because they are planning to sell out (at a high price), but because everywhere they turn politically, there is lawyer's work to do.

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III

It is one of the purposes of the welfare state to transform struggles over group interests into litigation over individual entitlements. The transformation has worked fairly well in the past, in part because individual members of groups unable to defend their interests have also been unable to claim their entitlements. This is true both of groups without social or economic strength, like tenants or hospital workers or secretaries, and also of groups without clear socioeconomic identities, like people driving a particular make of car or living along the banks of a polluted river or working in the service sector of the economy. The pressure on the welfare state today, about which conservatives complain so much, doesn't derive from any significant rise in the level of entitlement but rather from an increase in the range of men and women claiming what they are already entitled to. The organizers I have been describing, along with the lawyers who join in their work, are *agents of entitlement*, acting on behalf of the members of powerless or dispersed social groups.

I have called their relation to government officials adversarial; it is not in any simple sense oppositionist. They represent claims to which public officials are not yet responsive, but to which they are, in principle at least, committed to respond. And, after all, welfare bureaucrats do have an interest in the expansion and elaboration of the welfare system. So the organizers outside the government are likely to find collaborators inside. They win victories as often by negotiation as by political or legal confrontation: small victories, to be sure, and often after a long and entangled bargaining process in which they are unable to involve the local people they have organized. The victory, when and if it comes, doesn't look much different from any other welfare benefit, delivered by authority.

At some point, it is hardly necessary to organize at all. One only needs legal standing or the political skills necessary to make city councils, regulatory commissions, and congressional committees listen. Then organizing as an activity passes over into pure advocacy, like the work of the Nader groups: cooperating with some officials, fighting with others, seeking general publicity (rather than speaking to a particular constituency), going to court.

At the local level—and always in union work—organizing and advocacy go together. There is even some room for direct action, as in the sit-ins at nuclear plant sites organized by groups like the Clamshell Alliance of New England. Indeed, the politics of the anti-nuclear movement, and of the environmentalists more generally, comes closest to recapitulating the style and ideology of the early New Left (and of the early civil rights movement). But even these groups, whose members defend the proposition that small is beautiful, regularly appeal to the state to assert and enlarge its powers. They want state officials, for example, to impose safety standards on corporate and entrepreneurial activities. And while the stringency of the standards is still the subject of political debate, few people would deny that officials should do that—for the sake of all of us, who are hardly able to do it for ourselves. When activists act on behalf of the unorganized and the unorganizable, they are always, explicitly or implicitly, asking the authorities to do the same thing.

It is often said, however, that when the authorities agree, they turn the men and women for whom they act into helpless dependents—eternally posed, in contemporary right-wing literature, with their hands out. If there is any truth to that view it's only a partial truth (to which I'll return later on). The scale of corporate institutions and activities also imposes dependency, and of a more drastic sort, because the corporation is not even potentially subject, as the state is, to the control of its dependents. So people organize to resist its power, and the welfare state is created to mediate the struggle. The mediation is incomplete. It works well for the well-organized, especially for highly cohesive national constituencies. For the unorganized and the unorganizable, and commonly at

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local levels of government, it hardly works at all. But in principle, at least, it can be made to work. The state is accessible in ways the corporation is not. There are political entry points, even for individuals and groups who cannot bring economic power effectively to bear. Hence the role of organizers and advocates. They insist upon the full meaning and the serious enforcement of the welfare and regulatory codes. Their "historical task"—it's not quite what their ideology tells them—is to expand the reach of the welfare state, to make the state effective at the local level, in detail, and for everyone.

They work within the system—these alienated, embittered, "radicalized" militants of the '60s—because there is no other place to work. And the system is constraining. Victories are possible, but these are always, as I have said, small victories, and the work is demanding, difficult, frustrating. Moreover, it is not obvious that the victories add up. Local organizing doesn't lead in any clear way toward socialism—no more than union organizing did in the '30s (though the prospect seemed brighter then). Organizing and advocacy in the contemporary welfare state create clients, first of all for the organizers and the advocates, and then for the state; they don't create self-determining men and women. This is the truth behind the conservative critique of welfare and regulation. But there is an easy response: clients are at least men and women for whom someone speaks. The greater danger today is not to be spoken for.

IV

Among the old/new activists, there exists a certain view of their work that incorporates, or might incorporate, much of my own argument. They talk about "base-building" or "softening the turf"—for they are literally in retreat, waiting for some new upsurge of leftist activity, a national movement to which they might deliver their clients and constituents. All that they can do right now, they say, is to break down existing barriers to radical argument and political identification among the great American majority: white workers, government and corporate clerks, young professionals, women. They need to win the small victories; they don't expect to win big ones. Indeed, some of them probably share the neoconservative view that the big victories are impossible. The politics of entitlement "overloads" the welfare system, and the system simply cannot deliver the benefits its rules and regulations promise, not if these are widely demanded. Hence at some point the demands will be blocked. Then it will be the task of the organizers to explain the nature of the blockage.

I am unsure that this view is right—or that it will be seriously tested in the near future—for the American welfare state, for all its immediate problems, still seems to be a highly expandable system. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing view. Imagine a world where tenants successfully insist upon the minimal safety and amenity standards required by contemporary housing codes, where service workers of all sorts organize and defend their interests as effectively as teamsters and steelworkers, where women must be paid as well as men, where high safety standards are imposed on car manufacturers and power companies, where neighborhood alliances demand and receive equal services and equal protection—in short, where people get what they are "entitled" to: Is it possible? What would it cost? And who would pay?

To deny that it is possible is to suggest that the contemporary welfare state requires a large underclass, not only or most importantly of poor people, but more generally of unorganized, passive, and inarticulate people. Perhaps this is so. It may even be the case that no alternative (socialist) state could actually give people everything they are entitled to. So long as entitlement is understood in terms of the receipt of benefits, it has inherent limits—which are, at the outside, more or less similar whatever political arrangements are established. The "outside" is, to be sure, far away. Welfare politics remains the most important politics today, and no serious activism can avoid the patterns it imposes: advocacy and

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administration, individual entitlements, and bureaucratic interventions.

BUT IT IS NECESSARY, at the same time, to think about something very different. The good society will not be a republic of clients whose relation to the *res publica*, the public thing, is simply that they appropriate its resources under fair distributive principles. Nor would it be a satisfactory outcome of contemporary struggles if the welfare state were left, at the end, as the only effective political organization or as the universal mediator of social conflict. It won't be satisfactory because such a state would indeed be "overloaded," and because its beneficiaries are not likely to sustain for long the parts of democratic citizens. Somehow, the shift from organizing to advocacy has to be reversed, so that cohesive groups take shape, whose members are not only consumers of benefits but active participants, capable of mutual assistance and even of mutual restraint. I am not sure how that reversal might be effected, but it is important that there be people at work not only at the center of the welfare state but also, so to speak, in the parishes. We should be sympathetic, then, to the pastoral retreat of the New Left. It represents both a surrender of millenarian politics and a stubborn recommitment to the Good Old Cause.*

*In writing this brief essay, I have benefited a great deal from conversations with various organizers, new and "old," and most particularly from the work of a group of students involved in community organizing, two of whom have written the critical response that follows. □

Susan Eaton and Karen Scharff

Organizing at the Grass Roots

The grass-roots organizing of the 1970s is an ambitious and at least partially successful effort to bring working-class women and men into the political arena as organized, self-conscious actors. The organizations that provide structure and direction to this "movement" are indeed somewhat precarious, often staff-dominated, and highly dependent on immediate victories. As Michael Walzer points out, the structure of the American welfare state pushes them toward traditional interest-group roles. Welfare bureaucrats are both familiar and comfortable with interest-group demands; they, like Walzer, see community and labor organizations as small collectivities asking only their "due" from the system."

As young people recently trained as organizers by "old New Leftists," we have a somewhat different view of the nature and potential of the current organizing. Our lack of connection to earlier protest movements and our first-hand experience with several organizations have led us to evaluate the groups' successes and failures in achieving their own goals. From inside the organizations, we saw clearly the extent of mobilization that does occur and the significant changes in self-perception that people experience as a result of winning small, reformist victories. It seems significant to us that neither organizers nor members view the staff as playing ministerial or advocacy roles; nor do they see members as

This article is based on work done collectively by us and by Adair Dammann, Sarah Royce, and Stephanie Van Dyke. Between us we have worked in a variety of community, labor and tenants' organizations. Our thinking reflects our combined experience.

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"clients." We want to explain, from the organizers' perspective, what the actual mobilization process means to staff and to members.

First, we want to distinguish unions from the consumer-based organizations that are more frequently associated with the grass-roots movement. Unlike community-organizing, union-organizing directly exposes the different interests of workers and employers. Wages, the organization of production, and other work-related issues are the essence of a union drive. A successful drive results in a permanent forum for conflict; a union is a form of institutionalized power. Further, the mediating role of the state in a union drive is both clearly defined and limited by law. The two sides—employer and worker—remain in obvious conflict. In community-organizing this is less true, for the target of protest is often confused. Here we focus primarily on community groups organized around consumption-related demands.

THE GOALS of grass-roots, or direct-action, organizing are derived from a thoughtful criticism of 1960s organizing and an economic and political analysis specific to the 1970s. While this analysis is inaccurate in some ways (chiefly regarding the role of the state), it has nonetheless shaped the work of current organizers. For instance, the decision to build multi-issue organizations is a political one. It results in part from the belief that class struggle occurs in many places and forms (community as well as workplace), and in part from the failure of single-issue campaigns to build lasting organizations. Similarly, the organizers' choice of constituency reflects their desire to avoid the exclusive focus on students and poor people, which contributed to the isolation and weakness of some 1960s movements. Organizing the poor as a separate group allowed working-class Americans to view their own welfare as distinct from that of the poor, and to see the gains made by poor people as coming out of their own pockets. However crude the class analysis that attempts to unite "most Americans, black and white, poor and middle income, women and men, against the centers of power and privilege,"* it is at least an aggressive strategy designed to overcome traditional divisions within the working class. Although majority organizing seems unable in practice to incorporate the underclass in its predominantly local forms, it is not simply a "retreat."

Three explicit goals form the basis of current direct-action organizing: (1) winning real, immediate improvements in people's lives; (2) giving people a sense of their own power; (3) beginning to alter the existing unequal relations of power. In addition, organizers hope that they will be able to achieve the radical political education of at least some members, using lessons learned in local struggles to raise socialism as an issue.

In order to win immediate victories, the organizations are both dependent on and committed to mobilizing their working-class members. While legal or advocacy skills are needed in some cases, these alone are usually not sufficient to win concessions. Ralph Nader notwithstanding, the organizers and leaders could achieve little without the vocal support and pressure of a mobilized base.

The pace, excitement, and aggressive tone of direct actions contrasts sharply with the drawn-out, dry process of litigation. The organizations use both tactics, but nearly all of them focus on organizing for direct action. They deliberately choose issues that require mobilization. One group, angered at the code violations in the buildings of a particular landlord, mobilized neighbors and tenants to picket in front of the buildings and at the landlord's house in the suburbs. The picket lines brought publicity to the group's cause, embarrassed the landlord, and won the attention of the housing inspector. Next, members demanded that the inspector tour the buildings with them. They used his presence to convince people who lived near the deteriorating buildings to join the tour. When the landlord was finally brought to court for the violations, neighbors and tenants were there to testify and support each other. This is quite unlike a court case brought by a single tenant. The issue won the support of the inspector and was brought to court directly as a result of neighborhood mobilization. The hearing itself, instead of involving only two individuals, became a confrontation between the entire neighborhood and the landlord. In choosing and carefully planning a campaign, its potential for involving members is often more important to organizers than how easily it can be won.

Certainly, the groups do not achieve anything approaching mass mobilization. They do well if they can count 5 to 10 percent of a given community as members (unions again excepted). But it is not generally true that organizers "use" members as representatives of the working class; rather, members see themselves in that way. Further, the broader constituency to which the groups appeal seems to identify with the working-class activists. Seeing people like themselves

*Harry Boyte, "The Populist Challenge," *Socialist Revolution*, March-April 1977, p. 52.

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confront landlords and officials gives even the unmobilized more of a sense of their own potential power than when professionals act as intermediaries or advocates. Neither the image of minister nor that of lawyer fits these organizers.

Still, organizers do seem to be permanent fixtures of the new organizations. In contrast to early Alinsky organizers, most current staff members do not expect that their roles will "wither away" with time. They recognize that their middle-class backgrounds have provided them with skills, experience, and a confidence in their ability to act politically not generally characteristic of the working-class members. Some groups also have successfully trained members for staff positions.

BESIDES MOBILIZATION, the achievement most visible to us after working in several grass-roots organizations is that members are changed in positive ways as a result of their participation in the groups. Many feel differently about themselves. "I was scared to open my mouth when I first came into the [community organization]," one woman said. "I didn't think I could do anything." She later became fund-raising chair, vice-chair of the organization, and a vocal critic of local government policy and corporate profiteering. This process is known in organizing circles as "empowerment."

The commitment to empowerment shapes the strategy and practice of organizing. Both democratic control of organizations and direct action as a pressure tactic are emphasized because they give members leadership skills, as well as confidence in their abilities to make changes in their lives. In our experience, the current organizing visibly gives some working-class people a sense of their own power. It also encourages people to see individual problems in social terms. In coming together with others over a common concern, individuals see more clearly that certain hardships are not unique to them or due to some failure on their part, but are social in their origins and solutions. A new sidewalk, lower utility rates, a cleaner river, or a new union contract represent collective gains not won by any one person.

Even when from the outside these gains look, as Walzer says, like "any other welfare benefit," they appear quite different to local workers and community residents who have spent months fighting for them. Members feel they have won the gains by working together and challenging the power structure. Further, they approach a more conscious class identification with each other than they have had before. Even when groups are forced into negotiating roles, they refuse to send in an individual representative. In some unions, for example, collective bargaining sessions include large groups of workers rather than just a union official and lawyer. Similarly, when an official requests a meeting with one or two representatives of a community group, the organization insists that he or she meet with all its members at once. Empowerment, both individual and collective, fundamentally differentiates direct-action organizing from "advocacy" or "welfare politics."

Evaluating new grass-roots organizations from within and on their own terms brings to light their real accomplishments. They are mobilizing and empowering people who were previously unorganized. That working-class people begin to share a sense of their collective power is a necessary, though far from sufficient, condition for more radical social change. The organizations' very success at empowerment, however, raises other problems. Objectively, the people they organize have relatively little power. What they gain from overcoming self-doubts about their right to make political demands can perhaps be dispersed as organizations approach the limits of their real power.

The weaknesses of the grass-roots strategy are painfully clear. Its small victories pose no immediate threat to corporate power, not to speak of capitalism as a whole. Almost no group has successfully raised the issue of socialism. Although their original intent was to attack corporations, their lack of power, combined with the structure of the welfare state, pushes them into interest-group roles. For the most part the groups are not trying to force an expansion of the welfare state. Yet, as Walzer points out, their immediate demands can often be met by state concessions of small collective entitlements. In the current political conditions, the groups seem unable to escape falling into some advocacy roles.

Yet, grass-roots organizing is still more than (and distinct from) parish-tending. Its potential remains largely unknown and unrealized. The leaders who are currently being trained and gaining experience are part of a constituency that has never been organized in America: women, service workers, low-paid production workers, white-collar workers. Much organizing work remains to be done. If the organizations can continue to build effective local bases, they may present a much more significant power constellation in the future. In the coming years, grass-roots organizing may provide a solid basis for a broader movement for social change in America. □

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Robert Lekachman

Troubles of the Welfare State

Such as it is in the United States, the welfare state, a term for which exegesis will soon be supplied, came under intense fire even before the OPEC coup slowed economic growth, upset a precarious political detente over the size and direction of social spending, set off a dangerous inflation, and precipitated a current crisis of governmental legitimacy that has paralyzed presidential and congressional responses. For reasons to be examined, social spending, and especially programs aimed at the difficulties of low-income Americans, had reached the point at which either retreat or significant institutional change was becoming unavoidable. Although for the time being a majority of the American public appears to prefer the first choice, there is reason to believe and hope that in the longer run the future of the welfare state, in an extensively altered political context, is much less dismal.

It is well to clear the ground of popular misconceptions. Despite their contrary reputation, social programs are not particularly wasteful. Even the most detested of their number—Aid to the Families of Dependent Children—delivers a higher proportion of the sums appropriated to recipients defined by statute than do investment tax credits paid to enterprises that would have purchased new equipment or erected new factories, in their absence or than subsidies to corporate farmers and funds to finance the cost overruns of incompetent defense contractors.

Taxpayers do not stagger under the heavy burdens of paying for social programs. By world standards, American taxes are comparatively light, and the public sector of the economy is smaller than in Western Europe and Scandinavia. German and French workers endure much heavier payroll taxes to finance health care as well as pensions than do Americans. Moreover, to a degree frequently ignored in media analysis, the bulk of the resources devoted to social purposes actually flows to Americans of moderate, middle, or even high income, and only a modest percentage is targeted to the poor.

The welfare state is a diverse, sprawling phenomenon, of equally varied popularity, piece by piece. Pensions for the elderly are taken for granted. When in his 1964 run for the presidency Senator Goldwater hinted a preference for private alternatives, he raised so violent a political storm that he hastily retreated. Unemployment insurance is an equally routine arrangement, criticized mostly by conservative economists. It is a comfort not to young, casual, illegal, and migratory workers who infrequently qualify for the benefits but to white- and blue-collar office and factory employees, occasionally joined by laid-off civil servants, managers, and

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professionals. Veterans' educational, medical, and pension benefits, the oldest of welfare interventions, are judged legitimate even by those who complain about their costs and administration.

In the social welfare community, it is a truism that programs for poor people tend to be poor programs, or at least are so perceived. It is an inescapable fact of American political experience that the portions of the welfare state that are most nearly universal are, if not actually applauded, at minimum tolerated. Only the policy explicitly directed to the needs of the poor, young, black, or urban is most often challenged as inequitable, wasteful, and indulgent of morally suspect human types. By semantic convention, tax breaks for investors and corporations, subsidies for homeowners, and assorted benefits for any well-organized producer group are not called welfare. A cynic might even conclude that the less the human need, the more acceptable is the expenditure of public funds to assuage it.

In the next decade, this country is likely either to curtail welfare benefits on the ground that resources are scant and their administration is incompetent, or to move in the direction of social democracy by grappling at last with the hard task of redesigning the markets in which jobs, health care, and education are now supplied. The sourness and fretfulness of today's national mood and the low quality of contemporary political discussion are transitory. Too much is vital in American traditions of social and political equality to allow of despair.

There is, however, no doubt that right now government action of almost any kind is supect. The "failure" of the welfare state, in particular, is taken by many as a platitude in no need of evidence or analysis. Typical of the condition was the response of California voters to CBS pollsters' inquiries about the motives for their support of Proposition 13 in June 1978. Overwhelmingly their disapprobation of government action centered upon welfare, domestically to the indigenous poor and internationally to the poor of other countries. Although Proposition 13 directly influenced neither AFDC nor foreign aid, the public mood it signaled led to widespread emulation by other states and the adoption of a balanced-budget amendment by Jerry Brown, the most sensitive political weathervane of our day.

Revulsion against welfare is premised upon old and new conservative grounds. The traditional conservative case that makes many congressional Republicans (and some Democrats) as well as media allies like the *Wall Street Journal* comfortable is essentially financial—fear of a growing public sector, intense distaste for the taxes necessary for its support, and apprehension that budget deficits will modulate into intolerable inflationary pressure. Less savory ingredients of the conservative mixture include lingering racism and associated aspersions upon the morality and work habits of welfare clients.

Neoconservatives, of course, also worry about money. In addition, they deploy the sophisticated argot of social science to probe more deeply and gloomily into the roots of welfare dependency. Edward Banfield's notorious association of intractable poverty with lower-class attitudes hostile to thrift, postponement of immediate gratification, education and training, and reliable work habits, readily leads to the conclusion that public action can do almost nothing to improve the situation. The underclass of the poor will always be with us, unless and until the psychology that defines lower-class status and separates it from the productive middle class is somehow transformed.*

*Banfield holds out little hope. In the first edition (1968) of his *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little, Brown), he had this to say:

> It would be premature to conclude that the lower-class child must be introduced to normal culture almost from birth if he is ever to succes in school. The evidence, however, seems to point in this direction. Unfortunately, the prospects for fundamental reform in this direction appear very poor; in a free society infants cannot be taken from their parents on the grounds that the parents are lower-class and that the children therefore will not do well in school. Perhaps parents could be bribed to send their children to day care centers. Even so,

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Milton Friedman and his followers support income maintenance in the preferred form of a negative income tax set at levels modest enough to avoid damaging work incentives. Friedman himself regards these cash payments as complete substitutes for food stamps, Medicaid, public housing, and social services. Money is saved, even the poor deserve free choice in the expenditure of their meager resources, and these resources will thus purchase more satisfaction than any set of choices by the best meaning of welfare bureaucrats.

Among neoconservatives, Milton Friedman is an extremist. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has favored somewhat more generous cash allowances, retention of at least some social programs, and an emphasis upon job training. His suspicion of many antipoverty programs echoes Irving Kristol's vendetta against his alleged New Class of disaffected university graduates with a vested interest in the preservation and extension of a welfare state that confers income and status upon them as its administrators. With or without attribution, Kristol and Moynihan are heavily indebted to Joseph Schumpeter, who in a few pages of his brilliant *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* identified the stratum of alienated intellectuals whom the very success of capitalism has created.

As the neoconservatives summarize the current condition of welfare, the social pathologies of lower-class behavior have created one large group of permanent clients and another, somewhat smaller but steadily increasing, of equally enduring functionaries. Bad enough. Worse still, the claims of the welfare constituency incite predictable emulation by other groups. The "revolution" of rising entitlements of which Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, and their allies have made so much unites in a common clamor for political attention and financial aid women, blacks, Hispanics, Gray Panthers, and the physically or mentally handicapped. How can even an economy growing far more rapidly than ours expect to accommodate all of these claims? The taxes imposed upon productive workers to subsidize the essentially unproductive discourage effort and enterprise. Often they are the occasion of extensive tax evasion and rebellion.

Indeed, the heaviest neoconservative charge against the welfare state is its endorsement of claims against the community that impede growth, erode productivity, and promote inflation and social discontent.

To these complaints the liberal response has been half-hearted to the verge of nullity. Those still willing to hold to the liberal identification appear nearly as convinced of the disabling defects of public housing, Medicaid, job training and the residues of the war against poverty as their ostensible conservative antagonists. Democratic Congresses have rejected Carter's welfare reforms and evaded health issues. Senator Kennedy—whose popularity, it appears, stems substantially more from his family name than from endorsement of his public postures upon health, taxes, and strategic arms limitation—at times appears to be the last traditional Democratic liberal, unrepentantly confident of the capacity of public policy to resolve social disputes, and willing to raise funds to finance the policies.

On recent performance, it is hard to distinguish liberals from conservatives. During the 1979 New York State legislative session Hugh Carey, a "liberal" Democratic governor, opposed any increase in welfare cash grants even though the last previous adjustment occurred in 1974. In piquant contrast, the "conservative" State Senate majority leader, Warren Anderson, favored a cost-of-living adjustment on the ground that he and his Republican associates were not Scrooges.

In short, the welfare state is a mélange of separable initiatives engendered by assorted pressures and interests and responsive to quite distinct constituencies, as often at odds among themselves as united in their claims

however, it is by no means certain that tens of thousands of suitable "teachers" could be found to look after them.

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upon the fisc. The "old" welfare state begins with the 1935 Social Security Act. Franklin Roosevelt lost a historic opportunity when he considered but rejected inclusion of health care in that act. All the same, the statute was a giant step toward protection of ordinary citizens against the vicissitudes of indigency in old age, short-term joblessness, and more protracted or permanent inability to find secure paid employment.

With the exception of defense, old-age and survivors' benefits are the most expensive of federal programs. President Carter's 1980 defense budget of $125.8 billion was a trifling $10 billion or so larger than the $115.2 billion committed to social security pensions. If, as it is reasonable to do, the $14.2 billion allocated to federal employees' retirement is lumped with social security, total retirement benefits exceed defense expenditures.

Social security has been comparatively uncontroversial for familiar reasons. Its financing from trust funds, replenished by contributions from employers and employees, has conferred upon the system the reassuringly conservative mantle of private insurance. Recent apprehensions over the adequacy of the trust funds have persuaded Congress to increase contribution rates as well as the earnings levels to which the rates apply. The new rates, high by domestic if no other standards, have set off public resistance, partly because inflation has at the same time risen faster than most wages and salaries. As a result, real income has been declining, even before taxes and still more steeply after them.

Working-class and middle-income Americans profit most from social security. Although some ill-paid men and women who survive to retirement age eventually collect pensions in excess of the sums actuarily justified by their contributions, large numbers in this category either fail to qualify for benefits, die in their fifties and early sixties, or live a comparatively short time after retirement. More fortunate Americans can look forward to a somewhat dignified independence of parents who might otherwise become their responsibility.

The apparent fifty-fifty split between employers and employees of contributions to social security trust funds probably pleases a good many people. Although employees in the end almost surely finance the entire program because in its absence their employers would pay higher wages, the lower actual deduction from paychecks might be preferred even by the sophisticated to the hypothetical prospect of higher wages were employers relieved of this cost.

The only persistently unpopular portion of the 1935 Social Security Act has been AFDC, welfare in its narrowest sense. Those who included AFDC in the Act apparently thought of it as a small, inexpensive, entirely respectable provision for the widows of coal miners and similar worthy souls, proudly striving to raise small children in cruelly straitened circumstances. No one appears to have contemplated the emergence of relatively large numbers of female-headed families, on and off welfare for years and decades. It is rather startling to realize that the contemplated cost of AFDC at the federal level in the 1980 budget is just $6.7 billion, not much more than 1 percent of that budget's half-trillion total, little more than half of the sums allocated to unemployment compensation. The welfare burden is evidently political and psychological rather than fiscal. Almost equal amounts were designated to assist the blind and disabled, and almost no one arose to challenge their appropriateness.

With the glaring but single exception of AFDC, the old welfare state grappled and continues to grapple with the normal vicissitudes of life. A vast majority can reasonably expect to reach a time of life when energies flag and earning capacity first diminishes and then vanishes. At some time or times, almost any wage slave will experience weeks or months of unemployment. And blindness and disability are individual tragedies of birth, crippling accident, or chronic illness, not defects of character.

Whatever a person's misfortune, an adequate income makes it easier to endure. The old welfare state sought to do little more than

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shuffle funds from the employed to the retired, from employers to the briefly unemployed, and from taxpayers to welfare families, veterans, and other claimants. Among federal bureaucracies, the Social Security Administration enjoys an unusually favorable reputation because its mission is almost entirely a matter of collecting money from the public and then disbursing it to appropriate groups of recipients, a task at which government excels.

During a half dozen years of the 1960s, the welfare state considerably enlarged its ambitions and in the process acquired new constituencies and new enemies. The stream of innovation began with Kennedy job-training schemes and widened in 1964, 1965, and 1966, the *anni mirabili* of the Great Society, with enactment of statutes covering education, health, the cities, housing, nutrition, and poverty. One of recent history's saddest unanswerable questions concerns the Great Society's development in the absence of a futile war, which drained resources and diverted national attention from domestic reform to the tragedy of Vietnam.

What distinguished the War on Poverty, model cities, compensatory education grants, food stamps, and Medicaid among other Great Society policies from the old welfare state was deliberate concentration upon the problems of the disadvantaged. From the outset then, the elements in the Great Society targeted to disfavored minorities were vulnerable to rejection by a majority only uncertainly sympathetic with special help to selected groups and readily subject to suggestions that programs were ill-conceived, poorly administered, and unduly expensive—as in fact some undoubtedly were.

The Great Society in a second respect is distinguishable from earlier welfare provisions. Timidly but unmistakably, its administrators tried briefly at least to influence markets in the private sector. Johnson's amplification of the smaller job-training efforts of the Kennedy administration aimed at improving the quality of marketable skills at the lower end of the labor force and by doing so to improve the negotiating position of some employees against some employers.

Some of the most controversial features of the Great Society involved attempts substantially to alter the operations of markets for public services. Community Action programs and allied participatory procedures in housing and education were designed to mobilize apathetic low-income constituencies against city halls around the country so as to increase the volume of local services in low-income neighborhoods. Bright young lawyers who enlisted in the Legal Services offices were effective allies.

A lesson of the Great Society experience indeed seems to be that many of its failures, complete or partial, stemmed from too little rather than too much intervention into the operations of private and public markets. The health sector is an outstanding illustration of the point. Medicare and Medicaid became disastrously expensive because a victorious coalition of physicians, hospitals, and health insurers defeated any attempt to modify financial arrangments. Lyndon Johnson accepted, possibly because he had no political alternative, a statute that preserved the tradition of fee for services, imposed no effective ceiling on hospital charges, left Blue Cross and Blue Shield in peace, and simply fed billions of additional federal money into the system. Although these dollars purchased some additioal health care for the elderly and medically indigent, an extremely large percentage of the money, by common agreement, improved the incomes of doctors, dentists, and other providers of health services.

No economic training should have been necessary to predict these consequences of increasing the effective demand for services whose supply was unregulated. Intervention was inadequate in the allied case of Title I grants to improve the education of children in impoverished school districts. Some of the money somehow leaked to middle-class areas. But even funds disbursed in the right places were often ineffectively spent, because less attention was paid to the special needs of

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urban blacks and Hispanics than to the shortage of money under which their schools labored. A touching faith was in evidence that reading scores would improve in cheerful step with the availability of Title I grants.

At this point in the argument, care is essential, for I may be conveying an impression that I accept the familiar indictment of the Great Society as dreadfully prone to throw money at problems. As even Daniel Patrick Moynihan has conceded, not very much money was ever devoted to, much less thrown at, the Great Society's constituents. Moreover, according to the scorecards of qualified experts, the Great Society has turned out to be a mixture of incomplete successes and partial failures, by no means the tale of foolish bureaucracies and wasted taxpayers' dollars so frequently told these days in Congress and in the media.

A typical judgment is that of Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, manpower experts based at George Washington University. After appropriate scholarly warnings that "information on many questions is totally inadequate" and "the tools of measurement and evaluation are very crude, and the latitude for normative judgment is very wide," they go on firmly to assert *"that the 1960s programs and policies and their continuation had a massive, overwhelmingly beneficial impact, and that the weight of evidence convincingly supports this view."* (See their *The Promise of Greatness* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976], probably the best available examination of the social science evidence pro and con community action, housing, education, manpower training, and other Great Society efforts.)

In arriving at their temperate conclusions, these seasoned observers carefully separate themselves from the rhetoric of unconditional war against poverty and "unreasonable" expectations of quick and dramatic success on any of the major social fronts—education, housing and health, and parity of black/white incomes. Levitan and Taggart rebut intemperate charges of administrative inefficiency and emphasize instead the intractability of many of the conditions addressed and the experimental mode of some of the attempts to ameliorate them. In short, according to the criteria applied to previous ventures in social welfare, the Great Society did at least moderately well.

Another pair of evaluators rendered a similar accounting. Irving Kristol interrupted the *Public Interest*'s usual run of autopsies on the Great Society long enough to publish in 1974 a special issue, and he invited Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, two economists of moderately liberal viewpoint, to edit it. The book that resulted from this special issue—*The Great Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1974)—reached this summary judgment:

> The record of the Great Society is one of successes mixed with failures, of experiments that proved themselves at least partly successful and experiments whose returns do not appear to have justified the effort. In other words, it turned out about as any sensible person should have expected.

Even *Public Interest* regulars from time to time concede unexpected merit in the social efforts of the 1960s. In his excellent dissection of the neoconservatives—in his book *The Neoconservatives* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), Peter Steinfels quotes Aaron Wildavsky to this effect:

> . . . Fairly construed, the government's record on social policy during the last decade has been one of vigorous effort and some note-worthy if nevertheless defective accomplishments. . . . Steps have been taken in numerous areas to meet the needs of those who had previously been neglected.

None of us is completely consistent. Here is Wildavsky in a testier mood:

> A recipe for violence: Promise a lot; deliver a little. Lead people to believe that they will be much better off, but let there be no dramatic improvement. Try a variety of small programs, each interesting but marginal in impact and severely underfunded. Avoid any attempted solution remotely comparable in size to the dimensions of the problem you are trying to

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solve. Have middle-class civil servants hire upper-class student radicals to use lower-class Negroes as a battering ram against the existing local political systems; then complain that people are going around disrupting things and chastise local politicians for not cooperating with those out to do them in. Get some poor people involved in local decision-making, only to discover that there is not enough at stake to be worth bothering about. Feel guilty about what has happened to black people; tell them that you are surprised they have not revolted before; express shock and dismay when they follow your advice. Go in for a little force, just enough to anger, not enough to discourage. Feel guilty again; say your are surprised that worse has not happened. Alternate with a little suppression. Mix well, apply a match, and run. . . .*

The Great Society has been unfairly and maliciously criticized. Its accomplishments have been more than negligible. The case against it involves identification of the narrow possibilities of social change within the context of market capitalism in the United States. Lyndon Johnson's grandiloquent rhetoric is a good place to begin a search for the reasons why social advance has been so infrequent and so incomplete. The evaluators of the Great Society whom I have cited reached mixed or mildly favorable conclusions because they revised sharply downward its proclaimed objectives. A sensible person can't really expect to eliminate poverty, but it is surely a good thing to reduce the number of poor people. Black earnings will not match those of whites in our time, but how inspiring it is to note (so long as it occurs) an upward drift in the ratio of black to white incomes. Pupils in Bedford-Stuyvesant and South Bronx public schools will continue to test worse than their Scarsdale and Great Neck age mates. Still, any narrowing of the gap is good news. And so on. It is the fashion of the benevolent so to define the goals of social action as to increase the number of program successes.

*Quoted, naturally enough, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan opposite the title page of his *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

I am inclined, quite on the contrary, to say that nothing was wrong with Lyndon Johnson's rhetoric. His aims were and are the appropriate, the minimum objectives of an affluent community traditionally devoted to equality of opportunity and even sometimes to equality of condition. As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, the crucial measure of a society's stage of development is the size of its underclass—its population of unemployed, casually employed, and miserably employed and its cadres of addicts, hustlers, petty criminals, and long-term welfare recipients. The underclass subsists in isolation from the mainstream economy.

By this criterion, America in 1964 was less developed than Japan, Western Europe, and Myrdal's Scandinavia. No question that the Great Society was timid in design and frugal in its expenditures. Even less doubt that local and national politicians were able to emasculate innovations that threatened to redistribute political power and channel jobs, funds, and prestige to some unfamiliar addresses. The real failure of the Great Society must be laid to Lyndon Johnson, to the Congress, and to the public's failure to will the means essential to the fulfillment of the stated ends. In a sense, those who denounce the Great Society as a total failure do Lyndon Johnson the unintended honor of adopting his own definition of success.

The old welfare state endures and alongside it much of the Great Society—Title I school grants, Medicare, and Medicaid most notably. But the continuing political stalemate over welfare reform attests to the difficulty of resumed social advance in a centrist Democratic Administration after eight years of Nixon-and-Ford-sponsored retrogression. There was a false dawn during the heyday of the Warren Surpreme Court, in the final half of the 1960s, when the Court's majority visibly moved toward the definition of welfare as a right rather than an act of grace on the part of the sovereign state.

In short order, the Nixon court reversed direction and reverted to the old language of

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gratuity. Justice Blackmun, one of four Nixon members, asserted in 1971 that welfare departments were entitled to require compulsory home visits by social workers as a condition of continued eligibility for benefits in spite of Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unlawful searches and seizures and associated guarantees of the "rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects." As Blackmun stated the majority's view,

> One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker, has not only an interest but an obligation.*

Welfare reform has been a lost cause and will continue to be so in the absence of major shifts in political and public attitudes, because a successful redesign of AFDC requires transfers of income from the top to the bottom half of the income distribution. Americans now accept redistribution from young to old, healthy to sick, able-bodied to disabled, and civilian to veteran. They still reject similar shifts from rich to poor. Thus the story of first Nixon's and then Carter's plans to rationalize AFDC needs to be understood within the existing ideological constraints upon social progress.

In the summer of 1969, President Nixon startled Congress and his constituents by recommending an ambitious Family Assistance Program (FAP). FAP was the major project of the Administration's house Democrat, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then enjoying a two-year incarnation as White House counselor. Moynihan sweet-talked his surly master into reenacting the political role of Benjamin Disraeli and even into reading Robert Blake's magisterial biography. The crafty Victorian stole or adapted enough of his Liberal opponents' social schemes to ensure a long spell in office for himself and his Tories. Why not, asked Moynihan, parlay FAP into a similar Republican triumph? The House of Representatives dutifully approved FAP in 1970 and again in 1971, but on each occassion the Senate rejected it.

Liberal Congressmen and George Wiley's National Welfare Rights Organization decried the benefit levels, approximately two-thirds of the official poverty line, as disgracefully meager. What doomed FAP ultimately, however, was equally determined opposition from the right. Senate conservatives decried the additional cost of the new program. They shrewdly identified its imperfect articulation with food stamps, housing allowances, and Medicaid. Their crucial objection was to the heart of FAP's design—a guaranteed income. No quantity of Nixon work-ethic rhetoric and no volume of disclaimers of any resemblance between FAP and any version of a negative income tax could disguise the fact that FAP extended incomes guarantees not only to unemployed families now on welfare but also to low-income, fully employed persons. Congress and a presumptive majority of its constituents were unwilling to declare a right to a minimum income.

Not to act is also a choice. On this occasion, it is to accept continuation of the inconsistencies, inequities, and cruelties that have always disgraced the conduct of welfare programs. In 1977, a welfare family of four in Mississippi got $720 in cash grants annually. The figure in New York City was $5,712. Even in adjacent states, the disparities defied logic. A Texas family of four was instructed to scrape by on $1,608. Across the border, its Oklahoma opposite number could expect a lavish $3,408. Kansas City, Missouri, pegged benefits at $2,040. Just across the river, they ballooned in Kansas City, Kansas, all the way up to $4,368. Adding to the confusion, half the states limit eligibility to families headed by a single parent, and the rest of the country offers help

*See *Wyman v. James* (400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d. 408). It is a minor irony that this artifact of one of Nixon's so-called strict constructionists serenely ignored several inconvenient precedents contrary to its preferred position.

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to intact families in which neither adult is employed.

The public worries about welfare cheaters. When news is slow, some newspaper is certain to run a gaudy series about welfare families living it up in the Waldorf-Astoria and driving to welfare centers in Cadillacs. For their part, welfare administrators and social workers fret over inadequate benefits, red tape that denies aid to eligible claimants, and public willingness to allow inflation to erode the real value of allowances. All parties agree that it would be just splendid if more adults on welfare got jobs in the private sector.

No wonder then that welfare reform was high on Jimmy Carter's agenda of campaign pledges. Accordingly in August 1977, he promulgated his Program for Better Jobs and Incomes (PBJI). Pat Moynihan, by then New York's junior senator, sponsored the Administration bill in the upper chamber but within weeks began to criticize the very legislation he had sponsored. By the end of the 1977-78 session of Congress, Senator Moynihan had introduced a measure that did little more than extend a measure of fiscal relief to New York City and urban communities in similar straits, and a series of subsidies to employers who graciously hire people off the welfare rolls. (Inclusion of subsidies to employers may have been the price of Senator Long's support of Moynihan's alternative to PBJI.) In the end the unmourned 95th Congress adjourned without action on any welfare reform measure.

Bloody but unbowed, President Carter sent Congress in May 1979 a substantially curtailed version of PBJI, billed as costing only $5.7 billion extra, down from the $20 billion price tag attached to the 1977-78 proposal. PBJI Mark II sets national minimum benefits for families of four at $4,654, approximately 65 percent of 1979's $7,200 poverty line. Intact families will be covered in all 50 states. Benefit payments will rise for 800,000 families in 13 states (most of them in the South), some additional federal money will make its way to New York and other Northern jurisdictions; employers who hire welfare clients will collect larger tax credits, the earned income-tax credit for the working poor will be liberalized, and 420,000 new public jobs will be created.

In its present frame of mind, Congress seems as likely to take favorable action as it is to welcome any statement from the White House other than a promise from Mr. Carter to deed the presidency forthwith to Teddy Kennedy. Yet, this thumbnail sketch of the history and hard times of welfare brings us back yet again to the solution of an easily untangled dilemma: if everybody including its apparent beneficiaries detests the welfare system, why is it so hard to improve?

The answer is neither the President's low standing in the public opinion polls, nor Russell Long's frequently demonstrated capacity to block true welfare reform in his Senate Finance Committee. As much in 1979 as in 1970 and 1971, no solution can dodge redistribution of income to poor people in general, not just to welfare recipients. In effect, both FAP and PBJI do tax earnings (or reduce benefits) at 50 percent rates—$1 is subtracted from benefits paid for each $2 of earnings. President Carter's latest proposal would give some aid to families of four earning as much as $9,308 annually, $2,000 above the poverty line.

Now 50 percent just happens to be the highest marginal rate applicable to ordinary wages and salaries. If the poor are as rational as the rest of us (why not?) their incentive to work will surely be stimulated by much lower levies on possible earnings. But: *really to encourage work is to redistribute income.* A 25 percent tax on earnings would widen assistance to families earning as much as $18,616, just about 1979's median figure for the entire population. Even a 33.3 percent rate would enlarge benefits to include families earning up to $13,962, a sum larger than that collected by a very large fraction of New York City's employed population.

The choices are so unpleasant that they are almost inevitably evaded. High tax rates on earnings discourage people on welfare from seeking the ill-paid and unpleasant jobs for which they qualify. On the other hand, low

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rates translate into redistribution of income from the prosperous to their poorer brethren. Accordingly, one of this season's safer prophecies is congressional rejection of the son of PBJI and the grandson of FAP.

I have lingered in some technical detail on welfare because it is paradigmatic. Ten years of fruitless reform initiatives by presidents of both major parties have sharply etched the limits of the welfare state in the United States. Programs that aid moderate-, middle-, and upper-income Americans are popular. Current agitation over social security relates to the rising level of payroll taxes and the adequacy of trust funds to finance future benefits to a rising population of pensioners, not to the legitimacy of the program itself.

According to the Treasury's current estimate, the Internal Revenue Service would collect at least $30.6 billion in extra taxes if homeowners were shorn of tax deductions for mortgage interest and local property assessments, if large donors were barred from subtracting their gifts from taxable income, if assorted subsidies to farmers, shipbuilders, defense contractors, and other corporations were cancelled, and so on. Welfare for the rich is a good deal more expensive than welfare for the poor.

In inescapable contrast, programs that threaten seriously to rearrange the distribution of either resources or power are suspect. This generalization stretches far beyond welfare to community action, legal services, Medicaid, and, crucially, to unsuccessful efforts to define full employment as a significant national goal. No doubt, as Moynihan and others charged, *some* Community Action Programs fell into the hands of hustlers, and others were exercises in incoherence. (As several critical reviewers [including myself] pointed out, Moynihan in *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* once more floated sweeping and adverse conclusions on evidence from just two cities, Syracuse and New York.) What doomed the concept, nevertheless, was its threat to existing distributions of local services and patronage.

The long struggle over the mission of the legal services program focused on the dispute between conservative advocates of individual assistance and comparatively radical partisans of structural change. The legal and political establishment was quite willing to enlarge the availability of free legal help to poor individuals on a case-by-case basis. Political reaction intensified when legal service attorneys began filing class actions aimed at expanding the rights of welfare clients, women, the rural poor, native Americans, prisoners, and other comparatively passive groups. (The Burger court has severely limited the conditions under which class actions can be filed.)

Under pressure from the AFL-CIO, UAW, and Senator Kennedy, the Carter administration has at last submitted a disappointingly small health program that promises protection against catastrophic illness and some liberalization of Medicare and Medicaid. As the White House sees its prospects, "We will be going to Congress at the outer limits of political possibility." Kennedy's own, more comprehensive scheme, which is given no chance of passage by the Congress, itself represents a retreat from public operation and something of a surrender to insurers and health suppliers. (See Paul Starr's useful *New Republic* piece [June 9, 1979], "Kennedy's Conservative Health Plan.")

Although the earlier Kennedy-Corman bill stopped short of a national health service on the British model and continued the independence of doctors and hospitals, Kennedy-Corman would have put almost all health costs into the national budget, put a ceiling on expenditures, and forced health providers to operate within fixed budgets.

Kennedy's new plan responds to twin political imperatives, coexistence with private insurers and minimum costs. Kennedy's experts have devised a sophisticated approach to the deployment of existing market mechanisms. The primary new device is a medical voucher. Health Insurance Cards will

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entitle their owners to a variety of hospital and physicians' services. Patients can use their card by free choice of an accredited Health Maintenance Organization or insurance company. Employers and their employees will share costs. The medically indigent will receive free cards or vouchers.

An innovative feature is the insertion between subscribers and insurers of four private national consortia, representing respectively Blue Cross, commercial health insurers, Health Maintenance Organizations, and independent groups of doctors who consent to accept a flat amount annually for each enrolled patient. Payments will be adjusted to the characteristics of the clients. A medical group that collected young and health subscribers would receive fewer dollars for each one than a plan that treated pensioners and the chronically ill. Insurers will be encouraged to increase profits by controlling cost and improving the efficiency of their administration.

In a further attempt to control costs, a national health insurance board, still another new agency, will set national and state health budgets and the payroll tax rates required to finance them. In each state, premiums will be higher or lower according to the degree of success in keeping costs low. Planning boards at the state level will promulgate hospital budgets. No doctor will be legally entitled to charge more than the rates set in the insurance program in which he chooses to participate.

Vouchers, of course, have been a favorite proposal of free-market economists. Although Kennedy's scheme does increase public regulation of the market for health services, it leaves the structure of that market comparatively unaltered. In spite of these major concessions, Kennedy's program has been greeted as excessive in size and cost and radical in conception.

Finally, there is the instructive history of full-employment legislation. Nowhere is the discrepancy between apparent and actual social goals wider. Fearing a return to mass unemployment after World War II, liberals struggled valiantly in 1944 and 1945 to enact planning legislation for full employment. The initial Wagner-Murray Full Employment bill mandated specific presidential and congressional action in each session for full employment. After bitter debate and much pressure from the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, Congress enacted the Employment Act of 1946. Deprived of all enforcement provisions, the toothless statute even substituted the ambiguous "maximum employment" for the more alarming "full employment" and, in a wordy preamble, elevated the maintenance of free enterprise to parity with high employment as a legislative target. Congress created two of the more talkative bodies of the ensuing years: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress [which is not allowed to sponsor legislation] and the Council of Economic Advisers.

Following a scenario eerily reminiscent of the 1940s, Congressman Augustus Hawkins and the late Hubert Humphrey refought the full-employment battle with only marginally superior results. Once more the usual coalition of labor unions, church groups, and liberal intellectuals floated a measure that featured national economic planning for full employment, defined a right to a job, and allowed any individual to sue in federal court to enforce his/her claim to an appropriate job. (Some of the same actors played in this revival. Leon Keyserling and Bert Gross who in the 1940s worked on the original Full Employment bill were actively engaged in drafting and negotiating Humphrey-Hawkins.)

By the time the negotiations were over and the essential compromises reluctantly accepted, not much was left of the original measure. Its advocates could wistfully point to the retention of chronologically defined employment targets and the faint and cautious sketch of a potential planning framework. Possibly the most encouraging reaction came from *Business Week*, one of the more intelligent business journals. It editorially warned that Humphrey-Hawkins

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might be an entering wedge for national economic planning.

Why the resistance to full-employment legislation equiped with sharp teeth? Everybody's favorite aspiration for those on welfare is to shift them to private payrolls, to paraphrase the immortal sentiments of Richard Nixon. Unemployment is bad for business and fiscally expensive into the bargain. The bills for welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, and unemployment benefits rise even faster than unemployment rates. The federal deficit rises partly because of these new expenses and partly because at the same time tax receipts decline. Nor is recession a cure for inflation. The very Carter administration economists who have been designing economic slowdown concede that only a major depression is likely to cool inflation. If work is such a splendid idea, particularly for the poor, and unemployment does so little to combat inflation, a naive soul might be astonished at the extent of opposition to effective pursuit of policies designed to make work available in larger quantities.

The brutal fact is that unemployment, at "moderate" rates showers substantial benefits upon the prosperous and affluent. (Of course, high unemployment afflicts even good customers and frightens into thrift the still employed. Within the business community, only economic fundamentalists advocate true depression as a moral purgative.)

If full employment were a stable and predictable feature of labor markets, extraordinarily high wages would have to be paid to toilers in restaurant kitchens, laundries, filling stations, car wash emporia, and other humble occupations. Whenever decent jobs at living wages or better are plentiful, recruiters have great trouble coaxing young men and women into our volunteer army. Without a volunteer army, how can middle- and upper-class youngsters be spared the rigors of conscription?

Unemployment calms the unions and moderates their wage demands at contract negotiation time. Since Carter imposed guidelines last October, even strong unions settled at figures well below the escalation in the cost of living. When workers are apprehensive about their jobs, they work harder and gripe less. In more dignified language, absenteeism declines and productivity improves. (The poor productivity record of the American economy in recent years is the consequence mostly of lagging capital investment and escalating energy costs.) Better still, in the corporate view, factory and office workers, alert to threatened layoffs and plant shutdowns, are unlikely to nag management and unions leaders to make work more interesting and less threatening to health and personal safety.

Nor is this quite the end of the tale. The hunger of communities and regions for jobs and tax revenues encourages large corporations to extort an endless assortment of valuable concessions from state and local governments, either as blackmail to retain existing enterprises or bribes to lure new ones into town. Few major corporations pay their fair share of property taxes. Corporate propaganda has noticeably slowed the pace of environmental regulation.

Sustained full employment, by contrast, embarrasses the business and political establishment. (An occasional short spell of full employment is "tolerable" as long as all parties fully understand that the situation is exceptional and temporary.) It is the most efficient agent of equitable income redistribution politically feasible within the limits of market capitalism. Full employment sucks into the labor force men and women who now struggle to survive on welfare and food stamps. It shoves upward the wages of ill-paid workers in situations scarcely less precarious than that of the unemployed. Full employment is valuable to blacks, Hispanics, teenagers, and women—last hired during economic expansions and first fired during subsequent business cycle contractions. A decade of sustained full employment would substantially narrow existing wide differentials between the earnings of these groups and those of white males. (During the long 1961-68 economic expansion, the ratio of black to

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white income steadily improved. Progress halted in the 1970s in an atmosphere of slower growth and higher average unemployment rates.) During recessions, affirmative action is a mockery and average Americans feel too threatened to concern themselves over the condition of fellow citizens in still worse economic condition.

n the last decade, the welfare state has taken a new turn toward federal regulations aimed at cleaning air and water, improving the quality of consumer protection against dangerous products, raising standards of occupational health and safety, and attacking job discrimination against women and minorities. Although a currently fashionable cry is for less rather than more regulation,* each new intervention has responded to a collection of corporate practices outrageous enough to overcome normal congressional reluctance to take on the large corporations whose contributions finance their campaigns.

The battle over regulatory quality highlights the complicated politics of the welfare state. Although such groups as Environmentalists for Full Employment do their best to explain the compatibility of jobs and environmental protection, the political advertising of the large corporations takes the opposite tack. Corporate money has funded a covey of conservative think tanks, among them the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. The *Public Interest*, hospitable for years to demonstrations that regulation is not cost-effective, has new allies in journals like AEI's *Regulation* and Heritage's *Policy Review*.

Many labor unions, unfortunately but comprehensibly, have an occasion allied themselves with corporations in resisting regulations that appear to threaten jobs by increasing corporate costs. (The machinists, led by the imaginative William Winpisinger, are an encouraging exception.) Often enough environmental regulation is a useful pretext for closing an elderly plant in a declining market. All too often, however, corporate arguments ring plausible in their workers' ears. Unemployment and the fear of its increasing incidence have many other dispiriting influences upon the politics of social action. Such allies as labor unions and black groups in past and present struggles for comprehensive health coverage, full-employment legislation, and the civil rights landmarks of the 1960s now quarrel over the incompatibility in the presence of substantial unemployment of two valid principles—the seniority clauses in collective-bargaining agreements and the affirmative-action goals pursued by women and minorities with the support of the Office of Contract Compliance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and other federal agencies.

Coalitions shift from issue to issue and the absence of full employment sets former allies against each other. For in a conservative political environment the natural consequence of meager economic growth, of stability or actual decline in the real income of white- and blue-collar families, and of intensified job anxieties is an ever-more ferocious scramble for individual and group advantage.

That scramble is certain to intensify in the 1980s. The politics of OPEC have hastened the end of an era of cheap supplies of energy. In the short run, the best that Americans can expect is an opportunity to transfer an increasing portion of any economic growth that actually occurs to Middle Eastern suppliers. Substitution of synthetic fuels, an increasingly popular solution, will vastly improve this country's leverage against OPEC but it is unlikely that it will very much reduce the resource costs of energy.

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*Within the Carter administration, Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Charles Schultze has led the movement toward either deregulation or regulation that accords with "free"-market incentives. His Godkin lectures at Harvard, delivered shortly before he joined the new Administration, are the manifesto of the movement. See *The Public Use of Private Interest* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977).

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Other strains are increasingly visible. Developing and developed societies are engaged in unbenign rivalry for manufacturing markets, under the auspices of multinational corporations. Within the United States, the shift of industry to the Sunbelt is a microcosm of an even larger movement to low-wage, anti-union, authoritarian states in Asia and Latin America.

No wonder the multinationals are the most fervent advocates of free trade. Their subsidiaries process and market an increasing share of exports to American markets. A major political battle is now shaping up over possible limitation on multinational freedom to close domestic plants without notice or explanation and shift operations to lower-cost havens. (Economists, traditionally devoted to free trade, will almost unanimously oppose requirements of notice and compensation.)

The barriers to labor-market entry that already confront young workers are aggravated by the continuing shift from commodity to service production. It is notoriously more difficult to increase service than commodity productivity. This is not just a matter of the absurdity of enhancing the efficiency of tenors, violinists, and ballet dancers; it is a matter, from the economic standpoint, of the more consequential intractabilities of shuffling paper and processing data. From the heavy advertising in the business media of improved ways to manage offices, write business letters, and sort and store information, a skeptic might easily infer that the flood of data has more than kept pace with the technology designed to simplify and rationalize it.

Traditional entry-level, unskilled blue-collar jobs have become more and more scarce. In the decade that began in the late 1960s, New York City lost 600,000 manufacturing slots. Although many of the tasks performed by novices in banks, life insurance companies, brokerage offices, and corporate headquarters seem to require no more skill than vanished blue-collar alternatives, the social expectations on both sides seem to be different enough to raise substantial obstacles to the recruitment of high-school dropouts or even high-school graduates.

Just approaching visibility is still another substantial subtraction from potential growth as national income statisticians measure it.* This is the staggering expense of rectifying the more malignant consequences of past (and continuing) commercial irresponsibility. A handy case in point is Hooker Chemicals, a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum. (One had to look hard for this corporate association even in the *New York Times*. The print and electronic media conveyed the distinct impression that Hooker was a poorly managed family firm rather than the responsibility of a huge oil company.)

Hooker dumped tons of poisonous wastes, which have seeped into soil and water tables in a number of sites around the country, including upstate New York's Love Canal. No one knows how many Hookers have been fouling the environment. The cleaning bills will run into billions of dollars over many years.

The dangerous dilapidation of urban infrastructures is another example of business reluctance to support the environment within which it operates. Once again, New York City's condition typifies that of many older cities. The Nova Institute recently estimated that at least $40 billion must be spent over the next decade simply to maintain, repair, or replace bridges, sewers, water mains, and highways.

Unchecked, the tendency of entrepreneurs is to use the natural environment as a dump and the public sector as a source of free

*Gross National Product measures the dollar value of goods and services that either pass through markets or, as in the important instance of public services, can be analogized to such goods and services. The definition is idiotically agnostic. GNP rises when more cigarettes are sold. It also rises by the amounts spent to treat the lung cancer and other ailments associated with smoking. The statisticians ignore improvements in occupational safety, air and water quality, and product reliability. Like many other ostensibly neutral economic concepts, the national income definitions are skewed by the ideology of the marketplace.

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services and benefits. As economists demurely phrase these habits, commercial activities often impose external costs upon the community at large or upon specific individuals and groups within it. In plainer words, businessmen do their effective best to shuffle off the costs of treating the victims of their operations upon the taxpayers.

In part, apparent previous gains in living standards have been illusory. The bills are just coming in for past injuries to the natural environment and for past failures to maintain the social overhead. Galbraith's 1958 contrast between private affluence and public squalor—in *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin)—is not less relevant now than it was in the Eisenhower era. The squalor has turned out to be dangerous as well as distasteful.

Thus at best, in the absence of other major interruptions of petroleum shipments by OPEC, Americans in the company of Europeans and Japanese confront a future of limited opportunity for improvement in living standards, narrower paths of upward mobility, and heavier pressures upon existing social benefits and union gains.

The politics of growth that has dominated debates since the end of World War II is comparatively benign. Its adepts can evade group and class conflict and concentrate instead on more agreeable problems of dividing up each year's increment to growth. The virtual disappearance of these growth dividends has provoked current unresolved and ill-tempered controversies over the distribution of existing entitlements and the incidence of the taxes needed to pay for them.

No one, not President Carter nor his few congressional allies and his more numerous opponents, cares to play the new zero-sum games. The upshot is political paralysis, drift to the political right, intractable inflation, and imminent recession of unpredictable depth and duration. In time, even political vacuums are filled. In the short run, the strength of business influence upon the political process, the pervasiveness of free-enterprise ideology, and the weakness of the left, all strongly combine to create a drift toward some version of corporatism—far less mitigated than it is now by pressures from unions, consumers, minorities, women, and environmentalists.

The split within the business community between Neanderthals like William Simon and Walter Wriston and planners like Felix Rohatyn, David Rockefeller, and the shade of his brother Nelson, is likely to be resolved in favor of the planners. Unlike their archaic colleagues, they understand that in the grim context of slow or no growth, a measure of coherence in national policy is the prerequisite to economic and financial stability vital to their own interests. They seem prepared to pay a price in welfare service for the social stability that is equally vital.

In its more belligerent mode, the new alliance between big government and giant business is promulgated by dangerous politicians like John Connolly, our Man in the White Stetson, who are prepared to junk civil liberties and representative institutions the better to preserve their own dominion. Mild or brutal, corporatism presents new and larger bills, first to the usual losers, women, blacks, Hispanics, and young workers, and very shortly thereafter to hordes of new recruits from the ranks of factory and office workers. Wages and working conditions are likely to deteriorate and social programs to shrink in their wake.

To say this is to identify the instability of corporatism. Resources will be too few simultaneously to enlarge property incomes, preserve mass living standards, guarantee steady employment to the majority of the work force, and maintain the protections of even a curtailed welfare state. The increasingly inequitable distribution of income will stimulate increasingly violent public reactions.

Prophecy is a mug's game. All the same, I shall hazard a guess that, as the realities of the new economic era penetrate mass consciousness, our politics are likely to polarize. The natural program of the democratic left—a coalition of unions, women and minorities,

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consumerists and environmentalists—will include attention to the equity of wealth and income distribution, social control of health, energy, housing, and participatory national planning.

Throughout American history, a steady tension has existed between the political and social egalitarianism of the Bill of Rights and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and those institutions of market capitalism that glorify financial inequality. In the next decade, this country may well move in the direction of plutocracy. In the longer run, I have confidence in the enduring power of the first tradition. As its incompatibility with a business-dominated polity becomes apparent, I expect that Americans will look far more kindly upon the sort of democratic planning for an equitable society that today seems no more than utopian vision. □

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Growing Pains of Spanish Socialism

I: Benjamin Martin

Left Turn, Right Turn, or Where?

In Spain, the democratic transformation continues to have a churning effect on many aspects of life. The vicissitudes of change are having their greatest impact in the political sector, as the various parties now strive to align ideologies with the new situation.

The 28th Congress of the Spanish Socialist Workers party (PSOE), held in Madrid last May, was to have been the party's gala celebration of its 100th anniversary. There were, of course, plans for discussions of major policy issues, and the leadership was confident that this could be managed without excessive difficulties.

As the date of the congress approached, signs of a gathering internal storm grew stronger. The exaggerated expectations concerning the March 1st elections had caused unhappiness in the organization and undoubtedly had played a significant part in triggering the growing turbulence. But still, General Secretary Felipe Gonzalez and the party's Executive Committee persisted in believing that the expected opposition could be contained within manageable proportions. The leadership, after all, could point to a record of extraordinary accomplishment. From modest numbers of supporters with dubious prospects several years ago, the party has undergone a near-miraculous rise in membership. It now boasts a constituency second only to the governing Union of the Democratic Center (UCD). Now Socialist mayors preside over most of the country's cities, and the PSOE counts more than four times as many elected city councilmen among its membership than was its total five years ago. A remarkable achievement!

The leadership, however, could not have been more mistaken in its expectations of general acclaim. It found itself outvoted in a tumultuous and emotionally searing congress unique in the party's 100 years' history. Instead of discussing the major issues that confront the country, as befits a party with pretensions to assuming power in the near future, the congress focused mainly on the "issue" of Marxism. Is the party to be defined as exclusively "Marxist"—or as having a more pluralist outlook? By a two-to-one margin the delegates voted to reject a compromise formula that would have included Marxism as one of the various sources of party doctrine. Instead, the PSOE was categorically proclaimed to be "Marxist and a class party, democratic and federalist."

This and other decisions had the effect of disowning the leadership and contravening the very strategy that has made possible the party's successful rise. Amidst consternation and tears, Felipe Gonzalez, the party's charismatic idol, declared it his moral obligation not to seek reelection as general secretary, since he saw the decisions as a

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repudiation of his leadership and policies. The congress then voted to schedule an extraordinary convention set for late September 1979, to reestablish the party's basic orientation and elect a new leadership.

WHAT WENT WRONG? How is it possible for a party that came so close to winning the March 1st parliamentary elections to induldge in such a chaotic, self-destructive display?

The answers must be sought in (a) the legacy inherited from the Franco era; (b) the nature of political change in the post-Franco transition; (c) the setback experienced in the March 1st parliamentary elections; (d) the manner in which Felipe Gonzalez and his close associates have directed party affairs in recent years.

As the Franco regime entered its terminal phase, PSOE's prospects were hardly promising. The many years of sterile isolation under the leadership of exiles, a gerontocracy operating from France, had reduced the party inside Spain to scattered enclaves. During the early '70s, however, a new generation of post-Civil War leaders had emerged inside Spain and gained control of the party. In 1974 Felipe Gonzalez, a young labor lawyer from Seville, was named general secretary.

Party membership in 1974 was down to about 4,000, divided equally between exiles and members within Spain. The party's trade-union ally, the General Workers Union (UGT), had only a few dispersed islands of influence, principally in the mine fields of Asturias and the metal-working plants of the Basque region. During the Franco years, ironically, the Communist party (PCE) had gained control of the Workers Commissions (CCOO), the leading opposition movement operating within the government-controlled labor oganization. As the best organized force in the anti-Franco opposition, the PCE attracted substantial support from intellectuals and among Catholic activists who underwent radicalization in the '60s. The PCE, with its superior organization and resources and its role as the principal opposition under Franco, had good reason to expect that it would emerge in the post-Franco period as the dominant party of the left.

But the Socialists kept steadily gaining strength as the post-Franco period began in 1976, though they continued to lag behind the PCE in membership, organizational resources, and trade-union influence. For these reasons, the outcome of the first post-Franco parliamentary election, held in June 1977, proved to be a stunning upset. Cornering 29 percent of the vote, the PSOE not only emerged as the country's second most important party, it came close to upsetting Prime Minister Suarez's governing Union of the Democratic Center party. The PCE, to its chagrin, received only 9 percent of the vote and so was consigned to the role of a marginal parliamentary group.

These results permitted several important conclusions. Clandestine life under the Franco regime, indeed had been a congenial atmosphere for the PCE. In an open democratic election, however, "historical memory" turned out to be an asset of much greater value. Despite four decades of dictatorship, the long historical tradition of the Spanish socialist movement persuaded most Spanish workers and many in the middle class to give their support to a reborn PSOE.

Catapulted into the role of principal opposition party, the PSOE experienced a period of extraordinary, rapid growth. Within months, it became transformed into a great popular movement. This also served to convince many workers that a trade union with socialist orientation was a viable alternative, and soon thousands swelled the ranks of the UGT.

In the factory works-council elections held last year, 34 percent of the elected delegates represented the Workers Commissions Trade Union Confederation (CCOO), and 22 percent the UGT. Thus Spanish trade unionism was transformed into a bipolar movement, a development that has prevented the PCE from attaining the trade-union

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power the Communists hold in France and Italy.

The PSOE estimates that its membership—which was 4,000 in 1974—now has reached 200,000. In 1976 the UGT had about 25,000 supporters; it now lays claim to 1.35 million. Although actual membership in both organizations may be appreciably lower than the official figures, the growth is still awesome.

The ensuing problems of consolidation, cadre formation, and political education are staggering. Because of the 40 years of Franco and illegality, the Spanish socialist movement now finds itself with one of the lowest cadre-member ratios experienced by a mass movement in a Western industrial society. The few members with political organizational experience are forced to assume disproportionately heavy burdens; those in the leadership echelons of the party usually serve simultaneously as members of parliament, mayors, officers of UGT, and in the leadership of local, provincial, and national party organizations. Gradually, an organizational infrastructure is being established. Merely to provide training facilities for the 37,000 elected works-council delegates of the UGT and the 15,000 city councilmen of PSOE, for example, is a formidable undertaking.

Rank-and-file membership consists largely of young people—highly motivated, impressionable, and politically inexperienced. Close to two-thirds of the 1,000 delegates to the May congress had less than a year's membership in the party! The moderation of the PCE makes it less attractive than the Socialists to many young people. Few controls have been employed in determining eligibility for PSOE membership, so that all sorts of far-left elements have entered, including organized Trotskyist groups.

Because of the present low ideological level, political discussions are frequently conducted in a crude "radical" jargon, a practice inherited from the hothouse years of clandestinity. Marxism, a theory understood by few, is enthusiastically embraced by many who wear it as a badge of ideological machismo. The fact that recent members often have only barely begun reconciling rhetoric and reality has prompted a leading party veteran to observe that the violence of the criticism of the leadership at the May congress stands in inverse proportion to years of party membership. . . .

After the violent polemic over Marxism at the congress, the long-time German Socialist Max Diamant, who has been closely associated with Spanish Socialist affairs since the Civil War, observed that it seems to be a question "of faith, and this is characteristic of Spain. People tend to argue issues involving faith, but in reality it is something secondary that does not affect the fundamental problems. It is not politically relevant for a party as large as the PSOE."

The platform that was adopted at the party's first post-Franco congress in 1976 fairly bristles with radical rhetoric. At the time the Spanish socialist movement was fragmented and uncertain; and the PSOE was specifically qualified as "Marxist," although by tradition and practice it had always been a movement in which both Marxists and non-Marxists have coexisted.

Since then, however, both the responsibility for directing a mass movement and the sobering experience of dealing with the formidable problems of a society in the state of democratization have had a tempering affect on the leadership. But since the party's transformation took place within an extremely brief time, a disparity of views has developed between the leadership and many rank-and-filers.

THE PARTY'S SPECTACULAR EXPANSION persuaded Gonzalez to broaden the PSOE's appeal by modifying its platform, and so to win the moderate left middle-class and professional vote, which is crucial to the further electoral progress of the Socialists. The PSOE needs a half-million additional votes (it now claims more than 5 million) if it is to become Spain's foremost party. With this goal in mind, Gonzalez last year announced

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his intention to eliminate the Marxist label that had been assumed at the 1976 congress. But the arbitrary manner in which he did so had a galvanizing affect on those who view the Marxist badge as sacrosanct. The announcement also placed many who consider themselves Marxists but also supporters of Gonzalez in an uncomfortable position.

THE PSOE'S MAY CONGRESS was the most open and democratic assembly held by any political group in the post-Franco era. But, nonetheless, the issue of internal democracy has become a major concern within the party. The manner in which "Felipe"—as Gonzalez is commonly referred to—has run the organization is a matter of controversy, played upon with some effect by the leaders of the party's left wing.

Since becoming secretary general in 1974, Felipe has directed party affairs largely in collaboration with a small group of intimates, mostly fellow Sevillians. This has led to increasing unhappiness in some party circles. There is a visible and legitimate desire for a greater measure of internal democracy. The restructuring of the executive authority of the party's leadership, therefore, is necessary in order to render it more responsive to this organization that encompasses so many varied interests and points of view.

The leaders of the party's left wing are more united by their opposition to what they perceive as the back-sliding of the present leadership than by an articulated policy alternative. Among these left-wing leaders, the most outspoken is Francisco Bustelo, an exponent of the orthodox Marxist outlook. Another is Luis Gomez Llorente, the principal Marxist spokesman on the party executive committee. A third is Pablo Castellano, who was a major figure in the party hierarchy during the '60s and early '70s, until his defeat by Felipe in a contest for the post of general secretary. These three can count on the occasional support of Enrique Tierno Galvan, a prestigious intellectual who headed the Popular Socialist party, which merged with the PSOE last year. Galvan now serves both as honorary party president and as mayor of Madrid.

Bustelo's differences tend to concern the absence of ideological content rather than a critique of past policies. He argues that

> there is a lack of Marxist analysis. This is not to say that the policy is necessarily wrong or exclusively moderate. What does take place is more serious; a day-to-day policy is conducted without due concern for basics. The quotidian and episodic are insufficiently linked with the historic objectives of socialism.

The sterile debates of the May congress tended to obscure the crucial policy problems that confront the party. Relations with the Communists is one of them. Bustelo, for example, advocates a strategy of political collaboration with the PCE, envisaging ultimately a government of the left. Such an approach, however, runs counter to the PSOE doctrine of the post-Franco transition era. Felipe and most of the party leadership indeed share a deep-seated aversion for the PCE. The repressive role of Spanish Stalinism during the Civil War has not been forgotten nor forgiven, particularly since PCE leader Carrillo and many of his closest collaborators are men of the Civil War generation. Besides, during the March parliamentary campaign, Carrillo devoted most of his energies to lambasting the PSOE rather than criticizing the parties of the right and the center-right.

The PCE strongly favors unity of action between the two parties since, in the long view, the Communists would be the principal beneficiaries. In the trade-union field especially, the Workers Commissions Trade Union Confederation strives to persuade the UGT to enter into collaborative ventures. But even if the PSOE were politically so disposed, it would still remain chary of extensive collaboration with the Communists, for to embark on such a policy with its largely immature and impressionable membership would jeopardize the party's cohesion.

Socialist strategy envisages the establishment of a coalition of moderate left and

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regional political groups as the basis for a PSOE-led government. The Communists are not considered appropriate collaborators in such a venture, at least not in a formal capacity. The divisive affect of the 1936 Popular Front government is still present in the national consciousness, and both Socialists and Communists are careful not to advocate its revival. Instead, the PCE proposes a government of "national concentration" that would include all parties.

Just what kind of a party should the PSOE be? This is the question at the heart of the controversy. The leadership has tried to shape the party along realistic, moderate lines. But many in the ranks are having difficulty adjusting to the responsibilities and constraints imposed upon a party that has become the conscience of Spain's emerging democracy. A Spanish sociologist characterized the 28th congress as "the last of Francoism and clandestinity," and this observation accurately depicts the situation.

Little serious thought has been given thus far to adapting traditional Marxist theory to present-day Spain. Spanish society indeed has undergone great changes since the '60s. The underdevelopment and grinding poverty that characterized "the two Spains" of the '30s and '40s have become a historic memory. Political retardation also ended with the death of Franco. The Spain of today is highly urbanized and ranks ninth among the world's industrial nations. As in other West European countries, a consumer economy prevails. Workers' wage standards lag behind those of other European countries, but they have greatly advanced since the '60s.

A large urban middle class, the product of this transformation, has become, perhaps, the arbiter of Spanish politics. Its loyalties are divided between the center-right UCD and the PSOE, and both parties strongly compete to attract the support of the "vital center." The city of Madrid, for example, which contains a large middle-class population, gave the PSOE a plurality in the recent elections. The prevailing national mood, the economic slump, and an overriding concern for the consolidation of democracy have also imposed a posture of moderation on the entire left. The PCE and even the two Maoist parties are generally pursuing policies not so different from those one would expect of Social Democrats.

With respect to the PSOE's makeup, therefore, Gonzalez argues,

> A truly socialist program is not conceivable if it is not capable of responding to . . . diversity. Socialism today cannot have the working class as its sole reference because it is the class structure that differentiates us from the 19th century.

On Marxism he observes:

> The frontiers of socialism today go beyond the orthodox Marxist analysis that some advocate. . . . A modern socialist party has room for all, from a rigorous Marxism to a radical non-Marxist solution, including a socialism with a Christian commitment [which is frequent in the countries of Southern Europe], a socialism that arises from anthropological outlooks [ecologists, Krausists, humanists, etc.]. . . . The enriching diversity of socialism should be able to express itself with equality of opportunity.

When it became evident during the congress that he had mishandled the situation and could not prevail, Felipe Gonzalez decided to recoup his losses by refusing, on both moral and political grounds, to run for reelection as general secretary.

This bold move had the desired effect of persuading the delegates to vote for a special convention to review policies and elect a new leadership. It also came as a sharp disappointment to the leaders of the left wing who were thus prevented from assuming control of the party.

Felipe seems sure that he will be returned to his former leadership role at the forthcoming special congress, though it is likely that he will suffer some erosion in his former authority.

The Marxist issue will probably be resolved through a compromise solution acceptable to

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most sectors of the party. The more serious problem confronting the PSOE remains the gap between a leadership that has come to terms with the realities of power and a membership that has not.

No definitive solution of the ideological issue seems possible in the foreseeable future. After all, most parties have only attained this at the end of an extended process involving a gradual blending of theory and experience. Throughout most of its history, the PSOE has been a movement of broad embrace, containing Marxists and non-Marxists. Difficulties in the past have arisen when one or the other sought to impose their views on the party. Today too, a balance must be struck that permits doctrinal coexistence.

In a recent book about modern Spain, Raymond Carr observes that what really counts in a democratic society is the internal stability of parties. For the Spanish Socialist Workers party, this is especially urgent. □

II: Patricia Cayo Sexton

May Days of a Lively Movement

On the first of May in Palma, Mallorca (Majorca), I asked my non-Spanish friends whether there would be a May Day parade in town. Nobody knew; some had never heard of May Day. A taxi driver finally located the parade and took me to it, insisting all the way, with gestures, that all politicians are *banditos* and not to be trusted.

Hundreds of marchers gathered in the Plaza de España, most with banners or insignia of their own party or union, and a few with both Socialist and Communist emblems. The parade in Palma, and elsewhere in Spain, was sponsored jointly by the Socialist and Communist parties. The parade started punctually, marched in an orderly, spirited fashion, chanting and singing along its planned course through the city streets, with only minimal help from a cheerleader and a flying squadron to help turn the corners, gathering several thousand marchers on its way, and terminating in the Plaza Major for speeches and the final event, a rock band that raucously dispersed the crowd. Few police, no violence. Only later did a small band of black-clothed marchers appear to protest the murder of a Communist youth in the Madrid parade.

I asked marchers for a clearer translation of the banners, and in the exchange that followed they laughed incredulously when I told them that there are *real* unions, as distinct from what they call "yellow unions," in the United States. I evoked a similar response in everyone I spoke with later: so far as they know, American unions are all company unions.

The banners, I learned featured three demands: "*Paro, No.*" "*Patrimonial Syndical, Si,*" and "*Laudos, No.*" "*Paro*"—unemployment—is estimated by Socialists at 10 percent of the work force, a figure driven up sharply, Socialists say, by government stress on controlling inflation. "*Patrimonial syndical*" refers to the demand that unions and left parties be reimbursed for the property (funds, buildings, vehicles, etc.) seized by Franco, and "*Laudos*" to the old Fascist habit

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of controlling collective bargaining and forcing unacceptable settlements on labor (a habit that is as addictive in the Communist as in the corporate state). In 1977, living costs in Spain rose by more than 26 percent, yet wage rises of only 22 percent were imposed; so it goes, and each year workers' incomes are falling further behind living costs.

Union General de Trabajadores

THE PARADE'S SUCCESS, and my own success in finding it, stimulated me to seek out the Socialist party offices. The job was not easy, for nobody I asked, including the American Consul Agent, knew how to locate them. I finally found an address in the phone book and, after searching for it much of one day, I found the office. It was closed, with no change-of-address posted. The Avis man next door, obviously a Socialist, referred me to the union office down the block, a large, modern building, filled with people, most of them surprised and pleased to find an American woman among them, and anxious to offer information. (I find Mallorquins consistently eager to talk and help once the slightest interest is shown in them, and irrepressible when some knowledge of their cherished culture and history is displayed. The main obstacle to discourse is that few of them speak much English and most of them speak a dialect of Spanish that is heavily accented with their *other* language, Mallorquin, an antique dialect of Catalan and the principal language spoken on the island.)

The UGT, General Workers Union, is affiliated with the Socialist party and now its main support. Its Mallorquin membership of about 35,000 is somewhat larger than that of the CCOO, the Workers' Commissions Trade Union Confederation, an affiliate of the Communist Party (PCE). On the mainland, the proportions are reversed and the Communist unions are somewhat larger than the Socialist unions. During the Franco years, these unions were outlawed, the Italian-inspired corporate-Fascist model was imposed, and the OSE (The Spanish Syndical Organization), an arm of government, included both workers and employers in the same units and controlled their agreements. Under this system, employers settled disputes easily: they called in the police.

The rebirth of the UGT, a potent pre-Franco force, has a strange history. At the time of the first post-Franco elections in mid-1976, the UGT lacked any significant membership. But its growth was spurred by the electoral success of the Socialist party. When workers saw the Socialists spurt ahead and become strong challengers to the conservatives, many of them left the Communist CCOO and joined the Socialist UGT.

The UGT has grown despite the odd favoritism shown by government to the Communist unions. Fearing further Socialist gains at the polls, the government of Adolpho Suarez set up rules for the elections of plant committees that gave Communist unions an edge, and by mid-1978 the Communists had elected 66,000 plant delegates, the Socialists 41,000, and nonaffiliated unions 35,000. (Socialists claim that votes were miscounted and that their margin of loss was only 10 rather than 20 percent.) The UGT claims about 2 million members, the CCOO about 2.5 million and real figures are said to be lower.

An anomalous situation exists in which the unions have developed more quickly than employer organizations, but the Spanish Conference of Employer Organizations (CEOE) has been launched and its leadership has moved close to the governing UCD. Another anomaly involves workers' job security. Under Franco workers had few rights but, once accepted as regular employees, they could be fired or laid off only for serious misbehavior. Now employers agitate for easier dismissal rights, and workers worry about job security.

Basic union rights were restored by Parliament in mid-1977, and the new Spanish Constitution, adopted in December 1978, confirms these rights. Consequently, the Congress of Deputies, the key lower house of Parliament, drafted a labor law in 1978; but under pressure from both employers and the

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UCD, it came out so antilabor that it made no mention at all of the union's role in the plant.

Some 35 percent of the Spanish labor force is organized, a figure about 10 percent higher than that for the United States. In most respects, Spanish unions resemble other European far more than American unions. Like other European unions, they are organized on the basis of ideologies (or at least international affiliations) and, unlike American unions, lack government-backed rights to "exclusive collective bargaining" in any given workplace.

The upshot is that, while Socialist and Communist federations are separate, they compete for the same workers (in the same jurisdictions—hotel, contruction, etc.) and engage in coordinated "pluralistic" bargaining. Hence they must sit down at the same side of the bargaining table when agreements covering these workers are negotiated. They are competitors, but they are allies in bargaining sessions and also, it follows, in the politics that affect union rights.

On Mallorca, the UGT has more members than the CCOO among the hotel employees (hotels are big business in the island's economy); the contrary is the case among construction workers; among service workers of various kinds, including taxi drivers who were on strike when I arrived, membership is more evenly divided.

"What is the difference between the Socialist and Communist unions," I asked. "Why would a construction worker join the CCOO rather than the UGT?" "Maybe because the Communists are a little more revolutionary," was the answer, "though only a little." (The use of the word "revolutionary" in this context was, I think, more symbolic than specific, for both the Socialists and the Communists denounce insurrectionary tendencies.)

Partido Socialista Obrero Español

MY NEXT STOP was the Socialist party office, recently relocated on the third floor of a nice but slightly decrepit house on the Alejandro Rossello. Finding no bell downstairs and almost not clue to the PSOE's location, I groped my way to the floors above and pushed a buzzer at an unmarked, locked, yet likely door. I had found it, and luckily during its two daily hours of business. The office, two small rooms and a larger one, was decorated with the handmade flag of the Second Republic (red, yellow, and purple stripes) and another handmade Mallorquin flag (the multi red-and-gold stripes of Catalonia, plus a single purple border stripe for the Arab Almudiana). Portraits of Pablo Iglesias, the Socialist party's poet founder, and of "Largo Caballero" ("the big man," worker, disciple of Iglesias, pre-Franco head of the UGT, left-wing Socialist leader) hung on the walls—but no Marx.

A giant poster (used persuasively, I learned, in the local elections of March 1979) covered one wall. It contained no blazing red emblems, no sign of class struggle, but instead depicted city life under socialism—a giant park, trees, birds, games, a puppet performance of *Hamlet* "presented by Garcia Lorca," a library, a "House of Culture," park benchers reading the socialist paper, and also the striking, widely known PSOE emblem (the fist holding a red rose, rather than a torch or a hammer and sickle) and the legend *Cambriar su Cuidad del los Socialistas*—"change your city with the Socialists." (The Socialists won almost every major city in Spain, including Madrid and Barcelona.)

Under the circumstances (including their absorption with the upcoming 28th PSOE congress in Madrid) I was warmly welcomed, and during that and later visits spoke many hours with party people, all of them lively, friendly, businesslike, and young. Since politics is new to Spain, its leadership in all parties is almost shockingly youthful.

Guillermo Mansito—handsome, bespectacled architect, hardly past 25 years of age—spoke of the new Town Council of which he was a newly elected member and its new Commissioner of Properties, Rights, and Contracts. Of the 27 councillors, the UCD had 13, the PSOE 11, the Communist party 2,

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and the PSM (a Mallorquin nationalist yet socialist party) had 1. With the latter two groups, the Socialists put together a majority of one and chose a mayor and new commissioners, including members of the coalition parties and even one UCD member, reportedly a "social democrat" at heart. The PSOE membership of about 1,000, much higher than the Communist, is overwhelmingly in favor of at least some forms of cooperation with the Communists.

The Socialist program extends in many directions but says nothing about "socializing the means of production" in Palma, hardly an immediate issue. Instead, it stresses "democratizing the institutions of local government," "reinventing the participation of people in government," "giving people the feeling that the Council belongs to them." To achieve this, the Socialists plan to set up community governments in each district and to give them some significant decison-making authority:

"Before 1975, we had no politics at all. Government was highly centralized; nobody had any say; people were apathetic, distrustful, afraid to have opinions. We now want to change that."

Socialists are also trying to rationalize government by coordinating services of various municipalities along the Bay of Palma, including taxis, sewage, and water districts. They also seek to rationalize the city's development, since hotel capacity far exceeds demand and growth has been (under the order of the Caudillo) rather chaotic.

The first national congress of workers was held in 1870 in Barcelona (center of industry, unionism, socialism, anarcho-syndicalism), and nine year later, exactly 100 years ago, the PSOE was founded. In the parliamentary elections of 1979, the Socialists won 29 percent of the votes and about as many parliamentary seats, a success those I spoke with attribute to the demography of class: at least 50 percent of the votes are cast by workers contrasting with 10 percent by an elite of wealth, 40 percent by those who are middle class and "nonideological," they say.

Autonomy

TWO OF THE HOTTEST ISSUE for Socialists are provincial autonomy and Marxism. Autonomy is an old and passionate issue in Spain, especially for Basques and Catalonians. Both straddle the Spanish-French border (which helps keep their militant ethnicity alive), and both, in the savage 19th-century wars of the Bourbon succession, for the sake of autonomy even supported the ultra-reactionary Carlists. (The Carlists lost, betrayed the Basques and the Catalonians by seizing their lands for a time, and a half-century later embraced Franco.)

The Basques—whose strenuous disposition can now be seen in their favorite game, Jai alai, and in the yearly Pomplona bull runs—resisted both the Roman and Germanic conquests and retained a language and culture like no other, remaining the oldest surviving racial group in Europe. A strange people, probably the most fanatic nationalists in Europe, perhaps in the world. (I do, however, feel some empathy for their peculiarities, since my own ancestry is Basque.) Their implacable resistance to Fascism (and centralism) cost them not only the symbol of their liberties, Guernica—the revered home of the Basque assemblies, which was leveled by Nazi bombs in the Civil War—but also incurred a good deal of retribution during the Franco years.

Now again the Basques seek autonomy, and some will kill almost anyone for their goal of independence. Their fervor raises several issue for Socialists. The terror spread by the Basque ETA (a nonsocialist, bourgeois group) makes the Irish IRA provisionals look like pacifists, and even dwarfs the horrors of the Italian Red Guard assassins. In 1978, in Italy, 30 political murders were reported; in Spain 88 , and 61 of them traceable to the ETA. In the first half of 1979, 17 people died in Italy, 61 in Spain—of these, 39 at the hands of the ETA and 14 killed by GRAPO (the lunatic First of October anti-Fascist Revolutionary Groups), 2 by the extreme right, and 6 by the police.

While many blame the governing UCD for

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failing to control the terror, others reflexively associate terror with the left (as many Italians falsely blamed the Communists for *their* terror). The image of the bomb-throwing radical is an indelible one, however innocent the accused may be. At any rate, people usually turn to the right and to "law-and-order" when their physical security is threatened. While Socialists would go further than the UCD in granting Basque autonomy, they do not go far enough to satisfy the *independistas*. As a result, the Socialists have lost ground to the nationalist right in the highly industrialized, unionized Basque regions where Socialists should be shoo-ins.

Spain is moving toward provincial autonomy, as provided in the new Constitution. The Basque provinces have submitted their *instituto* (plan for autonomy) to Parliament and so has Catalonia, but the Balearics have not yet done so. Since the newly created council of the Balearics is controlled by conservatives, based largely on votes from rural areas and the islands of Ibiza and Menorca, autonomy may injure the Socialists. The Linkages with Catalonia, indeed a Socialist stronghold, can only help them.

The Catalonians, including the Mallorquins (who are only 132 miles from Barcelona) are less nationalistic, fanatic, and religious than the Basques, and far more integrated into the language and culture (especially the French) of Europe. Cultural differences are exemplified in their proudest offspring: the Basque Saint Ignatius of Loyola, founding general of the Jesuit order, and his follower, Saint Francis Xavier—puritanical zealots, "soldiers of Christ" (often compared, with whatever accuracy, to Leninist cadres); and on the Catalonian side, the gentle Franciscan Fray Junípero Serra—Mallorquin, born on a farm in Petra—who became missionary founder of California's San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

Also on the ecclesiastic front, loyalists burned many of Barcelona's churches in their struggle against the Church-backed insurrection, but the Basque clergy so fully endorsed the Republic, for nationalist more than political rasons, that even today the Basque churches are crammed with the devout.

Differences between the Catalonians and Basques are also highly visible in the cities. The Catalonians can boast of one of the most beautiful and exciting cities in the world—Barcelona. The Spanish Basque cities (but not the countryside) tend to resemble Belfast, and I wonder if the terror generated in these diverse places does not in fact arise as much from industrial blight as from ideology.

Unlike the Basques, rather few Catalonians seek independence; most will settle for more autonomy. But, no mistake, ethnicity is a compelling emotion for the Catalonians, whose language, under Franco, was banned from print, the schools, and even public usage. They wish to recover their heritage, a passion that may be more potent than any political or religious ideology. Fortunately for Socialists, this heritage is inseparable from the egalitarian, democratic politics Franco sought to suppress but that now flourishes again. Efforts to dilute it, and to punish the Catalonians for their ardent anti-Fascism, included a Franco-backed immigration of the southern poor into the province, to the point where, Socialists say, Andalusians are now as numerous there as Catalonians. The final results of this forced wedding are unpredictable. There are tensions, mainly for displaced Catalonians and the cultural impact is bound to be deep (the Andalusians' Flamenco, for instance, now rivals the sardanas in popularity). Still, some people claim that the Andalusians, basking in the beauty, hope, and good living of Barcelona, have become more Catalonian than the natives. Yet, Andalusians do not learn the Catalan language, the carrier of this unique culture.

Carlos Marx

AT LEAST A DOZEN BILLBOARDS in Palma bore the fist-and-rose emblem and the brief message "28 Congress, PSOE, Madrid"; and when the time came in mid-May, all the Spanish media focused on that Congress, the first fully legal one since the Civil War,

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producing hours of TV coverage and daily press headlines.

Carlos Marx was the central issue, or at least a surrogate for others, at the Congress. So vital is his memory for Spanish Socialists (reputedly over the years the most Marxist of European Socialist parties) that it unseated the party's popular leader, Felipe Gonzalez, a 37-year-old former Seville labor lawyer, who has guided the party since its rebirth.

"You have wounded me badly," Gonzalez told the Congress on the eve of what was to be his almost unanimous reelection—and he resigned. He had proposed that the party drop its Marxist label in order to attract voters who liked the party's program but recoiled from the label, and perhaps by that means to win the next parliamentary elections. Delegates responded by voting to describe the party as "class-based, of the masses, Marxist, democratic, and federalist." Only 31 percent of the delegates dissented. Gonzalez had not at all anticipated so hearty a defeat on this and other issues. My Palma informants, a majority of them Marxists, had confidently predicted that the Congress would split at least 60-40 in favor of the Marxists.

Like Santiago Carrillo, who persuaded the Communist party in 1978 to drop its "Leninist" label (making it the first Communist party to do so), Gonzalez also sought to clean up his party's image and dissociate it from the Russian-Stalinist connotations that mistakenly adhere to Marxism and that surely are not at all applicable to Spain's Socialist party.

The party, Gonzalez said, confronted different realities from those prevailing at its founding 100 years ago. "I ask you, comrades, that you acquire Marxism with a critical spirit, because Marx is not an absolute that divides the good from the bad. These absolutes bury Marxism more than do the capitalists themselves. We have to be socialists *before* we're Marxists."

I asked the Mallorquins, "Why is Marxism so important to you?"

"It's important because it indicates the direction we want to move in. We want to go the way of the French Socialist party, or some elements of the Italian Communist party, or the way of the Yugoslavs, rather than the way of the Social Democrats of Germany and Scandinavia and Britain."

"Why not the way of the Social Democrats?"

"Because the Social Democrats want socialism in a thousand years; we want it in a hundred."

"But don't you think that's because the Social Democrats in the northern countries have had power in their governments, and know how hard it is to change things, while the French and Italian parties haven't come to power yet?"

"That's part of it, but the major difference is that they're not Marxists. We're not doctrinaire, we don't believe in absolutes, and none of us are Leninists, none of us; but we do regard ourselves as Marxists and we want to be identified that way."

"But, how exactly does Marxism affect your party's program? How does it affect the practical decisions you have to make? In other words, what do you do differently from the Social Democrats?"

A pause and a hesitant response: "The main difference is that we don't want to support the UCD government any longer. The government is doing very badly and we don't expect it to last out its term in office. We expect to have new elections before the end of next year, and we expect to win them."

Given the shaky economies of Europe (and the world for that matter), pressures from below threaten most governments and topple some. In Italy, the Communist party's cooperation with the ruling Christian Democrats was withdrawn because it cost the party too much ground among its own supporters. In France, the Socialists joined forces with the Communists and threatened the conservative government; but the left coalition fractured and so the elections were lost. Since the same discontent presses upon the Spanish government, Socialists search for votes to achieve a margin of victory. The Marxists look to the left, but Gonzalez seeks

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to include the uncommitted middle in the party's appeal for votes. The result of this split may be that the Socialists themselves will divide, and be conquered.

The Spaniard's affinity for the French, the Italians, and Yugoslavs is not surprising; they all are Mediterranean people. Genoa and Marseille are only an overnight trip by boat from Palma, a proximity that inevitably links cultures, religions, politics. It is indeed a political irony that the generous support given by the Swedish and German Socialists has played a key role in the successes of Spanish Socialists. Of course, since the launching of the PSOE, Sweden's Social Democrats have lost their long tenure in office. The German Social Democrats, almost alone among the large parties in the Second International, are still in power. Though they are now the dominant group in that International, they are hardly its most popular, at least not with those affiliates who believe they pursue right-wing socialist politics (a tendency that may also, in these troubled times, be keeping them in power). Perhaps neither the Swedish nor the German party is a galvanizing role model for the fledgling Socialists of Spain.

The second irony is the virtual occupation of Spain (including the Balearics) by northern settlers and tourists. There can hardly be much love lost, even by the gallant Spaniard, on such gross quantities of culturally aloof and often politically hostile strangers, even though they are vital to Spanish prosperity. Spaniards have been patient with their northern friends, remembering how their own country was used as an early battleground againt Fascism, while their Anglo, French, and Russian friends ho-hummed and allowed the German and Italian Fascists to defeat the Republic and then launch the Second World War.

In Palma, I saw the now popular revival of the film *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, an Anglo version of the war, in dubbed Spanish: the Spanish heroine, Ingride Bergman, in brown face; a central hero and ultimate Anglo, Gary Cooper; the Spanish character, Akim Tamiroff. The theater was filled, with expectations as well as patrons, but the children squirmed and many adults understandably dozed off. *This* was *their* war?

Marxism being so pivotal an issue, I itched to probe it further with Mallorquin Socialists, knowing from experience that many "Marxists" assume "dialectic" to mean merely a conversation between two people. But being in no position to quiz them in these arcane topics, I simply asked:

"Do you have any *model* of a society in mind? Is there some country you can look to now and say, 'we want to move in *that* direction'? Like, say, Yugoslavia?"

I struck a responsive chord, without recalling at the moment the Catalonian tendency to anarcho-syndicalism and worker self-management.,

"We like the Yugoslav model very much," they responded eagerly, "or at least many aspects of it. The workers own and operate industry, and it works. It's also more democratic because the people run things, rather than the government or a few private corporations. But we think that the CIA, the Russians, and our own military would block that. The CIA has agents everywhere; they wouldn't want it; and the Russians want the state and the party to run everything. We want to be neutral in the battle between the superpowers, and we want to find a new way, not capitalism and not state communism."

I pointed to the single economic issue in the party's "transition program" for the '79 elections:

"Hacia el Retorno de la inversion! How do you interpret those words?"

"They mean we want to move toward a return on investments, and we want to stimulate new investments. After the transition period, we hope to stimulate *public* investments and provide some competition to private ownership."

"And after that?"

"We don't know, it's too early to tell. We will do what is needed to make the economy work and keep it from being controlled by a few individuals."

"And the social welfare system, what about that?"

"The budget for social security is bigger

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than the total of all other budget items for the whole nation, but again, it's centralized and controlled by a few people who administer it very badly. The system is inefficient, it doesn't care about the people, and it pays out to political favorites. The money is there, but the people who need it can't get it."

"Your program refers to the 'emigrants.' Why are they important?"

"A million and a half people left Spain under Franco. They are exiles. Many of them were exiled with the Republican army, others went elsewhere to find jobs. Most of them are workers and Socialists. The government denies these emigrants the vote and makes it difficult for them to return to Spain. We want votes, jobs, and an open door for the emigrants."

Some Spanish Socialists, at least for now and for specific aims, are working with the Communists. They claim that the Communist party, while more highly centralized than the Socialist, is nevertheless an "omnibus party" that even contains many Social Democrats. History can be misleading, but Socialists might jog their memories with George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* and his chilling accounts of Communist terror against other leftists, including himself, during the Civil War. But today's Spanish Socialists are young and have no personal memories of those years. It may be just as well. One can be too certain, based on some past performances, about who the good guys and the bad guys are. There was, after all, a Torquemada and a Catholic slaughter of heretics. But the Spanish church, hardly the noblest of bodies even now, no longer sheds the blood of dissenters. While the Russians may not have come this far, Stalin *is* dead, and the range of views in parties elsewhere is easily as wide as the Church's. Indeed, as Pope John Paul II is showing us, these opposite numbers are learning to live together, perhaps too well, and someday, if a second Aquinas appears, there may even be a reconciliation of Catholic and Marxist theology. Once disarmed, these dogmas (or at least the frenzy they inspire) might be laid to rest, so that we could all go to the seashore, or at least to Lorca's puppet show in the park.

The Spanish way, whatever the new and constantly improvising politics of the young will make it, can touch every *norteamericano*, surrounded as we are by a world in which, it is said, more people speak Spanish as a mother tongue than any other single language—and most especially by the swelling numbers of *sudamericanos* in our midst, who look to Spain for models. □

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David T. Bazelon

How Now "The New Class"?

The notion that there is a New Class in our society—"class" for large groups like owners or workers; "new" because Marx did not include it in his grand schema—is an idea that has arrived. After nearly a century of episodic and heated discussion, it has arrived, here in America, in perfect disarray.

The discussion of this concept was undertaken almost entirely within the socialist movement: most particularly, between disappointed thinkers on the way out and the regular fellows remaining to tend the flame. Today, the idea of a nonowning but privileged class has a special resonance in the East. There, the pervasiveness of Marxist ideology, along with the unarguable fact of a new group of bosses not accounted for by that ideology, makes the idea utterly obvious. I understand that Milovan Djilas—second to Tito in the Yugoslav revolution, who revived it with *The New Class*, published in English in 1957—has been an influential leader of underground political thought among dissident youth in Eastern Europe.

Three writers I know of were probably stimulated by Djilas's book to speculate about the existence of a New Class (not necessarily consisting of bosses) in the United States. These three are Daniel Bell, a post-Marxist who had established his version of the line of thought in *The End of Ideology* (1960) and pursued it in essays throughout the '60s culminating in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973); John Kenneth Galbraith in *The Affluent Society* (1958) and *The New Industrial State* (1967); and my own work in *The Paper Economy* (1963) and *Power in America: The Politics of the New Class* (1967).

I call Bell here a post-Marxist. (I used to say ex-Marxist, but I think post-Marxist is more precise. The power of his thought lingers a lifetime, even after one has decided he is wrong or inadequate on this-and-that proposition. An ex-Marxist is someone who is just sorry about the whole thing.) And, like Bell, I'm a post-Marxist—a junior member of the *Partisan Review*-Trotskyist group that attempted, back in the '40s and '50s, to terrorize Stalinist middlebrows with homemade polysyllabic bombs. So, with whatever else, I inherited Max Shachtman's theory of bureaucratic collectivism, which he devised to explain the postrevolutionary horror in Russia. (Among other effects, this theory certainly took the bloom off the rose of socialism.) The critical proposition was that something other than socialism might, and in Russia did, supplant capitalism, namely, rule by a new class of unpropertied bureaucrats who controlled the state that owned everything. He took some of this from Bruno Rizzi after refracting it through Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*, who probably borrowed a piece here and there from Max Nomad, who of course inherited it all from Jan Waclaw Machajski, who may very well have lifted some from Louis Boudin, after that one came across it in Michael Bakunin. I think somebody also stole something from Robert

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Michels, but who knows. Daniel Bell has traced the original ownership of this Maltese Falcon back to Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon.

But the one who got all the credit for popularizing the idea was James Burnham. Immediately after his exit from the Shachtman group, he published *The Managerial Revolution* (1941), in which he put together an effective amalgam to announce a new postcapitalist society aborning East *and* West—taking the famous Berle-Means thesis as to the separation of ownership and control in large corporations, the exfoliation of government bureaucracy under the New Deal, along with the now well-traveled theory of bureaucratic collectivism.

When I got into the matter in 1959, I mixed my post-Marxism with a brief but intense stint as a corporate lawyer. It was a great surprise to me to discover that the same idea—property—was central to both. Working for business, one simply walked the other side of the street. Doing so, however, the relation of managers to owners was clearly not to be filed comfortably under Master/Servant. The imaginative use of the idea of property by up-to-date American lawyers—as with exotic devices of the Internal Revenue Code, elaborate schemes of securing debt, and other splinterings of unitary property—certainly carried Karl Marx several steps forward. And I discovered that when I had lived through the Great Depression and the New Deal response to it, I had unknowingly been privileged to witness the third great American revolution (no more final or secure than the other two).

In *Power in America* I assumed the managerialism thesis out of Berle-Burnham and went on to expand the notion of the potenial "reach" of the New Class in America. I had by then met some people who were neither post-Marxist nor big-business lawyers, so I added moderately educated people to the mix. After all, by the mid-'60s one also had to deal with our newly mass-produced intelligentsia in the United States. Comparing the advance of the New Class with the historical rise of the bourgeoisie, I noticed that where there were markets and property in the one, there were organizations and careers in the other. The heart of it seemed to be education translated into organizational position. (Galbraith here decided to go with two different names—"technostructure" for the educated people in the corporations, and "educational and scientific estate" for the intelligentsia elsewhere, especially in the universities.)

So for me—hold on to your hats!—the American New Class included, for instance, a professor at Harvard, Herman Kahn or one of his generals, a corporate executive, a government bureaucrat, William Kunstler, an engineer, Tom Hayden, and me. Well, you can imagine! (With a class of this character, one may reasonably expect many and serious intraclass factional struggles.)

The great events of the '60s broke up that old *Partisan Review* gang, and much else besides. In reaction to those events, especially to their culmination in the McGovern nomination, a small but well-placed and highly talented grouping began to appear, most noticeably in and around *Commentary* and the *Public Interest* (and, just as noticeably, *not* in the *New York Review of Books*). Somebody started calling them the neoconservatives, and the designation stayed. They have taken up the concept of the New Class in a new and big way.

Irving Kristol declared war on that New Class in the *Wall Street Journal* (May 19, 1975), not long after he had been appointed a brigadier general in the Intellectual Supply Corps of the business class. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, even before he became a senator, had identified the New Class as that particular group of the university-educated who dispensed "services to populations that are in various ways wards of the state." Norman Podhoretz, also, is a leading figure in the grouping. That talent of this order should now have undertaken a defense of the established corporate order is, in my view, a major American departure. We don't do that very often.

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In a new book entitled *The New Class?* and edited by B. Bruce-Briggs (New Brunswick: Transaction Books), Norman Podhoretz writes the lead essay on this subject of the New Class, freshly presented by the neoconservatives. It is a lunar-clear louseup of the McGovern liberals, now called the New Politics people. Podhoretz's essay, entitled "The Adversary Culture and the New Class," is a broad-brush history of the intellectuals in this country. The simple story is that intellectuals were naturally hostile to the dominant business civilization in the United States and so created and adopted an "adversary culture" (Lionel Trilling's phrase)—political radicalism, avant-garde, warmed-over Dada, whatever bombed in Peoria. But with mass education engulfing the academy, there was a population explosion in the intellectual community. The culture that had been designed in other times for a small elite was now manhandled by a mob. Thus the spectacle of the '60s: a mass of privileged youth, along with cadres of the aging advantaged, wolfishly chomping away at the hand that fed them so well.

Why? he asks. Because now they are a New Class—based in the media, the academy, and the government—challenging a reduced and befuddled business class for ultimate rulership.

What is true in this story is obscured by the clarity of presentation. The worst ideological excesses of "New Politics liberalism," and these alone, are employed to bedevil the entire New Class, the whole professional and technical intelligentsia. Meanwhile, the business class is pictured as an over-the-hill jock being eaten alive by a swarm of gnats. But wait, I hear bugles sounding: the neoconservatives have risen to stand firm in defense of Western civilization, middle-class values, etc., etc.

The Podhoretz essay appropriately sets the tone for half the problem with the whole collection. I mean the problem of identifying the New Class solely by the raw New Politics ideology, and solely for the purpose of wholesale attack thereon: that is, *the creation and slaughter of a class enemy*. The rest of the problem with this neoconservative book (which, I feel, is important as an "event") is the limited, skewed, and downright unimaginative notion of what "class" in "New Class" might be or come to be, and whether in any event there is one. (A moment for the background of the book. It is the product of the New Class Study, foundationally undertaken by B. Bruce-Briggs with 4 assistants, 12 contributors, and 18 advisers [of which I was one]. All but one of the writers, Michael Harrington, is or looks like a neoconservative; maybe four or five of the advisers do not look like it. The essay you are now reading is, therefore, something in the nature of a Minority Report.)

The neoconservatives have decided to make believe that if there is a New Class, they are not members of it. In fact, educated workers in favored organizational positions—whether or not one is pleased to call them a class—are differentiated mostly by the character and agenda of their employers. The conflicts among the latter are then mirrored in factional differences *within* the intelligentsia itself. For example, the creation and establishment of the Cold War bureaucracy was probably the major New Class advance in the immediate postwar period. Following Sputnik, the greatest such movement forward was the expansion of the university professoriat in the '60s. There has been movement back and forth between the two groupings—and also great antagonism.

Well, we all hire out, one way or the other. Come to think of it, that's the bottom line on the whole idea of the New Class, if there is one, and on the neoconservative's misuse of the idea, even if there isn't. Whatever the New Class may be, if it be at all, it is obviously still a servant class. And whom you serve, when, and in what manner, is the subjective bedrock of membership—much more important, certainly over a full career, than choice of fashionable ideology.

The second half of the problem with the book called *The New Class?*—what it is, if it

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is—is dealt with in the big essay that is, inappropriately, the last one: "The New Class: A Muddled Concept," by Daniel Bell. Having been one of the major propagators of the idea, he is now signing off. As usual, he renders the matter with useful elaboration. In the end it is exactly the complexity of the historical changes in capitalism that requires him to abandon the concept of the New Class as a term of any utility. He concludes:

> It is a mentality, not a class. [It . . .] consists of individuals who have carried the logic of modern culture to its end. . . . It is not a "new class" in any social-structural sense. It is the endpoint of a culture in disarray.

The heart of the adversary culture—the "mentality"—is hedonism (as elaborated in Bell's *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*). On this he offers a very suggestive formulation, much more useful than the neoconservative "class-enemy" thesis:

> Without the hedonism stimulated by mass consumption, the very structure of the business enterprise would collapse. . . . Having lost its original justifications, capitalism has taken over the legitimations of an antibourgeois culture to maintain the continuity of its own economic institutions.

Daniel Bell acknowledges all of the observable trends in our changing society that would lead one, do lead me, to adopt the New Class notion: the dominance of organizations, state or otherwise; the heightened intellectual content of technology; the appearance of an augmented intelligentsia. But Bell prefers a set of his own more specific analytical terms. Perhaps that is appropriate for a sociologist busily developing a postcapitalist theory. Still, something like a "class" lingers as a needed common denominator. (I think he abandoned the term to neoconservative misuse, rather than contesting the territory.) His evidence and argument persuade one that the New Class, if it exists, is emergent and certainly not a fully matured class—not like the English uppers, for instance, a few generations ago. I, for one, never thought it was.

I would also embrace the suggestion, implicit in Bell's essay, that the phenomenon of class itself is probably different in our altered modern order: that we may be seeing the disintegration of the idea of class in a solvent of institutional and occupational complexity. But I'll stay with the New Class, even as a wastebasket category and if only to emphasize the reduced significance of property ownership, until the new groupings find a better common name. "Bourgeois" was a bit of a wastebasket, too: *all* property owners were included—financial, merchant, industrial, and candy-store.

Andrew Hacker, like Bell, will not use the idea. In his contribution to this book "Two 'New Classes' or None?" he favors the popular understanding of class in America—as in, She's a classy doll; or, He ain't got no class—and Hacker doesn't see any real class around. He will see it only when he notices a lot of individuals from a cohesive social background *who rule.* So the first basis for a New Class—essentially Burnham's managerialism—fails because most corporate managers "come from unprepossessing backgrounds," the power is in the corporation as a structure but not in these managers as individuals, and therefore the president of GM is merely one of the *haut prolétariat.* As for the second basis—the mass intelligentsia—that fails similarly, but worse. Not only are they not powerful "classy" individuals, their wordiness and other faults make them even questionably useful to society.

Hacker presumes to discuss whether the New class is or isn't (he was commissioned to write a defense of it); what he actually does is to say that the people in question are not a class because they do not rule. With this approach, the proletariat or the peasantry were never classes; and the bourgeoisie was

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not one until it became dominant. Now that's an original notion.

Hacker isn't the only one who cannot see a class that does not rule. James Burnham himself not long ago dismissed the intelligentsia as a New Class, while defending his own managerialist view, with these traditional words:

> Who hires and fires whom? How many men can Norman Mailer or Walter Cronkite set in motion when he picks up the telephone, compared to Harold Geneen or to What's-His-Name at the top of IBM? Come now.

But Hacker was certainly more candid than the neoconservative writers, who have hopped so avidly onto the corporate lap, in at least entertaining for a few pages the idea that those privileged educated workers employed by the corporations are to be counted as members of the New Class—the primary, solid core of it, in my view. Not so, leading representatives Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Robert L. Bartley, Nathan Glazer, and Kevin P. Phillips (as well as Norman Podhoretz). They define the New Class solely as an *ideological* grouping. Nathan Glazer, for example, sets out on a safari hunting lawyers who fit the "neo-conservative version of the 'new class.'" Hopeless journey. In this view, an attorney learning tax practice in the Treasury Department would be New Class, but only until the day he left the government, as he always intended, to use what he learned there for a much better price on the side of the corporations. (Another original view of "class.")

B. Bruce-Briggs, the book's editor, notes that the study on which it is based was indeed provoked by the new use of the term in 1972—identifying the New Class as made up mostly of university and government liberals—by Moynihan, Podhoretz, and Kristol (who is not included because he did not hand in his homework on time; Moynihan was an adviser). Still, to his credit, Bruce-Briggs has not adopted this special version of the idea—which nevertheless dominates and characterizes this book.

The New Class, I suggest most earnestly, has become an inevitable idea—not least because of this recent "class-enemy" use of it. Accepting it undistorted, we can get on with the longer, larger effort of monitoring the rich internal variety (and conflict) it presents. Otherwise it devolves to neoconservative cartooning. More important, we may not notice the massive advance from all quarters of the educated proletariat in our major institutions. Since *that* is inevitable, why not, then, the idea *of* it?

Nor should criticism of the loud ideological liberals be left to the frightened neoconservative faction. The new mass intelligentsia, our former students, need more generous counseling from cooler minds. This devil theory benefits not them but their corporate and other institutional bosses. Criticizing the New Class is both proper and urgently needed. I would love to join in again. But not lying around in a corporate whorehouse.

It is not simply that these people rely on, or defend, or bypass criticism of the corporate order but that they do so on a reduced level, much beneath their former one. All New Class elements are to be defined, in part, by the institutional powers to which they are most beholden. We all are still servants, with one master or another. But this neoconservative burst, *which is itself a New Class maneuver*, provides a fairly unpleasant spectacle of rampant self-interest. Now that intellectuals are a class, pursuing careers the way their fathers chased the business dollar, we have the fresh burden of reinventing noncareerist intellectuality. If that statement of the moral issue is not clear, enough, then how about saying it in Latin: *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*?

If there is a New Class other than the liberal-hating cartoon Irving Kristol created long ago and Norman Podhoretz adopted recently, *it began with the advance of the nonpropertied.* Originally, we thought that meant the factory workers and lesser persons, and only them. We were wrong. The great advance of the nonpropertied has been made

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by educated/organizational people, not by the classical proletariat. If Marx was right and property is indeed all that important, then the rise of a segment of the nonowning servants of property to the status of near-masters is equally important.

Irving Kristol and I know that *ideas* of classes are great political weapons. That's why he declared war, acting for the corporations, on an intentionally *mis*defined New Class. He chose as initial target the most vulnerable of the educated employees, those recently hired by government and universities. But the really important, indeed constitutive, employees of the corporations should not rest too easily, or enjoy the spectacle too much. If they separate themselves from their classmates employed elsewhere, they weaken their *own* potential class defense. When the time comes. All in all, Kristol devised and sold a brilliant (and British) divide-and-rule strategy to our bosses.

Kristol shows us how to *dis*organize a class. The remaining and rather more interesting question is how one gets organized. With a *new* class—since class is based on a person's position in society—I can only think that awareness of this new position is the stuff of which organizing principles will be made. One can look at this from an individual or a social perspective (hopefully and finally, of course, both). Individually, the issue is moral and stark because there is so often a real choice for the educated hireling between careerist motives and the candid, objective, devotional pursuit of idea and image: that is, subjective action within the traditional image of the intellectual. Socially, the basic factors (or choices) of organization are: the intelligentsia distinguishing itself from its various employers, asserting its own political independence, and making alliances (not domineering or supine identifications) with other classes and groups.

The ever-present threat to our bosses is the forging of a 51 percent coalition against them. With a greatly expanded intelligentsia leading, it becomes feasible as never before. Podhoretz notes with alarm that in 1972 they "came infinitely closer to actual power than any political movement associated with the adversary culture had ever done before. . . ."

But, it must be asked—particularly in the afterglow of the McGovern campaign—is the New Class or any major faction of it, in any probable organized form, capable of building and then entitled to lead a new democratic coalition? I merely ask and do not presume to answer the question. But note that the New Class advances on not one but two fronts: on-the-job, and off-the-job. The first alters the character of our institutions; the second will participate in remaking our politics. In the long run, advances on the job may well be more determinative of the character of the class in its maturity. Certainly, ideological dogma—a notable emanation of the New Class—is deadlier in small groups. And coalitions compel compromise.

To conclude, let me give a quick sketch of my class map of the United States. At the top is the *Over Class*, essentially C. Wright Mills's power elite: Rockefellers and Mellons, of course, but also corporate and governmental bosses, univeristy and foundation bosses, all institutional elites. Then, the under-the-top people who make the organizations work: the *New Class*. Off to the side, the *Rentiers*: the paper-holders, the residual rich whose wealth is managed—as is everything else—by the educated/organizational New Class. Then, the *Proprietors:* owners who control what they own, and actively make their place in the world thereby, whether Henry Crown or the Chevy franchise-holder in Waukegan: the enduring classicists. Next, the *Unionized Worker*: the proletarian who got organized, then used government and his own institutions to force a special place in the system (generously, for himself and others; selfishly, with exclusionary thrust). Finally and least, the *Underclass*: all the uninvited, those not welcomed in and unable to get there anyway. Please note that this expanded lumpen-proletariat includes not only enraged blacks, welfare habitués, social losers of a great variety (in and out of institutions), but also an

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increasingly sizable and significant downward-mobile population: e.g., Ph.D. cabdrivers. A large number of sometime-students stand perilously between the New Class and the Underclass. That, I suggest, is where the real radicalism will be—indeed, already is, in Italy.

Now doesn't that give you a feeling for separating-out the educated/organizational well-to-do, whether or not they are "liberals"? Is it really still all right to think of the bosses of GM, and their top helpers, as merely *haut prolétariat*? A boss is a boss, whether or not by virtue of property ownership. Privilege is privilege, even if based "only" on organizational position and education.

The amoeba of the unpropertied proletariat has bifurcated, perhaps more than once. If some want to continue to see workers only, just interesting occupational changes—all right. But keep watching. And as you do, especially notice what the fast, smart ones do. Don't call them a New Class, if that is your pleasure. But keep your eyes open. You never know what they are going to do next. For instance, this neoconservative group. . . .

In my view, the New Class will persist and grow, even if defined out of existence. So will the corporations and other organizations that they cannot exist without, and that cannot exist without them.

Let's say the most real issue for all us New Class people is, What kind of employee of The Organization shall we be? That is, what do you think of the Boss? What do you say to Him?

Wasn't that always the most real issue? Everywhere? □

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Henry Pachter

Marx and the Jews

It is not because his life was too short that Moses could not enter the promised land, but because it was a human life.

—FRANZ KAFKA

I: Psycho-History vs. Marx

Histories of socialism usually begin with the Old Testament prophets, mighty preachers against usury and "those that buy the poor for silver," visionaries of a golden age and messengers of perpetual peace. Their god was a god of Justice above all. Later, in the Diaspora, the Jews responded to persecution with a fervent messianic faith (which need not, of course, be socialist); but immediately upon emancipation, the buried message of social justice burst forth again in a crop of small and great prophets. Many Jews were followers of Saint-Simon, others helped to lay the foundations of Social Democracy: Moses Hess, Stefan Born, Ferdinand Lassalle, and, towering above them all, Karl Marx. In the generation of the Second International, Jews became so visible among the socialist leaders that Viktor Adler tried to restrain their zeal: Bernstein on the right wing and Luxemburg on the left, the brilliant Austro-Marxists and many of the Russians, both Marxist and Populist: Trotsky, Isaac Steinberg, Axelrod, Martov; in America Morris Hillquit and the anarchist-feminist Emma Goldman. Among the martyrs of anarchism also were Gustav Landauer and Erich Mühsam.

However varied the ideas and careers of these men and women might have been, it is reasonable to assume that some elements of the prophetic and messianic tradition may have contributed to the formation of their intellectual profile. Conversely, as revolutionary socialists, most of them had to shed other parts of the Jewish tradition (notable exceptions were Moses Hess and Isaac Steinberg), to reject their parents, to liberate themselves from the confines of their social, national, and religious origins through a more or less vehement gesture of rebellion.

In an era of rapid modernization, members of an oppressed minority may have to make painful choices. Some may acquire a totally new identity—Johann August Wilhelm Neander (Mendel) became a great Protestant theologian, Friedrich Stahl the theorist of German Conservatism, Eduard Gans the oracle of orthodox Hegelianism. Others, who also "bought the ticket of admission" (baptism)—Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Börne, both great German patriots and democrats; Benjamin Disraeli, "the alien patriot"—never allowed anybody to forget that they were Jews. Conscious of both the Paradise they lost and the other they did not gain, such persons live under tensions that may turn their genius toward total alienation and destructiveness (Weininger, Drumont) or to the creation of a personal vision of

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Paradise. To some Jewish rebels, however, a lucky combination of history and tradition has given the opportunity of converting the problem of personal or tribal salvation into a message for all mankind.

Such a turn from the particular to the universal requires an intellectual reorientation, or rather a shake-up of all former premises, a tearing-away from tribal, religious, and national moorings, the conception of a total revolution. The messianic-prophetic message must be transposed from a context in which it no longer makes sense to one that transcends both the minority world and the greater world of the environment. A twofold tension then becomes the spring of a prophecy: to open the doors of the ghetto, which cannot accommodate the ideas of the new century, to open the doors of bourgeois society, which is unable to contain all the new energies streaming into it. While everybody may have utopian dreams at a certain age, the task of restructuring the world may become a lifetime obsession for some.

In many of these respects the life of Karl Marx was so typical that older biographers hardly felt the need to dwell on details. They were interested in the sources of Marx's ideas rather than his emotional inspiration; his relations to the Movement rather than his family relationships; his interaction with his contemporaries rather than his dreams about his ancestors.

Recently, the virus of psychoanalysis has invaded history departments, and now posterity must learn all about a subject's suckling and weaning, sex life and pathology. "To his valet no man is a hero," says the proverb—to which Hegel answered: Precisely, because he *is* a valet! This valet's view of history sometimes yields interesting results on some level, but peephole information is not historical explanation.

The mischief is not as new as some of its practitioners think. Fifty years ago Otto Rühle—an anarcho-communist, friend of Karl Liebknecht and later Cardenas's adviser on education—published a Marx biography, based on the psychology of Alfred Adler, which explained that Marx's rebelliousness stemmed from Jewish inferiority feelings, and the troubles in the First International from his carbuncles. In these fifty years, however, psychohistory has progressed. With greater sophistication, we now know that the carbuncles were not the cause but the effect of Marx's failures; or even more subtly—the carbuncles were his subterfuge to prevent himself from getting out of the rut to which he was irretrievably addicted, an addiction the infant is said to have acquired in order to stay dependent on his mother.

This is the theme of Arnold Künzli's erudite and voluminous *Karl Marx: Eine Psychographie* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1966). Künzli knows that little Karl objected to being weaned and begrudged his younger siblings their place at the mother's breast; Mrs. Marx was what one might call a smothering Jewish mother and never allowed Karl to grow up and develop mature relationships. Rejecting his parents, he developed a strong aversion to their Jewish background and behavior; Jewish self-hate in due time prevented him from coming to terms with his messianic heritage and, forced to look for another "chosen people," he invented the proletariat. *Voilà* Marxism exposed as the fantasy of the Jew who failed to grow up, and only three small points remain to be explained:

- A million Jewish boys have overbearing and overcaring mothers, but one becomes Karl Marx, the other—Portnoy; *la petite différence!*
- What do we know about Engels's Jewish mother? Or Lenin's, Liebknecht's, and Bebel's?
- Suppose Künzli is right—what caused millions of people to identify with the fantasy of this inefficient, immature Jew?

Watching a blimp, a psychoanalyst once made me notice that it was a penis symbol; I replied: Maybe, but doesn't it fly? Some Jews seem to take comfort in the revelation that the man who killed six million of them may have been a sex pervert; such talk merely distracts us from studying the phenomenon of fascism.

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Likewise, the considerable body of literature that has been written about Marx's *kvetches*, and especially about his "anti-Semitism," is largely irrelevant to an understanding of his thought; nor does it help us understand the sociological phenomenon of left-wing anti-Semitism. Toward such comprehension and an illumination of this problem only Marx himself has made a contribution and, after him, George Lichtheim ("Socialism and the Jews," first published in *Dissent*, now in his *Collected Essays*, New York: Viking, 1972).

The question whether Marx was "anti-Semitic" centers mostly on his controversial essay "On the Jewish Question," which he published in 1843. It has been answered affirmatively, before Künzli, by Eugene Kamenka in "The Baptism of Karl Marx" (*Hibbert Journal*, LVI, 1958) and by Edmund Silberner in *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage* (Berlin: 1962; see an English version of the part relating to Marx in *Historia Judaica* XI, 1949).

The recent biographers Fritz Raddatz and David McLellan come down against Künzli's exaggerations, and Jerrold Seigel totally reverses Künzli. According to Seigel (*Marx's Fate*, Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 145) Marx came into his own when in 1844 he eventually rejected the Christian-German philosophy and embraced "Jewish" materialism. The newest review of the entire material, judicious and comprehensive but adding little really new, is by Julius Carlebach: *Marx and the Radical View of Judaism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). This work has been carried down to recent theories (including the Frankfurt School) but fails to come to grips with New Left anti-Semitism.

My own approach will be historical. I shall try to show that the term "anti-Semitic" as we understand it today does not apply to the author of "On the Jewish Question" and to his contemporary audience, which understood his meaning in the context of the Hegelian philosophy and its language. I shall also contend that one is not entitled to draw psychological inferences from this essay, unless one has a thorough grasp of its terms.

II: The Jews Marx Knew

When Franz Mehring wrote his classic biography of Marx sixty years ago, he was content to mention that the founder of scientific socialism was "descended from a long line of rabbis"; thereafter he did not think it necessary to refer again to the subject of Jewishness, except to express disapproval when Marx used epithets in bad taste against Lassalle. Times have changed, and with them our knowledge, our sensibilities, and our interests. In the latest biography Fritz Raddatz—the distinguished literary editor of *Die Zeit*—takes pains to trace the rabbis on both the father's and the mother's side down to famous Talmud scholars of the 16th century in Lvov and Padua (going back 13 generations, every Jewish family probably can come up with a famous Talmud scholar). More to the point, we learn that Mehring used an edition of the Marx-Engels correspondence that had been piously purged of dirty words and anti-Semitic expletives. Moreover, we learn that he had knowingly withheld from the comrades embarrassing intelligence of the son Marx had fathered with his maidservant—information that had also been kept from Mrs. Marx and the daughters, a touching reminder that the great challenger of middle-class morality and his immediate followers were still living this side of liberation.

That Marx and Engels were children of their time is, perhaps, nowhere as painfully apparent as in their attitude toward Jews, especially in their younger years. They saw them as "kikes" and used language that was common among their contemporaries. But Jews used the same language too. As a black man may call another "nigger," Jews disseminate the lovingly self-deprecating jokes about scared, crafty, and *chutzpah*-prone coreligionists—jokes that the uninitiated consider a sign of Jewish self-hate but the connoisseurs allow to melt on their tongues as fruits of refinement, and that they like to interpret as expressions of freedom or proof of maturity. We find these jokes in the works of two great apostates, Ludwig Börne and

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Heinrich Heine, next to passionate pleas for the civil rights of Jews and moving lamentations on the Jewish plight. Neither they nor Marx had turned their backs on Jewry, and Marx's daughter Eleanor proclaimed her Jewishness in public, although she knew nothing about Judaism.

At the same time these assimilated Jews were highly conscious of the chasm that separated them from the mass of their coreligionists. They were an elite, not of their own tribe but in the German middle class. Marx's father Heinrich, himself a deist and liberal, had to convert in order to keep his government job, since some of the emancipation laws that the French Revolution had brought to the Rhineland had been revoked after Napoleon's defeat. Characteristically he chose Protestantism in a Catholic province, and he remained on good terms with his brother, the chief rabbi of Trier. Several years later he found it necessary to have his children baptized too, and only his Dutch wife held out a little longer.

Mrs. Marx may have had only a rudimentary education; her German was grammatically imperfect and her spelling atrocious; we do not know whether she kept some Jewish customs after baptism. Father Marx was as upright a patriot and liberal as one could find in Prussia; he was chairman of the local lawyers' guild, organizer of a "banquet" that dared to petition the absolutist government, and spokesman for the Jews. Two hundred other middle-class Jews lived in Trier with their families; but there were in the county ten times as many Jewish peddlers, cattle dealers, small-time usurers, and others whom the classmates of young Karl Marx had in mind when they spoke of "the Jews." They were the *visible* Jews, hated and despised by the gentiles. In Marx's time such Jews still had to step down from the sidewalk whenever a Christian gentleman demanded it, and only one child per family was allowed to marry and live within the city.

I don't hold with *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*; still we all know the *embarras* of poor relations. One will never understand the attitude of Karl Marx to the "Jewish Question" unless one realizes that middle-class Jews had every incentive to emphasize what separated them from these lower-class Jews. By immersing themselves in German middle-class culture, classical literature, and patriotism, they hoped to fend off the specter of pogroms: by repudiating their poor relations they hoped to escape the opprobrium that attaches to the "dirty" Jews. Heinrich Graetz, the great Jewish historian, wrote in his 12-volume *Geschichte der Juden* passages like this:

> Twisting and turning, lawyers' tricks, wit, and prejudiced rejection of what transcends their horizon . . . are the characteristics of the Polish Jews. They don't know honesty and justice . . . they rejoice in cheating. . . . The gentiles resented their superiority in Talmudic logic.

(Graetz, incidentally, exchanged books with Marx.) Such expressions of liberal sentiments were typical among German Jews; they do not, in a man like Graetz, indicate Jewish self-hate or anti-Semitism, but parallel exactly the feelings a German gentile might express about Polish gentiles. It is the mimicry of a West-East differential in cultural development that already appears in 18th-century documents:

> I know, Sir, that the German Jews have nothing in common with the Portuguese Jews except a certain religious ritual, but that their mores betray no real similarity between them [*Ephraim Justifié: Lettre à André Pinto, Juif Portugais*, 1758. We shall again encounter this "Pinto the Jew," who crossed swords with Voltaire.]

The middle-class German Jew tried hard to be seen as someone very different from his distant cousin. For instance, among middle-class German Jews one never spoke of money; as gentile cant prescribed, one had a "calling" (*Beruf*). But the cartoonist's Jew, the Jew whom the anti-Semite knew, spoke candidly of profit, and the German Jew was ashamed for him. (To be precise, the middle class I have referred to here would probably be ranked as "upper middle" by American sociologists.) Neither Stendhal's Leuwen nor Balzac's Nucingen, both of whom were modeled after James Rothschild, have conspicuously Jewish

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features. Only poor Jews are dirty. (By the way, Marx thought Balzac a superb observer of the bourgeoisie.)

Though obviously only a minority of Jews could be usurers, a man who was about to hock his watch might say "I am going to the Jew" as readily as, not so long ago, a New Yorker who took his dirty shirts to the laundry might say "I am going to the chink." This was the world in which Marx grew up. It is well reflected in European literature, and its stereotypes were accepted even by Jews. A novel like Gustav Freytag's *Debit and Credit*, for instance, which strikes us today as anti-Semitic, could be found in many Jewish households, although the rapacious, unscrupulous Itzig, with jargon, kaftan, and all, was presented there as the prototype of parasitical capitalism. Börne, Heine, and the young Marx had imbibed the ugly language in which "Itzig" (diminutive of Ignatius, a common name among East European Jews) stands for everybody who talks with his hands. Whenever Marx was angry at Lassalle's presumptuousness he called him that—or worse—behind his back. In a letter to Engels (MEW XXX, p. 259) he also called Lassalle "negroid," adding a low speculation about his mother.

III: The German Heirs of Philosophy

There is more of this in Marx's correspondence and notes. In the now-famous "Eleven Theses on Feuerbach" he criticizes the philosopher for contemplating theory only, "while practice can be grasped only in its dirty Jewish form of appearance." The word Jewish is added here for emphasis; it is a gratuitous snicker for those who took this language for granted. As I shall explain later, however, it is not entirely unmotivated in terms of Marx's intellectual development. He was wrestling with the problem of the unity of theory and practice; coming from the school of philosophical idealism, he was still looking for a way of endowing practice with some kind of halo and was shocked to find it only in its "dirty," raw and unidealized form. His materialist turn would come soon.

Marx never published the "theses," but even in his published works he used anti-Semitic invective when it served a propagandistic purpose. To discredit a loan that the hated Czar tried to place at the London Stock Exchange, he denounced the involvement of the Jewish bankers who expected to profit from the transaction ("The Standing of the European Houses" and "The Loanmongers of Europe," New York *Daily Tribune*, November 9 and 22, 1855; a superb work of financial journalism). Incidentally, this is the only place where Marx attacks the House of Rothschild. Likewise, when he wished to denigrate a measure to increase the circulation of money, proposed by the Prussian Minister of Finance, Marx cited "a book *On Circulation* by the Jew Pinto, a famous stockjobber of the 18th century," and thereafter always referred to the Minister as "Pinto Hansemann" as though the Jewish surname made him look foolish (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, April 1849, passim).

Engels, too, was not above appealing to anti-Semitic prejudices for purposes of propaganda, though in his case no Jewish mother can be cited as the real object of his hate. An example occurs in his article on the Polish revolution, published in the same paper on April 29, 1849, under Marx's editorship. Like all radicals, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* ardently supported the Polish cause, while the German National Assembly in Frankfurt opposed it, pointing to the great number of Germans living in the provinces that Austria and Prussia had annexed from Poland. Indignantly Engels replied: "They counted the Jews as Germans although this meanest of all races could not have any relation of kinship with [the Assembly in] Frankfurt, neither by its jargon nor by its descent, except perhaps by its lust for profit." At the same time the article denounced the "Teutonic money-grubbers," and the intention clearly is to throw opprobrium on a Prussian king who condescends to ally himself with Jews. Its aim is obviously not to sow anti-Semitism but to

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exploit an existing anti-Semitism and make a point.

Bad enough. But to judge such outbursts, one must compare them with similar invectives against other races that had incurred the wrath of these strict censors; one after the other the Russians, the Danes, the Prussians, the "Ur-Teutons," the "Balkanians," the Croatians, the Slovenians have stood in the path of revolution and therefore are subjected to national or racial slurs. Other Slavic minorities in the Austrian monarchy are even worse off: though not guilty of counterrevolution, the Czechs and Slovaks are unable to make their own revolution successfully—the Hegelian World Spirit has condemned them to remain *geschichtslos*, without history, the worst insult a Prussian can fling at another nation:

> On the one hand the revolution: Germans, Magyars, Poles; on the other, the counter-revolution, i.e., all Slavs except the Poles; also the Rumanians, the Transylvanians. . . . All history shows that only three nations are capable of living. The others have the mission[!] to be swallowed by the revolutionary storm and to perish [quoted by Roman Rodolsky in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, vol. IV, Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1964, p. 187].

Later, when the Poles disappointed Engels, they too were thrown into the dustbin of history. The Jews missed the boat of history in 1849, when their leading cadres, together with the entire German middle class, abandoned the revolution.

Nevertheless, it is the Germans who were called by Hegel's World Spirit to take the lead in the next stage of history. With unconcealed pride Engels commented on Bismarck's victories in the Franco-German war of 1870, and Marx allowed that the superiority of the German arms would also help Marxian socialism to win out over Proudhon's brand. From their Olympian seat the two leaders judged Liebknecht's opposition to the founding of Bismarck's Reich "silly," for German unity had been one of their earliest political aims. To be fair: they often ridiculed and denounced the stupidity, meanness, and cowardice of the political establishment in Germany, and condemned German nationalism and imperialism. But such strictures were political, never racial or ethnic; nor do the historical betrayals of the German bourgeoisie ever doom the Germans as inexorably as they doom other nations in the eyes of Marx and Engels.

In the case of Russia, by contrast, Marx's hate of the Czar and of the whole "Asiatic mode of production" seems to color his view of the Russian people. When he writes a pamphlet against Bakunin, he begins, "The Russian, Bakunin," as though this characterization could predispose the reader against his opponent. Bakunin responded in kind by calling Marx a treacherous Jew. But you really don't have to be Jewish to display German haughtiness vis-à-vis the Russians: when Bakunin tried to organize the Slavic resistance against German-Magyar domination in the Hapsburg monarchy, Engels berated him in almost racist language, pointing to the gratitude the Slavs owe the Germans, who civilized them, and to the impossibility of founding viable states with such slovenly nations. In the same article he also applauded the efficient, culture-wielding, railway-building Yankees for having taken "rich California from the lazy Mexicans" (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, February 15 and 16, 1849).

Marx, too, had a poor view of the lesser breeds. While he deplored the destruction of the ancient Indian culture, he saw it doomed anyway by frequent invasions and suggested that it would be better for the Hindus to be subjected by British than by barbarian conquerors: "The British have broken up the self-sufficient inertia of the villages, and railways will supply the new art of communication" (New York *Daily Tribune*, August 8, 1853).

In his private correspondence Marx was even harsher on backwardness. But while he shared the prejudices of all Victorians, he also gave warmhearted public support to all national movements: Indian, Italian, Czech, Polish, Irish, and especially to those that were directed against German-Austrian overlords.

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No one can doubt the sincerity of Marx's internationalism, and we must often admire the soundness of his judgment on national revolutions.

But in their political-philosophical beginnings both Marx and Engels had shared the Young-Hegelian hopes for the *Grossdeutsche* revolution that was to bring "unity, justice, and freedom." As this hope grew more radical, they thought that the democratic revolution in Germany would transform itself into the social revolution, and being equipped with the heritage of German idealistic philosophy, the underdeveloped German proletariat would lead the socially and economically more developed West:

> In Germany no particular servitude can be broken without breaking all kinds of servitude. Radical Germany cannot be revolutionized without revolutionizing everything from bottom to top. The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of Man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot be realized without abolishing the proletariat, the proletariat cannot be abolished without realizing philosophy. ["Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, 1843—hereafter referred to as the *Yearbook*; my translation. For the context, see *Writings of the Young Marx*, Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, eds., New York: Anchor Books, p. 264. Hereafter this edition is referred to as Easton and Guddat, eds. and cited only for identification of context.]

This, of course, is pure Hegel, and its logic is carried along by the antithetical phraseology. As we shall have to remember presently, Marx enjoyed using this style, which he had learned from the master.

IV: *Schachern* De-Theologized

In this scheme of things the Jews had once occupied a place. Their historical function had been to introduce capitalism, or, more precisely, a religion compatible with acquisitiveness, calculation, and money. (*"Où il y a de l'argent, il y a des juifs,"* said Montesquieu in *Persian Letters* LX.) Although only a few Jews had profited from the system, it had spread all over the civilized world; though the Jews did not rule, Marx said, their spirit did. "Mammon has become our God," Engels complained in this same *Yearbook*, though of course he was not the first to say so. But, Marx goes on, precisely because it has reached its peak, the tide must turn—by virtue of another Hegelian law Judah's fall is imminent:

> When society succeeds in transcending the empirical essence of Judaism—haggling and all its conditions—the Jew becomes impossible precisely because his particular consciousness no longer has an object; the subjective basis of Judaism—practical need—is humanized, and the conflict between his individual, sensuous existence and his species existence is transcended. The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism. [Easton and Guddat, eds., p. 248.]

These strange lines in the Hegelian manner form the conclusion of Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question," appearing in the same *Yearbook* from which I have quoted the idealistic exaltation of the German proletariat. What is even stranger, they form a rather non-germane second part to a 30-page essay whose bulk is a spirited defense of Jewish emancipation. Moreover, this same *Yearbook*, of which Marx was a coeditor, contains two further contributions with a strong pro-Jewish slant. One is a *chronique scandaleuse* about the Duchess of Baden and her Jewish lover who was cruelly expelled by the peasants, written by Bernays. The other is a skillful pastiche in which the commanding general's wife wishes to walk her dog in a public park "forbidden to dogs and Jews." After she has wrenched permission from her reluctant husband, the Jews come to claim that they ought to have at least the same rights as the dogs since they share their disabilities, too. The hilarious and sad incident, said to be true, is reported by Arnold Ruge, the coeditor of the *Yearbook* and a Young-Hegelian philosopher.

In a biographical context, the volume is of some interest because the three contributions

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by Marx reflect his rapid progress from Young-Hegelian idealism to Feuerbach's humanist materialism, and beyond, toward historical materialism. Shortly afterward, Marx and Ruge were to part company; the essay "On the Jewish Question" was a reply to another former mentor, friend and sponsor, Bruno Bauer. Bauer was a Young-Hegelian theologian who denied that Christ ever lived, and a radical democrat who did not believe in political action. He had accused Marx of lacking radicalism, because his own idea of revolution was that it must bring total liberation at once. Marx saw that this was possible only if one was content to operate "inside one's skull" in a manner that Hegel already had ridiculed. As an example of his attitude, Bauer had written two treatises on the Jewish question wherein he proved that a Christian state cannot emancipate the Jews without denying its own essence; hence, he concluded, Jewish emancipation would have to wait until everybody had become an atheist. Meanwhile, individual Jews had the alternative of emancipating themselves by converting to Christianity.

It is interesting to note that Marx was especially provoked by the impertinence of this latter proposition. He answered in great philosophical detail and, quoting the French and American Constitutions, showed that Bauer failed to distinguish civil from human rights. The former were meant to protect the latter. Civil emancipation did not mean equality in all spheres of human endeavor; it left each man free to err in matters of faith. By banishing religion from the public sphere,

> man was not freed from religion; he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property; he received freedom of property. He was not freed from the egoism of trading but received freedom to trade. The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals is accomplished in the same act. [Easton and Guddat, eds., p. 240.]

Fine so far. But then Marx was tempted to deal with the relationship between the Jewish and the Christian religions, respectively, and human freedom. Bauer had argued that Christianity, being "the most developed" faith, was only one step away from total liberation. This led Marx to introduce, for the first time, what thereafter became the "economic interpretation of history," or *Ideologie-Kritik*. He had learned from Feuerbach that in erecting idols man only worships the image he has of himself. Now he proceeded to reduce this self-image of man to the social image: theology merely reflects economic conditions:

> Let us set aside the Sabbath Jew and consider the actual, secular, everyday Jew. Let us look for the secret of the Jewish religion in the actual Jew. What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, interest. What is the worldly need of the Jew? Bargaining. What is his worldly God? Money. Very well—emancipation from bargaining [Marx always uses the Yiddish word, also used in German, *schachern* haggling] and money would be the self-emancipation of our era. [Ibid, p. 243.]

At this stage of his development, Marx still saw "money" as the embodiment of all evil—the incarnate alienation of man from his creative powers. He saw "Jews" as the personified symbols of that power. In the passage just quoted, therefore, "Judaism" and "Jewishness" are metaphors, rhetorical devices to get at the substance, which is the money-grubbing gentile. Just as he tried to smear the czar, the Prussian king and his finance minister by associating them with "Jewry," so he now attacks the Christian businessman:

> Judaism has survived . . . because the practical Jewish spirit has perpetuated itself in Christian society, and here it even has attained its highest development. [One has to hear the irony here: Bauer had said that Christianity had attained the "highest development" in religion—which now stands revealed as a reflection of economic relations.] The Jew is only the special manifestation of bourgeois society's Judaism. Judaism has survived not in spite of but because of history. Out of its own entrails bourgeois society ceaselessly reproduces the Jew. [Ibid., p. 245; the German term *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* is used ambiguously, meaning both civil society and bourgeois society.]

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The intention of the essay should now be clear, especially if we place it in the context of the *Yearbook*, where it was published. Having pleaded in various ways for Jewish civil rights, Marx now turns to the Christians, asking Who are you to deny us? Contrary to appearances, he is not attacking the Jews but is saying, That which everybody thinks is characteristic of Jews has been perfected by this Christian society:

> The Jew has emancipated himself inasmuch as the spirit of money has become the practical spirit of the Christian nations. The Christians have become Jews. [Ibid.]

Except for the peculiar language and the elegant antithesis, these are not Hegelian subtleties. A hundred years earlier, Voltaire had said: "Christians are uncircumcised Jews," and Germans had always called their Christian usurers "white Jews." A French socialist wrote in 1844, the same year Marx's *Yearbook* appeared, "I call by the despised name of Jew every dealer in money, every unproductive parasite who lives off other men's work" (Alphonse Toussenel, *Les Juifs rois de l'Epoque*). Marx's contemporaries, therefore, needed no guidance to understand his meaning; for us, however, a little sense of humor is needed to place the essay in its "period" context. Marx was not writing on the Jewish question but on the question of money. He made that point with finality twenty years later, in *Das Kapital*: "All commodities, however shoddy they may look, however malodorous they may be, in faith and truth are money, internally circumcised Jews" (vol. I, German edition, p. 162).

Said Saint Paul: "Not he is a Jew who is a Jew externally but he who is a Jew inside."

V: Marx Before Marxism

Although we can explain the essay "On the Jewish Question," we may still find it unsatisfactory. Jewish sensibilities have been hurt to the quick by Marx's bland identification of Judaism with money, and Jewish commentators have remarked that it was written without knowledge about things Jewish and without benefit of theological or sociological research. It was skewed because its intended target was hidden by the rhetoric of the manifest subject matter. It was simply trying to do too much at the same time:

— to answer an anti-Semitic argument made by Bruno Bauer;

— to plead for total emancipation, and for a secular, democratic state in general;

— to denigrate capitalists by branding them as "Jewish";

— to identify for primitive anti-Semites the enemy they should fight: "the Jew in themselves";

— to deny the Jews a particular and special existence as an estate, but to assure their safety as citizens;

— to show that religious strife concealed economic strife;

— to introduce a new method revealing the social roots of ideological and theological conflicts;

— to say for the first time: in order to obtain political change, you must change the social system.

A big load, which the narrow approach of this essay could not carry! Marx did not yet possess the terminology to deal with the questions he was opening up (the most glaring defect: he still says money where he means capital). He covers his ignorance with brilliant formulations, but he is unsure and repetitious, groping for the right words and often leaping from the economic base to the ideology and back instead of studying the mediations; his idea of historical materialism is still too crude to be plausible. The essay should be read as one that allows us a peek into Marx's workshop—like many originally unpublished manuscripts that an unkind posterity later analyzes under the microscope, it is a warming-up exercise, decidedly pre-"Marxist" in both tone and idea. For its content it depends too much on ideas of the so-called German Socialists whom Marx was soon to surpass and condemn in the *Com-*

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munist Manifesto four years later. Those early socialists were indeed fighting the cult of the Golden Calf, and "money" was their enemy:

> What God is for its theoretical life, money is for the perverted world's practical life—the alienated wealth of men, their life-activity that has been sold off. . . . Money is the product of mutually estranged men. [Moses Hess, quoted by Jerrold Seigel, in *Marx's Fate*, Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 115.]

The author, five years older than Marx and his close friend, was a mystic and messianist; later he became a precursor of Zionism, nevertheless retaining Marx's friendship. The article from which I have quoted had been submitted to the *Yearbook* and it is therefore not surprising to read there:

> Money is the jealous God of Israel before whom may stand no other god. Money debases all the gods of man and turns them into commodities. It is the universal, self-constituted value of all things. It has robbed the whole world, both human and natural, of its specific values. It is the alienated essence of man's work and being; this alien essence dominates him; he worships it. [Easton and Guddat, eds., p. 246.]

These claims are made in an apodictic manner. Neither Hess nor Marx proves how monotheism hangs together with the leveling power of money. Modern sociology would demand a study of the mediating links, a baring of the psychological mechanism, a closer determination of the nature of the relationship—whether it is causal or a mere parallelism. In his later practice of *Ideologie-Kritik* Marx was more subtle.

VI: From Usury to Capital

Anyway, the essay "On the Jewish Question," which has aroused so much controversy, does not reflect Marx's mature thought. A mere book review, it also is a mere transition piece. In the following section I shall show what place it occupies in the development of Marxism, as against the primitive anticapitalism of Marx's predecessors. Let us begin with Marx's treatment of money:

> Whatever is found to be abstract in the Jewish religion: the contempt of theory, of art, of history, of man-as-end-in-himself, that is the actually conscious point of view of man-the-money-maker, his virtue. Even the relations between man and wife become an object of haggling: women are bought and sold. [Ibid. — Again, "abstract," in Hegelian jargon, means one-sided.]

The last point is made frequently in early socialist literature; prostitution is used as a symbol for the condition of the proletariat. Marx also quotes Thomas Münzer, the peasant leader of the Reformation, who declared it intolerable that creatures of God should be owned by others. Marx developed this angle in the "Economic-Philosophical Manuscript" of 1844:

> Money is the visible divinity, it is the conversion of all human and natural qualities into their opposites, the general confusion and perversion of things; it makes brothers out of incompatibles. It is the general whore, the procuress of mankind . . . it is the alienating and alienated, self-alienating power of the human species. ["Nationalökonomie und Philosophie" in *Die Frühschriften*, Landshut, ed., Stuttgart: Kröner, 1953, p. 299.]

There he also quotes those lines from Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens* (act 4, sc. 3), which still reverberate in a footnote of *Das Kapital*:

> Gold, yellow, glittering, precious gold!
> Thus much of this will make black white; foul fair;
> Wrong right; base noble; old young; coward valiant
> . . . . This is it
> That makes the wappen'd widow wed again
> . . . Come, damned earth
> Thou common whore of mankind.

At this time, however, Marx had developed the full dialectics of exchange relations and was in possession of an adequate terminology for the analysis of capitalism. Therefore he no longer needed the synecdoche of "the Jew," citing the particular in place of the general. In

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his earliest studies of economics he had been baffled by the phenomenon of the division of labor. This seemed to him the very embodiment of all perversions, condemning man to a truncated existence. The specialization of the Jews, money trading, was at once the most outrageously dehumanizing and crippling activity and the most noxious for the community. The trader deprived himself of the pleasures of all-around activities, and he deprived the community of insight into the relations between its members. But by 1844, only one year after publication of the essay "On the Jewish Question," Marx was able to analyze this problem without resorting to the old visual aid—personalizing money in the Jew. In fact, without that distraction, the problem became clearer to him and to his readers. From then on, he no longer used the language of the early socialists, the anti-usury, anti-Semitic ideology of primitive anticapitalism.

Other socialists, like Proudhon and Fourier, never outgrew the primitive stage and never reached Marx's analytical clarity. Their intellectual development remained arrested at a stage where they still needed to see the abstract power of money embodied in the particular person of the Jew. Where they ought to have analyzed the functions of banking—good Christian firms like Neuflize, Hottinger, Laffitte, and Périer—they were content to shout "*A bas les Rothschild.*" Bruno Bauer, too, had taken it for granted that "the Jews own all." In 1843 Marx had answered: Look at all those white Jews, the Christian bankers. By 1844 he already was able to answer: Let us study the banking *system.*

In "On the Jewish Question" Marx took the first painful step away from primitive anticapitalist protest, but he still used the mystified language and imagery of that romantic rebellion. From then on we can watch him dissociate himself step by step: first explaining how imperfectly the symbol of "the Jew" reflects the conditions that create the symbol; then analyzing those conditions and developing tools for a new social science; finally, in the *Communist Manifesto*, criticizing primitive socialism as a whole. In the revolution of 1848, Marx forgot altogether the Jewish reference frame of his earlier diction, and naively accused the bourgeoisie *in its entirety* of *verschachern*, selling the revolution down the river. "They value freedom only as the freedom to bargain [*schachern*]," the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* declared on November 3, 1848. The language that had once been aimed at "usurers" now was leveled at the bourgeoisie *as a class.*

VII: Anti-Semites vs. Marx

In the preceding sections we have encountered the romantic Marx, the warmhearted seeker after human nature and critic of inhuman conditions—a man different from the cool scientist and tyrannical dogmatist whom the public associates with "Marxism." That he was an angry man, no one doubts; but then, anyone living under the conditions of the Prussian police state and facing the intellectual crisis of the 1840s might have looked for a radical philosophy—witness the proliferation of radical and liberal magazines despite harassment by censorship and police. Whether he had a grudge against his father or suffered from a smothering mother seems irrelevant in face of the fact that thousands of others also mounted the barricades in 1848.

That Jews felt the "German misery" twice as hard is obvious; even socially successful, baptized Jews, like Rahel Varnhagen, complained about it. At the time Marx wrote "On the Jewish Question," he had just been through a harrowing experience. The pietistic-aristocratic relatives of his fiancée, Jenny von Westphalen, had objected to their marriage, and her family had cut his mother, then a widow. Marx knew that baptismal water does not wash birth defects away, and after the revolution he warned the Jewish bourgeoisie that "siding with the counterrevolution will not save you from being sent back into the ghetto." However, when Jews were not with the oppressors but were the oppressed, he was on their side. A letter to

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Ruge, dated March 1843, reports that "the President of the Israelites here [in Cologne where Marx was editor of the liberal *Rheinische Zeitung*] . . . has asked me to help with a parliamentary petition on behalf of the Jews; and I agreed. However obnoxious I find the Israelite beliefs, Bauer's view seems to me too one-sided [*abstrakt*]. . . ." (Quoted by David McLellan, in *Karl Marx*, New York: Harper Colophon, 1973, p. 86.) Finally, when several Jewish writers answered Bauer and the latter rebutted them in his own paper, Marx came back to the charge and fully supported Bauer's Jewish critics (in two chapters of *The Holy Family*, 1845).

In view of all these facts the charge that Marx suffered from Jewish self-hate and tried to conceal his Jewish birth seems pure speculation, if not worse. It was voiced first by Eugen Dühring, an anti-Semite and Marx's rival for intellectual leadership in the German Social Democratic party (in his *Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie*, 1879, p. 490). This was the same Dühring against whom Engels wrote the series of articles, which then became the most popular introduction to "scientific socialism." In this book Engels mentions anti-Semitism only briefly (p. 136 of the German text) as "a specifically East Prussian superstition inherited from the Middle Ages." Marx was also attacked as a Jew by one Eduard Müller-Tellering, who had been a contributor to the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* and later in exile became an enemy, and by Wilhelm Marr, also a former associate, who was to become the foremost anti-Semitic agitator in the Bismarck era (in fact, he is credited with having invented the term anti-Semite in 1879). Ruge called Marx "a skunk and a slanderous Jew" and considered socialists "a gang of atrocious Jewish souls." More subtly, Proudhon seems to hint at Marx, writing "Jews are counterfeiters in trade and in philosophy." Marx never answered these attacks but allowed Engels to deal with them; according to Bebel, who liked to quote the coinage, it was Engels who said "anti-Semitism is the socialism of idiots." (This phrase is not mentioned by Silberner, op. cit., who cites a number of warm pronouncements by Engels after his alleged "conversion" from his early anti-Semitism. Silberner believes that Marx and Engels were anti-Semites in their early career; my point here is that their views on Judaism were a function of their social philosophy.)

If Marx had tried to hide his Jewishness, he could not have been successful. All who knew him and left memoirs have testified that he looked Jewish (Liebknecht, Ruge, Mevissen); his nickname was "The Moor" because of his dark complexion, and he could have sat for Michelangelo as a model for one of his prophets. His quarrel with his mother (probably over finances) has fed the theory that he wished to deny his family; but he maintained the most cordial relations with his Dutch-Jewish uncles, and his wife and daughters shared these affections. Carlebach, the latest to review the whole material (op.cit.), says that no clinical evidence supports the theory that Marx acted out of Jewish self-hate. Carlebach also makes the astute remark that if there was hate, it was not necessarily "Jewish" self-hate.

Nevertheless, it seems legitimate to ask why Marx came down so hard on the Jews. The unpleasant fact is that he was no model character and especially nasty when he spoke of rivals. Hence the anti-Semitic expletives against Lassalle. But he also had a considerable stock of anti-German, anti-British, anti-Polish, anti-Russian invective. His letters burst with obscenities. In *The German Ideology* he compares philosophy with masturbation; in his economic notebooks most authors are *Scheisskerle* (shitters), Malthus is ridiculed because of his many children, and only Adam Smith and Ricardo (though a Jew) never seem to deserve any epithet.

All nationalities were the object of his slurs, and Jews cannot claim any privileged place in the order of Marx's wrath; they merely have more reason to resent such derangement of taste in one of their sons. As to their sensitivity to his approach in "On the Jewish Question," I hope to have shown that at least partly this is due to the difficulties this essay presents to

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anybody who is not steeped in the philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach and in the language of early socialism. Shlomo Avineri has tried to correct this sort of misunderstanding in his essay "Marx and Jewish Emancipation" (*JHI*, XXV, 1964), in which he emphasizes Marx's distinction between civil society and political society, between human emancipation and political emancipation, between brotherhood of men and equality before the law, between bourgeois and citizen (both words are *Bürger* in German). But if Marx was concerned with man as a social being, why did he then confuse the social with the economic? He who knew Shakespeare so well might have quoted Shylock:

> Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases. . . . If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? [*Merchant of Venice*, act 3, sc. 1.]

VIII: The Unresolved Question

I think the essay "On the Jewish Question" is unsatisfactory; it evades the real questions, and F. Raddatz (op.cit.) says candidly that it does not make much sense. Jews will not be reduced to an economic paradigm. Nor is anti-Semitism simply a matter of economic classes. It existed long before capitalism. Jews were despised in ancient Rome because they would not eat with the gentiles nor sacrifice to the gods of the land or to the emperor. They did not participate in the rites that were needed to make the soil fertile and to weld the nation into blood brothers. They worshipped an invisible, alien, abstract god whom they carried everywhere—like money, indeed, but perhaps in a sense slightly different from the interpretation that Marx gave the association. In the Middle Ages the Jews were "dusty travelers" journeying from fair to fair, taking root nowhere, strangers everywhere. The service they performed might be necessary, but it could be performed only by outsiders, unclean people—untouchables who were allowed to live on sufferance, as a privilege granted by the sovereign.

Then the roles were reversed. As in Hegel's famous chapter, the master became dependent upon the servant; the gods of the soil died; the king aggrandized the manipulators of money, whose religion was compatible with the abstract, invisible power that was encroaching upon traditional life. The representatives of the aristocracy and of the clergy expressed their resentment: Jews are the carriers of rationalism, commercialism, bureaucratic government. Impoverished handicraftsmen, too, became victims of this same liberalism that benefited the Jews: the revolution emancipated their persons from the shackles of privilege and their business from the shackles of the guild system. Next to the tree of Liberty, therefore, grew "the poisoned root of anti-Semitic socialism" (George Lichtheim, op.cit., p. 414). Anti-Semites drew effective arguments from the resentments of the traditional classes, especially in Germany where nostalgic resistance against the Enlightenment and Liberalism was always confused with the resistance against French domination:

> The Jewish religion appears to be totally a work of the intellect: a creation purposely injected into the organic world order to destroy everything natural, to subject it and to replace it by its own mode of operation. Just so capitalism, which places an artificial, calculated, and manufactured strangeling into the natural, creaturelike world. Rationalism is the word that united Judaism and capitalism. [Werner Sombart, *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*—The Jews and Capitalism—Leipzig: Duncker, 1911, p. 242.]

Clearly, this goes back to Marx's indictment of "money"; but where Marx resolved the Jewish question into a question of capitalism, Sombart resolved the social question into a Jewish question. Then came the First World War, and the Kaiser needed the help of every Jewish banker in Germany. Behold, the great historian of capitalism found no difficulty in now ascribing all those Jewish traits of heartless, calculating mercan-

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tilism to—the British (*Händler und Helden*—Heroes vs. Traders—Leipzig, 1916). Not surprisingly, Sombart also adjusted himself to the Nazis and published a book on *German Socialism* in 1934. He declared that he was no anti-Semite but merely (!) wished to keep the Jews out of the German universities. If ever the crudest conception of the relationship between economic interests and ideology can be proven true, it applies to the German antirationalist philosophy, which is so closely connected with anti-Semitism.

But ideologies must be taken seriously, and Marx was too much involved in Hegelian and Feuerbachian rationalism to see the force of the romantic reaction. His analysis of the Jewish question shed light only on half of the problem: alienation in a money economy. "Abolish money and you will abolish the Jew," he had suggested; but "abolishing the Jew" does not mean to abolish anti-Semitism. Today "the Jew" no longer symbolizes money, yet the Jewish question is still with us—and precisely in those countries where not money but Marx is said to rule.

In the East as well as in the West, Jews are seen as representing the rule of rationality, alienation, abstraction, materialism, bureaucracy, and other invisible powers. Some who with good reason think they are disciples of the young Marx, write today: Abolish the computers, and you will render the "Jew" impossible.

X: "Jewish" Marxism

Marxism is, or originally was, a protest against the "purposeful rationality" it called capitalism. Was it, then, an echo of the prophetic tradition, as some have asserted? Was Marx, perhaps, not an "anti-Semite" but, on the contrary, one who upheld the ethics of Judaism against the morals of the Jews? Alienation is not only a condition for the successful operation of capitalism, it is also the consciousness of being a stranger in that society. For Jews this has been both a theological and an existential problem, and it has been expressed symbolically in these lines from Heinrich Heine's poem "Princess Sabbath":

Hund mit hündischen Gedanken
Kötert er die ganze Woche
Durch des Lebens Kot und Kehricht,
Gassenbuben zum Gespötte.

Aber jeden Freitag Abend
In der Dämmerstunde plötzlich
Weicht der Zauber, und der Hund
Wird aufs Neu ein menschlich Wesen.

•

Dog with doglike thoughts
all the week, a cur, he noses
through life's mire, dung, and leavings
butt of mocking street gangs.

But on every Friday evening
of a sudden, in the twilight
the enchantment leaves him
and the dog once more is human.

Marx yearned to overcome the split between the Sabbath Jew and the workaday Jew, between workday and holiday. But whatever the emotional motive for this yearning may have been, the idea and the categorical instruments to deal with the problem he had received from Hegel and Feuerbach. The nineteen-year-old student told this in a long letter to his father, and he acknowledges his intellectual debts in later writings. He, who was always scrupulously honest in quoting sources, never makes the connection between his own ideas and those of the Jewish prophets, or the church fathers (which might have been suggested by Hegel), or Saint Augustine. Moreover, he transformed these instruments to suit his own purposes. For to him, alienation is not a general *Weltschmerz*, not the Kafkaesque consciousness of impotence vis-à-vis unknown powers, but the specific separation of the worker from his work, from its product, from his fellow workers and, as worker, from his humanity. To confuse this with the sensibilities of a minority means to obliterate Marx's specific contribution to social psychology, nay to deny him credit for any original contribution.

Similarly, Marx's persistent expectation of

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the revolution has been interpreted as an echo of the messianic prophecies. Thus Mircea Eliade writes in *The Sacred and the Profane* (pp. 205-207):

> Marx takes over and continues one of the great eschatological myths of the Asiatico-Mediterranean world: the redeeming role of the Just (the chosen, in our day: the proletariat) whose suffering is to change the ontological status of the world. The classless society and the disappearance of social strife find their closest precedent in the myth of the Golden Age . . . which Marx enriched by the Judeo-Christian idea of a final battle between Good and Evil. . . . He takes over the Judeo-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history.

This is fantasy: in *The Communist Manifesto*, the victory of the proletariat is said to "end the *pre*-history of Mankind," and in *Das Kapital* Marx compares the proletariat with the Chosen People only ironically: "as the Jews are . . . Jehovah's people, so the workers are the property of capital."

Finally, as Melvin Lasky points out in *Utopia and Revolution*, "Marx was not interested in utopia, but in revolution." Marx considered it his decisive contribution to the theory of revolution that he found it neither in a divine scheme of history, nor in the logic of a Hegelian World Spirit, nor in the ethical commands of reason, but in the socially active forces of men. As a young man he put it into verse:

> *Kant und Fichte gern zum Äther schweifen,*
> *Suchten dort ein fernes Land.*
> *Doch ich such nur tüchtig zu begreifen,*
> *Was ich auf der Strasse fand.*
>
> •
>
> Kant and Fichte are fond of flying into the air,
> seeking there a distant land
> I only try honestly to understand
> what I find in the streets.
> [Lasky's translation, in *Utopia and Revolution*.]

In *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (the *Yearbook*) he wrote: "We do not face the world with a new principle: 'Here is the truth, here kneel down.' We develop new principles for the world out of the principles of the world" (Easton-Guddat, eds., p. 214). And elsewhere he denied that he had any message for the proletarians but "merely to make the workers aware of what they will find themselves led to do." In other words: Marxism is the opposite of a Sorelian myth, a Christian eschatology, or a Jewish prophecy. It is not apocalyptic but Promethean.

All previous revolutions, Marx remarks in another context, draped themselves in the garment of an ideal nation—the Puritans impersonated the Hebrews crossing the desert, the French bourgeoisie imitated the virtuous republicans of ancient Rome. The proletariat, by contrast, will have to build a bridge into unknown territory, develop principles of its own, create thoughts for which there is no model(*The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*).

The Marxian view of humanity and its future, therefore, is not closer to the Jewish prophets than it is to other visionaries—Joachim da Fiore, Thomas Münzer, some Russian Narodniki, or British Levelers. There is no Marxian soterology; the proletariat is no "Chosen People"; its historical mission is to abolish itself, neither to be elevated nor "saved":

> The present generation is like the Jews whom Moses led through the wilderness. It has not only a world to conquer, but must go under in order to make room for the men who are fit for a new world. [*Class Struggles in France*, C. P. Dutt, ed., New York: International Publishers, p. 114.]

X: The Marginal Man

This passage shows that Marx did not use Jewish symbolism in any way that would be different from the thousands of references in German magazine literature; since religious instruction belonged to the high school curriculum, writers and painters were able to draw freely on the rich imagery of the Biblical stories. The mere occurrence of such references, therefore, does not permit any inferences regarding the author's personal involvement. I do not find that the Jewish heritage is needed to understand Marx's

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intellectual development. His mature works transcend both the traditions with which he grew up and his original revulsion from them. What may need explanation is the violence of that revulsion.

A useful concept in analyzing an aggressive reaction to cultural crises is "marginality," lack of identity between two cultures, failure to integrate, lack of "belongingness." Of marginal characters Jessie Bernard wrote: "Since they cannot be either Jews or gentiles, they must destroy everything they stand for" (in *Jews in a Gentile World*, I. Graeber and S. H. Britt, eds., New York: Macmillan, 1942). Similarly, Salo W. Baron wrote: "They become a menace to the equilibrium of the general as well as the Jewish society around them" ("Modern Capitalism and the Jewish Fate," in *Menorah*, XXX: 2, 1942).

Marginality, however, occurs not only in the case of those who exist between two cultures coexisting simultaneously, but even more when one culture is encroaching upon another or when a main culture disintegrates. Intellectuals are known to announce such disintegration; they are most sensitive to the shortcomings of the culture in which they grew up; they secede from it most vociferously, they articulate all contradictions and resentments. Therefore, what has been said of Jews may be even more true of intellectuals.

Hannah Arendt is probably right in remarking that first of all Marx was an intellectual: "The anti-Jewish denunciations by Marx and Börne cannot be understood except in the light of the conflict between rich Jews and Jewish intellectuals." In polemicizing against his father Marx denounces middle-class society; in repudiating the Jewish religion he fights the state of alienation in which society forces the thinking human being to live. If he seems to flee from his family, he feels shame for all business-minded families.

"Handelsleute und Juden als solche," said Börne, and similar sentiments are found in Maximilian Harden—editor of *Die Zukunft* and a convert—in Walter Rathenau, and other Jewish intellectuals. They were "marginal" not only as Jews with respect to the main culture, but even more so with respect to the Jewish squares. So Marx: "The existence of a suffering humanity that thinks and of a thinking humanity that is oppressed will be unpalatable to the philistines who are thoughtlessly enjoying themselves" [Easton and Guddat, eds., p. 210.]

The work of many Jewish writers demonstrates similar traits, either as an explicit topic or in more subliminal ways. Kurt Tucholsky created "Wendriner," a Jewish philistine whose inane comments on current events made both him and his enemies look foolish. But if Wendriner was an expression of Jewish self-hate, Babbitt and Caspar Milquetoast must be called expressions of American self-hate and the term then becomes quite meaningless. (See Everett Stonequist, *Marginality*, New York: Scribner, 1937; and Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Conflicts*, New York: Harper, 1948.)

Marx hated Jewish Babbitts as much as he hated Babbitts in general, especially German ones. He criticized and denounced the Jewish bourgeoisie as part of the German and the English bourgeoisie. He was suspicious of Jews like Lassalle, who wished to become part of the German establishment. Marx indeed has expressed his disgust with Jewish parvenus. Before him, Molière had proved that you don't have to be Jewish to behave like a *nouveau-riche*, and after him an American sociologist wrote a book on the ostentatiousness of the leisure class. But when Jewish jokes telescope that point in a brilliant punch-line, other sociologists will write books on "Jewish self-hate." The truth is that the joke may do three things: it expresses *Schadenfreude* at the failure of misplaced ambition; it expresses sadness at the conditions that make the joke possible; and it disarms the anti-Semite by anticipating his scoffing comment. The joke is a protective weapon, a strategy to prevent others from laughing at Jews:

> Wit is a good weapon, but more suitable for the weak than for the strong, more appropriate for the oppressed than for the overlords. . . . Hence its importance for the Jews. [Fritz Engel,

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quoted by Eduard Fuchs, in *Die Juden in der Karikatur*, Munich: Langen, 1921.]

The great historian of mores Eduard Fuchs (incidentally, not a Jew), a friend of Rosa Luxemburg, felt that self-deprecation

> "is that form of self-emancipation which relieves the Jew of the onerous pressure of social humiliation. . . . It disarms the enemy by saying in a witty way: Yes, you are right. There is no finer way of self-protection as long as one does not have a club or one's upbringing prevents him from using it. . . . The taste of this form of mimicry has developed into a special characteristic of the Jewish intellect. [Ibid., p. 304-305.]

Apparently aware of all this, Saul Bellow says: "In America, certain forms of success require an element of parody, self-mockery, a satire on the thing itself." (*Mr. Sammler's Planet*, Penguin, p. 67).

A self-deprecating joke may be a means of asserting superiority: he who reveals his weakness or his shame is the stronger in spirit. In reading Marx's denunciation of Jewish usury or pushiness, one gets the impression that he is doing just that. He is not preaching anti-Semitism but trying to defuse it. The same goes for Tucholsky, Börne, for Heine, Kafka, Kraus, and others. They all proved that the narrowness of the Jewish ghetto could be overcome only if *every* group left the narrowness of its ghetto, and the larger city, too, was transcended. Liberation was to be complete.

To Sum Up:

The Anti-Semitism that Marx knew in the middle of the last century was largely social; it was not yet an organized political force with a philosophy and program. These exist only since the Dreyfus Affair and have taken their toll in this century. Carlebach makes the distinction more sharply than it probably should be made, but on principle one can concede that it is anybody's damned right to dislike Jews or Italians or blacks or, for that matter, WASPs. What matters is whether private sentiments are converted into racist philosophies. In this political sense Marx and Engels cannot be called "anti-Semitic," nor does their attitude to persons of the Jewish faith show any discriminatory pattern. They were both men of the Enlightenment, which anti-Semitism seeks to deny.

Both Marx and Engels used national epithets against individuals; they shared certain national prejudices of their age, which may have colored their political judgment; their contempt for German institutions and German philistines, e.g., was overlaid by their hopes for the German future. It is possible, however, to explain and interpret these attitudes without resorting to psychoanalytical theories.

This reservation should also hold for Marx's attitude to his ancestors. One must assume that he was as conscious of the problem as other ex-Jews; but that does not mean to say that the problem wrought decisive quirks in his character or significantly influenced his thinking. In particular, his attitude to Judaism and Jews seems to be very much in tune with the notions that he found in his environment; these also developed and changed in response to changes in his social views, and in fact he contributed to the reshaping of the environment. I hope to have shown that his views on Jews and Judaism can and must be understood in their historical context, and that even those that we find unpleasant and deplorable did not in their original setting have the meaning we associate today with the notion of anti-Semitism. I have shown in particular that the essay "On the Jewish Question" represents a transitional stage in Marx's thinking, and that his mature thought was totally free from any idols of the tribe, of the cave, and of the marketplace. It may even be that Marx was more critical of Jews than of other tribes because that is how most people show their concern for their family.

As a general rule, I would suggest to the psycho-historians a sort of Occam's Razor: that historical phenomena, and ideologies in particular, should be seen in terms of the situation out of which they have grown and

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that psychological explanations should not be sought unless the analysis of general conditions yields no satisfactory explanation. In the case of Hitler there may be such an irrational residue; in the case of Marx's and Engels's attitude to race and religion, the evolution of their thoughts out of the Hegelian left is so logical, and the relatedness of that evolution to the political and social developments of their age is so direct and open, that the search for hidden psychological sources seems redundant or misleading. Marx's views on Judaism were a function of the development of his social thought. □

THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES *(continued from p. 370)*

as they were—cannot be invoked to exculpate the rulers of Hanoi. Those who do so are apologists for inhumanity.

QUESTION: At the U.N. conference in Geneva, Secretary-General Waldheim announced that Hanoi had agreed to stop the flow of refugees for a time. What do you think brought this about?

STERNBERG: The Vietnamese decision to authorize Waldheim to inform the Geneva conference that "for a reasonable period of time it will make every effort to stop illegal departures" was undoubtedly brought about by international pressures and the need for Hanoi and the Kremlin to mitigate the opprobrium the refugee problem has generated. Lost sight of in this development is that what is being hailed as a success is tantamount to an expectation that the Vietnamese hereafter will guard their ports more rigorously and arrest would-be refugees before they can get to sea.

QUESTION: What is your evaluation of the efforts made by the U.S. and other Western democratic nations to help solve the problem?

STERNBERG: Elsewhere, I have characterized the [Carter] Administration's reaction to the refugee flood from Vietnam as pusillanimous. Events have since moved Washington to a more decisive position. "Don't let them drown" has proved to be a powerful plea—especially when addressed to a White House that has elevated the concern for human rights to a level of official policy. Still, every step in the direction of massive help has been impeded by budgetary considerations. While billions were spent each year on waging war in Vietnam, it is now difficult to get approval for measures that would cost millions—many millions to be sure—but still only a fraction of what the United States spent during one year of war. It is as if the Office of Management and Budget were running the Indochinese refugee operation.

France has been the only European country with a solid program for the Vietnamese refugees. But France, too, in announcing that it would take another 5,000 refugees, has hedged on its promise. Germany announced in Geneva that it will take 10,000 refugees. Bonn must have decided to pass up this opportunity to draw the parallel that German history should have imposed on it. England has also offered to take 10,000, but that will not decongest Hong Kong, which, after all, is still British territory. The Scandinavians, Austria, Switzerland—the rest are engaged in face-saving tokenism, I'm afraid. Japan remains obdurate.

QUESTION: What should these countries, especially the U.S., be doing? And is there the domestic political will to do it?

STERNBERG: What is needed most at this stage is a huge holding area, if necessary on U.S. territory, where refugees can be taken quickly. Promises have been made in Geneva, but unless they are kept without interminable negotiations and delays of one sort or another, the situation in Southeast Asia will not markedly improve.

Is there a domestic will to do it? If those who care enough keep the issue alive, there may be. □

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Murray Hausknecht

Meltdowns and Ideologies

The Three Mile Island nuclear accident occurred a bare two weeks after *The China Syndrome* opened at first-run theaters—as always, life imitating bad art. Since the dramatic center of the movie was the possibility of a meltdown, it was taken as a prescient warning of the dangers of nuclear energy and, as such, an influence on public opinion. For example, an engineer, defending the nuclear power industry on the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times,* wrote that the public was misled about the significance of Three Mile Island by "the rage of ideologically antinuclear groups, by conservative forces opposed to change, and the coincidental release of the film 'The China Syndrome.'" Yet, there is nothing in the film that justifies assigning it so potent a role; it neither questions nuclear power systems nor the industry that runs them. Indeed, it is doubtful that the movie is about nuclear energy at all except in the sense that the traditional cowboy movie was about cattle raising. Just what is the movie about?

In a key scene two television reporters, Jane Fonda and Michael Douglas, confront Jack Lemmon playing the role of an engineer who had been on duty in a plant when an accident occurred. They tell him they know the company has deliberately played down the seriousness of the accident, and they ask him to testify at a public hearing that the plant is not safe. Lemmon answers that the plant *is* safe; meltdown was averted because the back-up systems had functioned according to design. "It is something else," he says. Investigating on his own he has discovered that in the construction of the plant some required safety inspections of the equipment were omitted and records falsified. The defective equipment caused the accident and should be replaced, but the company's president has permitted only minimal repairs. Lemmon agrees, therefore, to send Fonda and Douglas the evidence he has uncovered.

The messenger carrying the material is forced off the road in a near-fatal accident by hirelings of the company who, subsequently, also threaten Lemmon's life. In desperation, he then takes over the control room of the plant at gunpoint and holds it hostage for his demand to be interviewed on television by Fonda. The company president accedes to the demand, but he secretly calls the police to have them break into the control room. He also orders a deliberate short-circuiting of the system, over the objections of other engineers who warn that it may cause a serious "incident." The tampering will set off alarms in the control room, distract Lemmon, and allow the police to seize him.

In the climactic control-room scenes just as Lemmon, at the beginning of the interview, assures the audience that the plant is safe, the alarms go off, the defective equipment begins to shake and buckle to the accompaniment of loud, rumbling noises throughout the plant, and the police break in and cold-bloodedly shoot Lemmon. They are followed by technicians who rush to the control-room consoles. The rumblings and the shaking begin to fade away; with the announcement that the shutdown is assured, Lemmon dies.

In the movie's final scenes the president attempts to cover up what has happened. On his instructions a PR man tells reporters that Lemmon was a crazed man and only the company's quick action saved the day. An outraged Fonda challenges him, and then turns to someone who had worked with Lemmon on the day of the accident. When she asks him about the truthfulness of the company's statement he answers weakly, "It is not for me to say." Pressed by Fonda, he finally blurts out that Lemmon was not crazy but merely trying to keep the plant running safely. With the truth finally out, Fonda turns away and receives a hug from Douglas. That's all.

The character played by Lemmon represents a

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dedication to technology; he exists only to function as a nuclear engineer. We learn, for example, that he had come to his present job from a career in nuclear submarines; he lives alone, apparently unmarried and without a family.

The nuclear power system is also presented as something separate from the rest of the world. In one segment Lemmon is inside the plant looking for the source of the original accident. It is a cavernous space and he is dressed in protective clothing, which makes him resemble an astronaut on the moon. He is a dwarflike figure among huge tanks and outsize pipes, an insignificant creature in an unnatural landscape. In other scenes there are fleeting glimpses of the plant set off in barren surroundings protected by fences and guarded gates. Inside the plant, the control room, with an armed guard at the door, is surrounded by a glass-enclosed balcony through which visitors can see into the room and one can communicate with its occupants only by phone. It is as if the plant is a holy place with a shrine at its center tended by priests and their acolytes, whose significance depends upon the functions they perform within these sacred precincts.

This vision of a nuclear generating plant as something apart from the rest of the world is congruent with its design as a self-regulating automatic system. That such systems can be built and maintained according to specification is a central tenet of a modern engineer's faith, and it is the heart of the ideology of the nuclear power industry. The faith is reflected in the jargon of the business: a malfunction in the system is called a "transient incident" or, simply, a "transient." The implication is that any disturbance of the system, any unanticipated event, is merely a passing or superficial occurrence and not to be thought of as linked to an inherent, fundamental flaw. *To talk of "transients" is to define the system* qua *system as unproblematic.*

Lemmon symbolizes this faith, and his hunt to uncover the cause of the "transient" is a search for confirmation. Just as Dante descends into the Inferno, so Lemmon descends into the bowels of the plant to find support for his belief. His discovery of the damaged equipment and false records affirms his conviction that the design of the nuclear power plant was not responsible for the accident; it was, rather, the action of outsiders, evil men. The final vindication of his faith is the successful performance of the system under the stresses of the contrived accident. *The China Syndrome* is a fable whose moral affirms a dominant faith: nuclear plants are efficient, safe systems whose design and functioning are unproblematic.

STILL, IT BECOMES DIFFICULT even for the faithful to maintain that an incident of the magnitude of Three Mile Island is merely the usual "transient." At Three Mile Island "human error" was the early and still favored explanation. "Human error" makes it seem as if machines and the people who operate them are not part of the same system; the idea implicitly reinforces the illusion that the system is unproblematic. But "human error" is only a special case of a more general cultural proposition about behavior that runs through *The China Syndrome.*

At the Cannes Festival Douglas, who is also the film's producer, said, "The first reason we made the film was to make an exciting film. If in this film there is a character who runs a company who is more concerned about the profits of the company than the safety of his employees, that is a reality of the film and a reality in life." The movie dramatizes this account. The head of the company is first shown in his office to establish who and what he is; later scenes show him in the plant, usually glaring malevolently at Lemmon through the control-room windows. The company head is clearly the film's "heavy."

The equation of "a reality in the film" with "a reality in life" confuses appearance and reality. It is not, of course, the person "who runs a company" who places profit above safety; here, the cliché of "the bottom line" would be a surer and more telling guide to social reality. The metaphor describes a standard for measuring competence and success, and anyone in business—be it the president of a nuclear power company or the producer of an expensive Hollywood movie—is *obliged* to make the primary consideration profits rather than "the social good" or "art." The movie distorts reality by making the conduct of managers solely dependent upon individual morality and ignoring the imperatives of the economic order. *The China Syndrome* reflects an ideology that turns attention away from economic institutions to the behavior of "bad" people and thereby presents the economic system as unproblematic, quite as much as the nuclear system.

If evil is merely the result of a person's immoral behavior, it follows that "good" people can overcome evil. Fonda and Douglas as investigatory reporters are obviously supposed to evoke the audience's memories of press and television during

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Watergate, an echoing of history that blurs another difference between appearance and reality. "The role of the press and television in Watergate" is not a statement about individual behavior but about *institutions.* That is, the pursuit of the story by individual reporters was expected and approved; it was something they, like managers watching the bottom line, were obliged to do as *journalists.* But the movie depicts another reality.

The manager of the television station refuses to run the reporters' story, and he holds onto the videotape they have made of events in the power plant's control room during the original incident. Fonda, a woman interested in furthering her career, is initially not inclined to jeopardize it by bucking the manager. This contrasts vividly with the portrait of a newspaper in *All The President's Men.* In that movie the editor, once convinced that a story existed, supported and encouraged his reporters; the action made it clear that editors and reporters alike defined themselves as part of an institution, "the press." Although this is a self-serving portrayal (the movie, after all, was based on a book by the reporters involved), it illustrates the point that individual behavior can be dramatized as an element in the functioning of a social institution. In *The China Syndrome,* on the other hand, behavior is dependent on individual morality, and motivation is unrelated to an institutional context.

This sink of venality is saved by the character played by Douglas. A bearded, free-lance cameraman, he dresses in the informal style suggesting the hippie costumes of the '60s, and he has a Chicano assistant. All this underscores his symbolic status as an outsider—very much like the movie cowboy who drifts into a lawless town on his way from here to there. It is Douglas, the outsider, who voices moral outrage at the attempt to suppress the story and regains possession of his videotape by stealing it from the station. As a result of his example Fonda joins in the pursuit of the truth. Douglas, then, is the strong, good guy among a crowd of outrightly immoral and weak people.

BUT DOUGLAS HAS a further significance. He is a free lance; he is someone not tied down to the daily routines of the marketplace, a person relatively free of the demands of an institutional structure. His capacity for indignation is a result of this freedom. The influence of a '60s ideology is obvious here, but it is also a traditional theme of movie reality.

Finally, *The China Syndrome* is a variation on the old movie Westerns whose mangled remains can be seen on TV between commercials. They are about evil men exploiting their weak and ineffectual neighbors who finally seek help from a stranger. His moral courage stiffens their will and eventually he leads them to victory. At the end, with good triumphant over evil, the stranger rides off into the sunset accompanied sometimes by a good woman found in the midst of battle. He fought the greed of cattlemen protecting their ranges from sheepherders, but it really made no difference, since the substantive evil was not the point of the film. The evil was merely a plot device for the creation of excitement and suspense. *The China Syndrome* is filled with suspense too; nuclear energy is as good a gimmick "to make an exciting film" as cattle rustlers in the hills.

But Westerns, like most movies, were rarely seen as being socially significant and hardly ever as forces molding public opinion. What makes *The China Syndrome* different?

The ostensible aim of the movie is to deny the nuclear power industry's claim that a serious reactor accident is impossible. Even before the release of the film the industry attacked it, and the attack was skillfully exploited by the movie's promotional campaign. The Three Mile Island accident lent credence to the definition of the movie as a radical, negative view of nuclear power and the industry. But that is not the sole basis of its reputation.

Hollywood has always constructed the public persona of a star out of the typical role he or she played, and then used the created persona to arouse expectations about the movies in which the star appeared. Humphrey Bogart and John Wayne, for example, were both public personalities and the names of movie roles. This variation on the blurring of appearance and reality is also used by *The China Syndrome.* Jane Fonda lends an aura of radicalism to the movie, because she is identified with anti-Vietnam protests and is the wife of a well-known ex-leader of the New Left who now runs for public office. *The China Syndrome* is a "Jane Fonda movie" (as once there were Henry Fonda movies), only now the expectations are aroused by a persona not created specifically to sell movies.

If we assume that Fonda symbolizes a type of radical impulse, then her radicalism has been transformed by the movie into a commodity, i.e., something packaged for sale in the market. This use of radicalism devalues it and blunts whatever critical edge it may have. What is more, when a symbol of radical values is incorporated into the

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public reputation of a movie, one that in fact does not contain the radical orientation being claimed for it, an illusion is created that an important public issue has been examined from a critical perspective. Such illusions subvert genuine attempts to comprehend the problems of nuclear energy and undermine real impulses to radical action. □

Harrell Rodgers

Civil Rights, 30 Years Later

The current phase of the black struggle for freedom and equality is approaching its 30th year. No one would deny that a great deal of positive change has taken place during this period, producing many gains for black Americans. Still, an examination shows that progress is much more modest than many believe, revealing the limitation of political without economic change.

A basic assumption of the civil rights movement was that if blacks could gain the ballot, they could obtain political concessions that would bring them into the economic, social, and political mainstream of American society. This assumption has proven to be wrong. While blacks have gained the ballot, they have increasingly become aware that the franchise alone is a modest resource in an elite, special-interest-dominated political structure committed to an economic philosophy that exploits and excludes millions of citizens. The frequent lack of relationship between black voting and policy gains has at least in part contributed to the erosion of black confidence in the ballot, causing substantial decreases in black participation rates.

For example, the figures below contrast black and white voting in recent elections:

Years:	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976
Black Vote	58%	42%	58%	44%	52%	34%	49%
White Vote	71%	57%	69%	56%	64%	46%	61%

Notice that a simple majority of qualified blacks voted in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968, and 1972, but only 44 percent voted in 1970, and only 34 percent in 1974. Only 49 percent of eligible blacks voted in the presidential election of 1976.

Much has been made of the fact that with increases in black voting, the number of black elected officials spiraled. In 1964 there were only 103 black elected officials in America, 16 of which held elective office in the South. By 1971 the number of black elected officials had increased dramatically, with 14 blacks serving in Congress, almost 200 serving in state legislatures and state executive offices, and 81 serving as mayors (47 in the South). Progress continued with 3,503 black elected officials in 1975, with 18 blacks in Congress, 281 in state legislative and executive posts, and 135 mayors. By 1978 the total number of black elected officials reached 4,022.

As impressive as these gains may seem, black representation in elective office in 1978 equaled less than 1 percent of all elected officials in America. These black officials are often stymied by limited financial resources, by impoverished city and state budgets, and by their small numbers. Even when black voters provide the margin of victory for candidates, their interests are often ignored. The Carter administration is a case in point. By providing Carter with 94 percent of their votes, black Americans clearly gave him his edge over Ford. Yet Carter has all but ignored the needs of black Americans and has taken some actions that have caused a deterioration in black gains.

The acid test of the impact of increased black political clout is economic gains, especially compared to the white population. The evidence indicates that black economic gains have been modest at best, and recently are declining. Between 1964 and 1966 the economic gap between black and white median family income decreased by about 8 percent. In 1964 black median family income averaged 50 percent of white median family income; by 1966 the ratio was 58 percent, a figure that changed only 1 to 2 points over the next nine years. In 1975 black median family income increased to 61.5 percent of white family income, but it decreased to 59 percent in 1976 and to 57 percent (lower than in 1966) in 1977.

As modest as black economic gains have been when compared to white income, there is evidence that the gains are in some ways more meager than the national figures indicate. Donald J. McCrone and Richard J. Hardy have shown that the decreases in the difference between white and black

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incomes are almost entirely limited to the South. Outside the South black citizens have made almost no gains, relative to white incomes—and McCrone and Hardy's research showed that black gains in the South are significantly related to conditions in the economy. Low rates of unemployment and healthy economic growth characterize those periods in which blacks do make gains relative to whites. However, when the economy is sluggish blacks make no gains, regardless of civil rights laws.[1]

McCrone and Hardy question whether it is possible within our current economic framework ever to close the gap between black and white incomes. Outside the South black incomes seem to have stabilized at about 75 percent of white incomes, and this condition seems highly resistant to improvement. The authors speculate that black gains in the South might top out at the 70 to 75 percent level, leaving blacks disproportionately and permanently mired in the lower quintile of the income scale.

THERE ARE TWO immediate reasons why black economic gains have been so modest.

- First, black unemployment and subemployment rates have been allowed to remain extremely high. Between 1948 and 1977 black unemployment averaged 9 percent, about twice the rate for whites. Between 1975 and early 1979 black unemployment remained above 13 percent, the highest unemployment rate for blacks since World War II. Black teenage unemployment rates have remained above the crisis level for years, hovering around 40 percent. If discouraged black job-seekers, both adults and teenagers, were added to these figures the black unemployment rate would be much worse. The National Urban League recently calculated that unemployed and discouraged blacks make up 23.1 percent of the black labor force.

- Second, progress in employment upgrading for blacks has been significant but limited and slow. By the mid 1970s about 24 percent of blacks (compared to 40 percent of whites) held white-collar jobs but only a very small percentage of all high-status, high-paying positions. By 1977 about half of all white men were in relatively high-wage professional managerial or skilled craft occupations; only 30 percent of minority men and 15 percent of minority women were so employed.

Blacks continue to be overrepresented in low-paying, low-skill jobs. Blacks represent only about 9 percent of the work force, and they constitute about 19 percent of all service workers and nonfarm laborers. And while blacks make up only 6 percent of the workers in wholesale and retail trades, finance, insurance, and real estate, they constitute 21 percent of the workers in personal service industries, 14 percent of hospital and health service workers, and 12 percent of public employees.

The financial impact of high rates of black unemployment and subemployment, and modest gains in employment upgrading is painfully obvious. By 1976 a majority (52.5 percent) of all white families earned in excess of $15,000. Only 27.6 percent of all black families had incomes in excess of $15,000, and 75 percent of these families earned below $25,000. At the other end of the spectrum, 38.6 percent of all black families earned less than $7,000 in 1976, compared to 15.7 percent of all white families.

The percentage of black families earning low incomes, compared to white families, is quite striking. In 1977, the income of 31.3 percent of all black families were below the poverty threshold for their family size, while only 8.9 percent of all white families were poor in 1977. A staggering 41 percent of all black families in 1977 were either below the poverty level or had incomes that were less than 25 percent above the poverty level for their family size. Only 13.3 percent of all white families were living in poverty or earning less than 25 percent more than the poverty threshold for their family size. The potential for black families to extricate themselves from poverty is lower than it is for many white families, because 69 percent of all poor black families are headed by a woman. Often these women are poorly educated, untrained in marketable skills, low in self-confidence, and needed in the home—and so their chances of escaping poverty are usually slim.

The evidence shows, then, that the civil rights movement opened the door to middle-class American prosperity for merely a small percentage of blacks, and mostly for those with the best educational and family backgrounds who could take advantage of available opportunities. Perhaps 30 percent of all black families have found their way into the middle class—but a very large percentage of all blacks, perhaps a majority, seem to have been little affected by the movement.

Large black communities in American cities—such neighborhoods as Harlem, Watts, the South Bronx, the ghettos of Detroit, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Newark, Cleveland, St. Louis,

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Gary, Houston, Memphis, and New Orleans—remain relatively untouched by change. Combined, these areas constitute a metropolis of misery. As John Herbers has written:

> A composite of them would be a land of several thousand square miles, of rubble-strewn streets and vacant blocks, abandoned stores, stripped-down hulks of automobiles, bleak and comparted public and private housing projects, battered school buildings, old men with glazed eyes.[2]

Within these ghettos live millions of black Americans who may have been banished permanently from the Great American Dream. Millions of middle-aged and elderly people have simply been left behind. Additionally, as economist Joel Dreyfuss has estimated, there may be a million youths living in these city ghettos who will never have decent jobs, a home, or a stable family.[3] Given the biases and flaws of American capitalism, there may simply be no place for them.

Notes

[1] Donald J. McCrone and Richard J. Hardy, "Civil Rights Policies and the Achievement of Racial Economic Equality, 1948-1975," *American Journal of Political Science* (22:1), February 1978, pp. 1-17.

[2] John Herbers, "Black-White Split Persists A Decade After Warning," *New York Times*, February 26, 1978, p. 28.

[3] Joel Dreyfuss, "Black Progress Myth and Ghetto Reality, *Progressive*, November 1977, p. 22. □

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Transnational Corporations in South Africa

I

At this time in history, could human rights considerations truly be a factor in the foreign-policy choices of Western countries? And might they determine the policies and activities of TNCs—transnational corporations? The rhetoric of human rights indeed has framed much discussion about motivations and intentions—but, so far, the issue has been manipulated to coincide with economic and security interests. South Africa is a case in point.

The relations of foreign interests in South Africa to that country's system of social organization—apartheid—have been under critical scrutiny in the capitals of South Africa's major economic partners. The many calls for economic sanctions against a country whose government encourages foreign investment are rare in international relations. Applying such sanctions defies the basic rule of nonintervention in the internal political affairs of a sovereign country proclaiming allegiance to Western values and liberal economics, and violates the established practice of countries with free-market economies only to interfere with firms investing and operating abroad when they ask for protection or intend to establish economic links with "enemy" countries.

How serious are these calls for economic sanctions—and are there any effective alternatives that might serve to support South Africa's black population? And what, regarding this issue, should, and can, be the role of transnational corporations operating in South Africa?

TNCs have expanded abroad in search of four basic advantages: (1) to gain access to and control over raw materials; (2) to establish new markets; (3) to maintain and expand these markets; (4) to obtain, for parts or the whole process of production, labor at lower cost than is available at home. It is rare to find a country that provides all four, as South Africa does. That country, so rich in raw materials and cheap labor, also provides market conditions comparable to those in industrialized economies—and, until recently, political stability.

No wonder then that most of the major TNCs are now operating in South Africa. After World War

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II, foreign investment expanded in South Africa, especially during the boom years of the '60s and up the present, in roughly the same pattern as in the developed countries. Out of the total of TNC investment in South Africa, 50 percent comes from the United Kingdom, 20 percent from the United States, 7 percent from the German Federal Republic, 5 percent from France, and smaller percentages from other developed countries.

Today South Africa indeed is very much tied into the production and investment system of the Western economies. Its banking and financial sector are an integral part of the capitalist world economy, and in the field of technology highly developed, capital-intensive methods of production have been shared by home offices without restriction, contrary to the pattern of technology transfers to developing countries. This in turn has allowed for reduced employment of unskilled labor—an important factor, considering the racial composition of the South African labor market, in which skilled jobs are strictly reserved for whites.

The magnitude of TNC presence, and of South Africa's economic integration into the West's economic system are widely underestimated. So is the all-embracing impact of apartheid. Apartheid indeed is the very basis of South Africa's social structure, of its political organization and economy—of labor laws, of the land-owning and property system, and all their consequences. And apartheid makes a principle of defying human rights. Its system was set up gradually, and it was strengthened and refined in the 1960s, a time of economic expansion! These two all-pervading factors—the high level of South Africa's integration into the capitalist world economy and the thoroughness of racial discrimination in the system of apartheid—have to be kept in mind when discussing any possibility of change.

II

THE HISTORY of international concern for the domestic conditions in South Africa may read to an optimist like the history of decolonization—or, less optimistically, like the history of development aid. Continuing the analogy, one could compare the present wave of anti-apartheid protests to the decolonization campaigns of the late '50s—or, on the other hand, to the popularity of development assistance in the '60s. But political decolonization now has almost run its course. Namibia and Zimbabwe, for instance, now stand at the end of the long process of decolonization—and South Africa plays a pivotal role in their ongoing struggle for independence. It is now in the context of North-South economic relations on the international agenda that the social effects of foreign investment are being discussed—and, specifically, regarding South Africa—that long-standing doubts are being raised about the positive effects of TNC presence on apartheid.

The developments of the last decade, of course, have made matters more complex. The formation of OPEC and the recession of the mid-70s have made everyone aware of the acute resource dependence of the industrialized countries. Beyond that, there now is deep concern about the safety of the economic, social, and political climate in the raw-material exporting countries. This harrowing problem of "stability"—or potential instability—has been perceived differently by various investors, but none can afford to ignore it. It is in this new context that we must discuss South Africa.

This new concern and criticism have been instrumental in bringing about a number of developments that seemed unthinkable a decade ago:

(1) The mandatory arms embargo voted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council in 1977;

(2) The voluntary Code of Conduct for companies operating in South Africa, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the European Communities in 1977, with the proviso of other measures, such as bans on new investments and export credit;

(3) The "Sullivan" principles for fair employment practices, adopted by mid-1979 by 110 corporations investing in South Africa.

Taken together, these and other statements and actions, and the numerous anti-apartheid campaigns, imply that there are now various well-concerted efforts underway to pressure the South African government into change. Among these anti-apartheid voices, a clear distinction has to be made between those who speak—

(1) for economic (and military) disengagement or withdrawal (i.e., leaving the country);

(2) for "constructive involvement" (staying on, either claiming to be improving the situation, or actively pushing for change, or both).

The lines of debate are clearly drawn between those who argue that foreign investment reinforces apartheid—and those who see it as a moderating, positive force. Both sides have often been articulated; to both sides, the policy implications, i.e., the utility and feasibility of applying economic leverage, are of central concern.

The argument for "constructive participation"

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proposes a reformist role for foreign investors—maintaining that economic growth, aided by foreign capital, has benefited blacks and will gradually lead to a dismantling of apartheid—a racial equivalent of the trickle-down theory. By now, however, it seems clear that these claims for the effectiveness of such "positive" internal pressure are unfounded. In large measure the gains blacks have made were brought about by the shortage of skilled labor, which has induced some white business and trade-union leaders to press for relaxation of the color bar. It is indeed significant that, as mentioned earlier, the legal structure of apartheid was elaborated and made fast in the '60s, a period of economic growth. Although some social engineering, implemented largely through labor and land policies, has enabled some blacks to participate in the economy as workers, they still are kept fast in their restricted conditions—being denied decent living conditions, social freedom, economic opportunity, and political power.

Alas, as patterns of wage levels and black unemployment in the '70s demonstrated, gains made by black workers in the boom years were neither far-reaching nor permanent. Some widely quoted statistics proclaim a reduction in the ratio of average white earnings to those of blacks. These figures, however, are misleading. The decline in the ratio only demonstrates the enormity of the gap. It has in fact grown in the important sectors at an increasingly rapid rate. Given the reservation of skilled positions for whites, data on average wages for blacks and whites do not even refer to comparable jobs: *the difference in earning speaks more of job discrimination than of wage discrimination.* Thus, indeed, the much publicized increase in wages for blacks in the '70s is a response to strikes and labor unrest rather than to trickle-down effects of economic expansion.

There is no official record of black unemployment in South Africa. Legally, blacks are citizens of the "homelands" and only reside in "white" areas to facilitate employment. However, unofficial calculations of black unemployment during the 1970s show that, in white areas, black unemployment increased from 6.1 percent in 1970 to 10.6 percent in 1976. These estimates are on the conservative side; others that include the "homelands" put it at 25 percent. Annual comparisons of black unemployment figures with those for whites and "colored" reinforce evidence of the impermanence of black gains. Periods of economic decline have had more severe consequences for blacks than for either of the other groups.

III

OUR FOCUS now is on the role of individual transnational corporations as employers of blacks. Unquestionably, TNCs have created jobs, although recent investments have been highly capital-intensive, providing few openings for unskilled workers; e.g., Richards May Minerals' new $215 million investment in mining and smelting provides only 1,000 jobs, two-thirds of them for blacks.

What kind of working conditions do black employees of TNC's experience? In the early 1970s, official investigations into matters of wages and working conditions found TNCs generally undistinguishable from local firms. As a result, voluntary codes of conduct, spelling out obligations for the socially responsible employer, have proliferated. But the record of United Kingdom firms, for instance, since such a code was enacted in 1974, shows that the utility of voluntary codes is open to skepticism. Still, most likely, both the corporations and their home governments will continue to favor this approach; it still leaves social responsibility up to the individual entrepreneur—a well-established norm in the capitalist system.

Firms operating in South Africa, however sincere their efforts for "constructive involvement," must participate in implementing apartheid. As elsewhere, TNCs are expected to respect local laws and customs, and in South Africa the laws specify racial discrimination. Thus, having chosen to operate in South Africa—where social engineering is so all-encompassing—TNCs must become part of the structure of apartheid.

Recently, those arguing for "constructive involvement" have shifted their focus from employment practices to an emphasis on the utility of TNCs and all economic links with South Africa as tools of potential pressure—maintaining that one needs connections in order to exert pressure.

Indeed, now the proponents of this argument reject trade sanctions, for they would eliminate these tools of persuasion—ignoring the cumulative affects upon the South African government were it to face economic isolation.

Foreign capital and trade indeed give substantial support to South Africa's government. Loans to state-owned corporations enhance the regime's resources. TNC participation in government projects developing basic industry reduces the regime's vulnerability to potential economic sanctions. TNCs provide the regime with military equipment, chemicals, communications systems. Finally, TNCs operate in the mining sector, which

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provides the export earnings so crucial to a government that now is burdened by mounting foreign debt. Recognition of the supportive nature of foreign investment leads to recommendations of economic pressure. We shall not dwell on particular options or examine the case for each in terms of the interests of various home governments. Instead, let us highlight the issue in the context of the current economic situation.

The deterioration of the international economic system that was established after World War II has been widely discussed, and developments in the world economy in the late 1960s and the '70s have been variously interpreted as a major crisis in world capitalism or as temporary imbalances in a basically sound system. Among developments relevant to our issue are the transfer of wealth to oil-producing countries, the resurgence of protectionism, the threat of structural unemployment in the developed market economies, political unrest and new demands in the Third World, and the increased role of multilateral institutions in economic decision-making.

The rapid transfer of wealth from the market economies to oil-producing countries have provoked an intensive drive for export earnings to offset high oil bills. Although there is some disparity in the impact of increased oil prices on the various Western economies, the sense of vulnerability is common to all. As South Africa is an important buyer of industrial goods, it is unlikely that its major trading partners will forgo this market. In the United Kingdom, which is most vulnerable in this respect, fears are voiced that to isolate South Africa economically would cause grave dislocations in the U.K economy, and in turn would affect other Western countries. Thus, perceptions of the precarious nature of "interdependence" in the international economic scheme relegate human rights to a secondary concern.

At the same time, the search for new export markets has led to increased trade competition between Western market economies, and the economic crisis has given rise to protectionism. Both these trends make unilateral action against South Africa unlikely.

New high levels of domestic unemployment are prominent in the policy considerations of South Africa's major trade and investment partners, and any action that limits exports must contend with union opposition. For instance, new guidelines announced by the West German government to limit the amount of export guarantees for South Africa allow exception for orders that have employment implications in the Federal Republic.

The success of OPEC within the context of Third World demands for a larger share of the world's wealth has precipitated deep concern about natural resources—i.e, secure supplies, reasonable prices, and adequate reserves. Thus the undisputable mineral wealth of South Africa constitutes a powerful argument for its continued integration into the capitalist world economy. A recent survey by the Royal Institute of International Affairs of EC dependence on South Africa for non-fuel mineral states:

> From the foreign policy viewpoint, the most important commodities are those in which South Africa is a major world supplier. In several minerals—cromium, gold, manganese, platinum metals, vanadium and certain types of asbestos—South Africa shares a key role with the U.S.S.R. and one—antimony—with China which is also a major supplier of tungsten. South Africa is also a significant producer of uranium, and of the main base metals. The three countries named above are the world's major suppliers of many important steel additives or alloying materials. There are subsitutes for most minerals in most uses—given time and money—when they are considered individually, but not when taken as a group. . . .

The United States is in a uniquely independent position with regard to many of these materials. Yet, a strong perception of interdependence makes it unlikely that the U.S. would abandon its concern for the needs of its partners.

IV

A LOOK at the expanding role of the World Bank Group, most notably the IMF (International Monetary Fund), in global economic decision-making can only confirm the pessimism about the potential for isolating South Africa. IMF has become a key mechanism for assessing a country's economic stability and credit ranking. Its appeal is based on the premise that its analyses and procedures are technical and apolitical—and that such objective criteria put investment decisions above the political interests of individual governments. These analyses, made in secret by such international institutions, now serve as benchmarks for commercial banks, TNCs, and governments.

South Africa's internal social arrangements do not enter into the IMF's considerations. In fact, that country's economic order and regime have received tacit approval and tangible support from IMF loans totaling $464 million in 1976-77, more

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than all the rest of Africa combined received from IMF during that period, and exceeded only by its loans to the United Kingdom and Mexico. The procedures of the IMF allowed it to define problems—its recent balance-of-payment difficulties, dwindling reserves, and lagging exports—entirely to external causes, giving no consideration to the domestic structural problems imposed by policies of racial separation and restrictions. The South African authorities' statement that, despite inflation, unemployment was at a low 0.5 percent was credited, even though this figure blatantly ignores black unemployment. And no attention was paid to the high increase of government spending for military expenditures that rose, in the period 1973-76, by 120 percent!

Thus, the IMF assessed South Africa's economy as basically sound. In IMF terms, this is true: it is a market economy rich in raw materials and open to export and foreign capital. The issue of human rights is not among the IMF's concerns.

V

ALTHOUGH the international economic policy-makers are not likely to promote considerations of human rights as the decisive concern, some recent developments may alter existing calculations of the costs and benefits in "doing business" with the present regime. For now there are factors and forces at work in South Africa that have to be taken into account.

The decline of the South African economy—in the face of the worldwide recession and domestic problems—has caused some leveling off in the flow of direct foreign investment. Recent economic indicators show that, since mid-1974, the rate of growth has continued to slow down. Unemployment for all racial categories has increased. Real gross domestic product, which increased by 7.1 percent in 1974, 2.1 percent in 1975, 1.4 percent in 1976, has continued to decline in 1977; however, real gross domestic product rose somewhat in 1978.

Although many will agree that South Africa's present economic difficulties may be overcome if the price of gold remains at its current high levels, the regime's political problems cannot be resolved by higher gold prices alone. Historically, one of South Africa's major attractions has been a docile labor force, which surely can no longer be taken for granted.

There also is the increasing control the government exercises over the private sector in order to lessen its vulnerability to international economic pressures. For instance, in the wake of the UN arms embargo, provisions of the National Supplies Procurement Act were reactivated, enabling the government to requisition production and provision of any specified good declared necessary to national defense. Implementation of such sanctions could create a conflict for subsidiaries of TNCs if home offices refuse to sell certain materials to South Africa's government—and refusal to comply with South African law might in future precipitate nationalization. Such interference by a host government in the private sector has been a classic cause for home-country intervention.

There is a possibility that actions taken by African states may alter the stakes for those who deal with South Africa. The Nigerian government, for instance, has declared that foreign investors must make a choice between operating in South Africa or Nigeria. On the other hand, one must recognize that, in the '70s, inflation, high oil and food prices, and depression affecting many raw-material prices have been devastating for the Third World. Thus it is questionable that many African countries will be prepared to force such choices upon their foreign economic partners. In addition, a number of these states themselves are dependent upon trade with South Africa, and the South African government has carefully cultivated these dependencies.

A somewhat analogous situation was experienced by the countries bordering on Rhodesia, which have borne the brunt of economic sanctions against that country's regime. If the major industrial powers claim that they cannot tolerate the economic consequences of severing relations with South Africa, it is difficult to see how these countries with their much more fragile economies can make that sacrifice.

The crux of the question concerning transnational corporations in South Africa and their stand on human rights is the debate on "constructive involvement" vs. "unconditional withdrawal." We have seen that those alternatives are either an exercise in futility or in wishful thinking. We must wait and see what will be the potential cumulative effect of slackening foreign investment, economic crisis, unemployment, and social unrest, and the growing international condemnation of apartheid, which has reached a dimension no colonial power has ever had to face. Only when the entire situation—and not only an individual investment—is viewed as "morally indefensible and economically unsound" can we expect a dismantling of the apartheid system. □

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Tom Milstein

Thoughts on the Next War

Supporters of detente use arguments that fall into two overlapping categories: economic and military. The economic justification of detente usually begins with a vision of fabulous profits purportedly awaiting Western business once detente progresses to the point of allowing expanded trade and investment between the two superpowers and their allies. This is often accompanied by a soundtrack emphasizing the soothing effects of commerce between former enemies. The whole show seems intended to suggest that the austerities of the Cold War ought to give way to the perhaps less noble but certainly more gratifying process of mutual enrichment.

The trouble with this show is that someone like Solzhenitsyn is always ruining it by standing up in the audience to ask what it profits us to gain a Pepsi-Cola franchise in Pinsk if it costs us our souls to get it. Others question the highly selective reading of history that ignores the numerous wars fought between countries with flourishing commercial relationships. The audience generally goes away with a highly unflattering impression of the true motive of detente's supporters: sheer greed.

There is a more sophisticated economic argument, actually more of an explanation of detente than an argument for it, that one hears in radical circles. It possesses considerable descriptive value, whatever one thinks of its Marxian underpinnings. According to this view, the current Western slump in economic growth, rising unemployment, and rampant inflation signify not a temporary dip in business activity but a long-term decline headed toward genuine economic crisis: a depression. This crisis reflects capitalism's saturation of available markets in the West and compels the opening of new ones. But the only available markets, complete with built-up economic infrastructures and disciplined working classes, are inaccessible to capitalism so long as the Cold War endures, because they are to be found in the Communist bloc.

The Communist countries, on the other hand, having completed the first phase of modernization by means of totalitarian mobilization techniques, now find themselves caught up in the economic crisis characteristic of *their* system—insufficient capital for further economic growth, beyond the first crude stage of industrialization, due to an inability to lower the cost of consumer goods, which in turn would create a mass market based on expanded consumer demand.

Each system is threatened, although neither can afford to admit it, by its own characteristic economic crisis. But the two crises complement each other in a peculiar way, so that what looks like a crisis in one system can be regarded as a solution when viewed from the other. It follows that economic matrimony is in the interests of both. The marriage may not be made in heaven, but then neither were capitalism or Communism in the first place.

This explanation of detente has the ring of truth. It corresponds to the economic facts in both the West and the Soviet bloc. It asserts that much more is at stake in detente than simple greed and shows how much both systems need each other; but it falls short of proving that detente will therefore be successfully consummated.

ECONOMIC NECESSITY may be the foundation of detente, but upon a given foundation more than one superstructure can be raised. A rapprochement between the two systems could conceivably resolve each of their economic problems—but so could a war. It will be recalled that, after years of Keynesean tinkering with a depressed American economy, Roosevelt in the end found it was rearmament and war that revived the economy. And despotic regimes are usually caught up in one sort of economic crisis or another; empire-building—war—has always served as one of their most dynamic activities for this very reason.

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Indeed, considered dispassionately as a solution to the East-West conflict, war has the distinct advantage over detente of bypassing the difficult task of political compromise between two antagonistic social systems whose normative orders conflict at so many points as to give all efforts at such compromise the appearance of "a covenant with Death and an agreement with Hell."

This prospect of war between the superpowers constitutes the other main argument used by detente's apologists, who contend that the only real alternative to their policy is the disappearance of the world, or a great portion of it, into a mushroom cloud. There is enough truth in this prophecy to give it a certain demagogic effectiveness—and enough demagoguery to justify disregarding it. It rests on the notion that deterrence can only operate during peacetime, and that once war broke out between the superpowers, it would be bound to escalate to the thermonuclear level. Since such a war is unthinkable, detente is the only realistic way of resolving the East-West conflict.

But the Soviet Union is nearing nuclear parity with the United States, and, according to some, may already have achieved it. This development strengthens deterrence insofar as it raises the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and correspondingly reduces the likelihood of a thermonuclear exchange taking place, even in the course of a conventional war between the superpowers. For the threat of MAD removes the incentive to escalate beyond the conventional level. But at the same time it weakens the ability of deterrence to inhibit all forms of warfare between the superpowers, precisely because it lessens the risk of such wars escalating beyond the conventional level. In other words, an all-out, conventional-type war, a world war, between the Soviet bloc and the Western allies, being "thinkable" in a way that thermonuclear war is not, invalidates the argument that detente is the only realistic way of resolving the East-West conflict.

If a conventional world war between the Soviet bloc and the Western allies is possible, how likely is it? The answer is that if it is possible, it is quite likely. It is a bleak historical fact that never have two dynamic and expanding, but mutually contradictory, social systems impinged on one another as the two superpowers do today without the conflict between them eventuating in a decisive war. Given the basic differences in social organization and ideology between Western capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism, given the fact that both are dynamic and expanding systems (each in its own way, of course), and that their post-World War II spheres of influence apparently no longer satisfy either's need for further growth, with the result that each increasingly encroaches on the other's sphere—given these facts, a realistic scenario of the East-West conflict ought to count on a military climax. A peaceful resolution of the conflict between two powerful social systems as different as the Western and the Soviet would be unprecedented in the annals of international relations.

BUT THERE IS an unprecedented factor to be considered in the event of war between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance. Its implications reestablish detente as a mandatory solution of the East-West conflict, even though it will, if achieved, be an unprecedented solution. This unprecedented factor arises out of the role China may be expected to play in a future conflict between Russia and the West. It is difficult to be categorical about such matters, but one feature of any such conflict stands out rather clearly, especially since Brzezinski's recent trip to China: an effective fighting alliance with the People's Republic of China has got to be part of any Western strategy that seriously envisions victory in a war with Russia. For various reasons, the West's capacity to win a conventional war against the Soviet Union is doubtful. Moreover, it is unlikely that this military imbalance will change in the foreseeable future, except to grow more favorable to the Soviet Union. The goal of a Western victory in the next war, therefore, presupposes that the Chinese play a role equivalent to that played by the Russians in the last war. The Chinese have the manpower, the organization, and the geographical position to open up the necessary second front against the Russians. What they lack—modern military hardware—the West has the capacity to provide.

Even with an effective Sino-Western alliance, there is no guarantee of defeating the Russians, but without it there is hardly the possibility. It must therefore be presumed as a condition of victory. Victory on such terms, however, will bring with it certain consequences—foremost among them that victory over Russia will not bring an end to the East-West conflict. Chinese totalitarianism will emerge from the war vastly strengthened in power and influence, much as the consequence of the Grand Alliance between Russia and the West to defeat Hitler was to deliver up half of Europe to Stalinist control and raise the U.S.S.R. to

(continued on page 483)

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Nicolaus Mills

Engaging Norma Rae: A Journal

Roanoke Rapids, N.C.

July 18, 1977

Dear Ann: *No matter how long I stay here I'm sure to go on feeling like Rip Van Winkle. Twelve years after Mississippi I'm back in a South I still can't believe. It's not simply that relations between blacks and whites are better than anything I could have imagined, it's the number of radical whites (native born) I'm constantly meeting. Even when I allow for the fact that this is the town leading the fight to unionize J.P. Stevens, I'm still astonished. What I wonder is, can this South be made as "interesting" as the old South? If we start winning the brown lung cases we're taking for hearings, if the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers can begin picking up other mill towns. . . . I keep thinking all that is dramatic. Enough to get more than a spot on* 60 Minutes *or the evening news. And then I feel my age, as if I were waiting for the sixties to begin again.*

New York

March 22, 1979

WHEN I READ that letter or passages from the journal I kept two years ago while I was in Roanoke Rapids working for the Carolina Brown Lung Association, the making of *Norma Rae* seems too good to be true. And that's what worries me. What if it's bad? Or gets everything wrong? Hollywood never made a movie about the farm workers or the civil rights movement. As far as the South I care about goes, it's *Norma Rae* or nothing for the next ten years.

March 25, 1979

I STILL CANNOT get up the nerve to see *Norma Rae*. Used this weekend to read *Rise Gonna Rise*, Mimi Conway's new book on Southern textile workers. Mimi is someone I saw all the time I was in Roanoke Rapids. Even then it was clear she was ready to stay as long as it took for people to tell her what they were feeling. And they did, knowing they didn't have to rush, knowing she wouldn't stop listening at the end of a day or a month or a year. How can a movie do the same? In the press kit I got from Twentieth Century Fox, the studio praises Martin Ritt for bringing *Norma Rae* in two weeks ahead of schedule.

Norma Rae

March 31, 1979

THE OPENING of *Norma Rae* is as good as anything I could have hoped for. As the credits are being shown, the screen is alternately filled with snapshots of a young Norma Rae (Sally Field) and pictures of the O.P. Henley mill where she now works. Except for Jennifer Warnes singing, "It Goes as it Goes," there is no sound at all, and as the cotton, which we first see in bales, is carded, spun, and woven, it is as if what was going on were magic rather than an industrial process. Then suddenly everything changes. The music stops, and the noise from the weaving room where Norma Rae works begins. The shock is terrific. The din from the looms dominates the scene, and as Norma Rae and a fellow worker eat their lunches in a glassed-in side room, we see that even here there is too much noise for normal conversation. Inches away from each other, the two women must shout in order to be heard.

But the worst is yet to come—and at this point we are jolted again. Norma Rae turns to her mother (Barbara Baxley), who is sitting on her far side,

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and when she does not respond to a question, Norma realizes that somewhere between the start of lunch and the present moment, her mother has lost her hearing. Horrified, Norma Rae grabs her mother by the hand, and pulling her along as if she were a child, rushes her to the company doctor. The help Norma Rae has come for is, however, the last thing she is going to get from this man. "It'll pass off. It's only temporary," the doctor patronizingly assures her, and the scene ends with Norma Rae screaming at him and he reluctantly agreeing to write her mother a note excusing her from work.

It is not until Norma Rae and her mother are home in their yard that the quietness with which the film began again dominates the screen. But now we react very differently. We know that it is not a permanent part of the landscape, only time away from the mill, and in the midst of it, we realize what has become of the young Norma Rae we saw in the opening snapshots. The weariness and defiance that alternately characterize her now have a source.

So perfect has this opening sequence been that there are really only two directions in which *Norma Rae* can go after this point. Either it can develop new characters and show us how other workers at the O. P. Henley mill are also victimized, or it can take Norma Rae's frustration a step further and show her becoming politicized. The problem is that, after carefully setting up these options, Director Martin Ritt does not commit himself to either. He goes through the motions of showing Norma Rae's evolution into a "union maid," as he sticks to the outlines of the film's inspiration, Henry Leifermann's story of Crystal Lee Jordan, who six years ago played a key role in the Textile Workers' organizing campaign at the J. P. Stevens mills in Roanoke Rapids. But in practice, what Ritt does is switch the direction of his film altogether, making it revolve around Norma Rae's sexually charged but unconsummated romance with Reuben Warshovsky (Ron Leibman), the Textile Workers' organizer who has come to the Henley mill to see if it can be unionized. It is the kind of mid-course change that directors make all the time in film and especially in TV, where the need for audience identification is crucial, but I find that as it happens in *Norma Rae* I'm paralyzed with anger. For me it is the movie equivalent of bait and switch: the gambit by which we're lured into a store because of a specially advertised product, told the store is out of the product, and then—the store hopes—persuaded to buy what is available (usually a costlier version of the same product).

Norma Rae: II

April 2, 1979

MY ANGER is in check tonight, and I am able to watch the romance between Reuben and Norma Rae without too much squirming. It's coy but interestingly coy, a variation on the Pygmalion story—with Reuben as a Jewish Prince (his ideal New York day is to play a little handball in the morning, go to a performance of *Aida* in the afternoon, and eat Chinese for dinner) educating a nubile but worn Norma Rae about the finer things in life (Dylan Thomas in this case) and the importance of building a union. Thanks to the acting of Leibman and Field, the romance holds our attention. Their first serious meeting, when Norma Rae stumbles into Reuben's motel room with a bloody nose that her lover has given her, is a model of tact (Reuben gets ice for her nose without asking questions) and ethnic comedy, and the relationship between them builds on this combination of affection and tension. Reuben is a good teacher but never fully likable. Even when he compliments Norma Rae, calling her another Mother Jones, he does it in a way that enforces his role as a teacher (she must ask who Mother Jones was). Norma Rae in turn is an excellent pupil, who not only becomes the "*mensch*" her teacher wants her to be but his teacher as well, introducing him to workers he would never reach on his own. As a result, by the film's end, Reuben and Norma Rae have touched each other deeply, and their good-by (they shake hands rather than embrace) is moving as much for what it excludes as what it includes.

But moving for how long and at what cost? The answer to that question doesn't improve with a second watching of *Norma Rae*. Our interest in the romance between Reuben and Norma Rae depends in great measure on the tensions produced by its nonconsummation (even after a nude swim on a hot afternoon), and yet by the picture's end, we still don't know why they haven't gone to bed. Out of respect for Norma Rae's new marriage? Because of Reubens dedication to union work? Possibly. But none of these reasons is given, and in the context of *Norma Rae* their flimsiness encourages us to think that at the right time Reuben and Norma Rae will become lovers.

The ultimate cost of the romance between Reuben and Norma shows up, however, in what happens to the original political concerns of the film. Bait and switch in this case means that we take

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home an inferior product to the one advertised. Crowded for time, Ritt ceases to make the union issues he began with an organic part of his film and instead reduces them to background material or sketches them in quickly. The worst case of this short-circuiting occurs at a house meeting Reuben calls early in his organizing drive. Only a handful of workers show up, and in response to a question Reuben asks, they tell him about their troubles at work. A woman says that even when she gets menstrual cramps she is not allowed to sit down at her machine. A man complains about the way the company has bricked over the mill's windows. A wife talks about her husband's death from brown lung disease. And on it goes in a neat circle: one complaint per worker about horrifying conditions and yet all of it sanitized—nothing that hits us in a way that seeing these problems fleshed out would.

Nor do things improve when Ritt tries to portray the process by which Reuben convinces the workers at the Henley mill to vote for a union. What we get is a glimpsed struggle rather than a dramatically achieved one. We see Reuben leafletting the mill, forcing the Henley company to let him inspect its bulletin boards, speaking in a church, but these scenes—although moving at points—do not set the tempo for *Norma Rae*. In the end they seem like postcards sent from an unknown region of the country to a middle-class audience. We do not, except for Norma Rae, have a clear idea of how Reuben gets through to people, nor do we understand how he overcomes the obstacles, such as pitting black against white, that the company sets in his way.

As it turns out, the workers vote for unionization by a margin of 425 to 373, but the margin could have been twice as big or the reverse. We have not been prepared for this climactic scene and must take it on faith. The only foreshadowing comes when Norma Rae, after being fired for her union work, defiantly stands on a table and holds up a cardboard sign with UNION lettered on it and one by one her fellow workers respond to her gesture by turning their machines off until the weaving room is silent. But even this scene raises more questions then it answers. Is it Norma Rae that her fellow workers are honoring with their silence? Or is it a unanimous vote for a union? Or a combination of the two? The mystery is gratuitous here, and once again its effect is to cost *Norma Rae* political coherence.

April 3, 1979

WHY SHOULD *Norma Rae* end this way? For Ritt, whose past films include *The Molly Maguires*, *Sounder*, *The Front*, political coherence is clearly important, and he took a huge cut in salary to make Norma Rae.

May 3, 1979

AN ARTICLE in *People Magazine* on Crystal Lee Jordan (now Sutter). Her response to *Norma Rae*: "In the movie they make like it's only me that's important, and there were so many others." Ritt's reply: "She's turned into a middle-class bourgeois woman who doesn't want anyone to know about her life."

Roanoke Rapids

August 11, 1977

WALKED BY *the Rosemary mill this morning. Cotton everywhere. In the cyclone fence around the mill like spider webbing. In the gutters of the street like dandelion fluff. Yesterday I was in the union's office on Main Street when two workers came in directly from their shift. They looked as if they had been in a pillow fight. The longer I'm here the more sinister the mills seem. In 1895 no less a figure than Stanford White was brought here to design a mill and construct thirty houses for mill employees. What we have now are a series of mills with bricked-over windows and workers' houses so narrow and cramped that cross ventilation is impossible. New England transmogrified? Or still worse, New England with its nineteenth-century defects intact? Day after day I see people in the Brown Lung office who can barely walk or catch their breath. There is nothing subtle about this kind of suffering, and in a town this small, nobody can say, "I didn't know."*

I can't see anything except raw power beating the mill owners and executives. They've spent years denying there was such a thing as brown lung (all the while firing workers whom they feared they might have to put on disability). At best they're Good Germans. The media give me a bit of hope. Sometimes—as at the hearings the House Labor Subcommittee held here this week—they seem so anxious to fit everything into a three-minute TV spot or an 800-word column that nothing less than a warm corpse is enough to hold their interest. And their remoteness is even more discouraging. They arrive on a press bus, are taken to a restaurant for a two-hour lunch, and leave as if they were rich tourists who had just put in a hard day sampling the

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fare of an underdeveloped country. But every once in a while they appear to drop their guard and listen. There are writers who come here and do not pull out the next day, and there is a documentary film crew from San Francisco that has put in a number of weeks.

Norma Rae: III

May 10, 1979

TONIGHT I was moved by a scene I barely noticed before: one in which Norma Rae's father (Pat Hingle) talks about being tired from work, then gives his daughter a hug, and as he puts his arm around her, we see that he is missing a finger. The camera does not stay on his hand for more than a second or two. But that is long enough. His fatigue, his mutilation from a job in which the machinery is cannibalistic, his love for Norma Rae all merge. It's the kind of modesty and inclusiveness Ritt is capable of, and beyond that, it's the material of *Norma Rae* coming through. What better reason, I think, to judge Ritt harshly when he takes the easy way out or to feel that praise for *Norma Rae* as a feminist film obscures its political thinness more than it captures the spirit of Norma Rae. □

COMMUNICATION *(continued from p. 479)*

superpower status. Daunting as that consequence was, few would contend that it was worse than the alternative, a Hitler victory. Similarly, the prospect of a totalitarian China enjoying superpower status—a future danger—would not in itself excuse a defeatist attitude toward the present danger, Russia, if war comes.

Even so, the prospect of an aftermath to the next war that features a new bifurcation of the world, in which China succeeds to the role hitherto played by Russia, raises questions extremely pertinent to the debate over detente. For the Chinese succession will inject a sinister new issue into the East-West conflict, the issue of race.

The roots of the East-West conflict are institutional and historical. If the present form of the conflict—between Russia and America—has one redeeming virtue, it is that no racial factor obtrudes. Neither side's propagandists are able to harness the passions of race to the many institutional and historical factors dividing their social systems. Russians are not readily distinguishable as human beings from the arch-fiends of Imperialism, nor are Americans from the Godless red atheists of the Kremlin. Neither side can credibly portray the other as a subhuman species worthy of annihilation.

But that which is difficult to invoke in the present form of the East-West conflict would be even more difficult to stifle in its future form, when totalitarian leadership will have passed to China. Even though the real roots of the conflict will remain what they are today—institutional and historical—their coincidence with the racial factor and its immense demagogic potential would soon transform a conflict between differently organized social systems into an atavistic war between races. More civilized elements of both countries' elites, which tried to resist a racial definition of the conflict, would be crushed by its elemental force. To the extent that positive human values are at stake in the East-West conflict today—and there are such values, on both sides—these would evaporate in the conflict to come.

It is the grim specter of race that haunts the East-West conflict and requires that conflict to be resolved now, in its present form, if it is ever to be resolved at all. The reason that "there is no alternative to detente" is not that "war is unthinkable." It is quite thinkable, and moreover not at all unlikely, considering the interests at stake, the contradictions between the two sides, and the difficulty of compromise. But it may no longer be regarded as *reasonable*—not even in the sense that World War II was reasonable. For the consequences of such a war, even assuming a victory over the Russians, would be as intolerable as the consequences of defeat by the Russians. And that is why detente must not be regarded as a passing diplomatic episode, or a clever strategic ploy aimed at weakening the enemy. Detente is a policy *goal* for both sides, an end in itself, and toward its realization certain formerly "unthinkable" compromises are warranted. □

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Erazim Kohák

Fire in the Ashes

Voices of Russian Dissent

THE CHALLENGE OF THE SPIRIT, by Boris Shragin. Translated by P. S. Falla. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 262 pp. $10.00.

THE PUNISHED PEOPLES, by Aleksandr M. Nekrich. Translated by George Saunders. New York: W. W. Norton. 238 pp. $10.95.

THE SAMIZDAT REGISTER, edited by Roy A. Medvedev. New York: W. W. Norton. 314 pp. $10.95.

ALARM AND HOPE, by Andrei D. Sakharov. Edited and translated by Efrem Yankelevich and Alfred Friendly, Jr. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 224 pp. $8.95; paperback, New York: Vintage, $2.95.

PSYCHIATRIC TERROR, by Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway. Foreword by Vladimir Bukovsky. New York: Basic Books. 510 pp. $12.95.

Behind the facade of Soviet ideology, there is a tremendous longing for the clear, pure word of truth. That, more than anything else, is the driving force behind the upsurge of literature, in typescript and carbon copies, emerging in all parts of the Soviet empire. The men and women who risk life, liberty, and fortune—such as they are—to produce and reproduce those slender volumes are not an opposition seeking to replace the rulers of the Soviet state. They are not even dissidents in the usual sense of proposing an alternative ideology. In their own eyes, they are simply people weary of pretense, people who have chosen to live in truth: to say what they are and be what they say.

To Western observers, that passionate earnestness often seems naive. We, too, are accustomed to think *ideologically*. Whether we speak of macrosociology or of "critical theory," we seek a more sophisticated and less demanding substitute for both truth and reality in a theoretical model that purports to describe the hidden driving forces of History. The realities of the concrete, individual struggle for moral integrity appear to us as little more than an uninteresting biographical footnote to history.

In the Soviet Union, however, years of enforced orthodoxy have rendered all ideology suspect, not just because it is often false, but because it is always *untrue*, far removed from the living reality of human lives. While, in the name of sophistication, we, like our Soviet counterparts, seek to explain individual freedom in terms of systematic necessity, Russia's proscribed authors look for a key to the complexity of the system in the spontaneity of human freedom.

Even the term "sam-izdat" is indicative. To translate it, literally, as "self-publishing" misses the point. *Samizdat* is not a primitive version of the vanity press. The word is a variation on *Gosizdat*, short for *gosudarstvenoye izdatelstvo*, the government publishing monopoly. The *Gosizdat's* omnipresent productions are official, centrally directed—and so suspect: for truth must bear the mark of spontaneity. This is the significance of the "*sam*" in *samizdat*: it is spontaneous literature, ordered by no one, directed by no one, produced at no one's behest by the readers themselves.

Spontaneity, not any ideological sophistication or the number of its supporters, is what makes this unauthorized literature of the Soviet empire significant. For too long have we tended to see the Soviet Union in terms of the ideological facade that its rulers chose to project. At times we accepted it at its word, at other times we questioned it but,

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throughout, the Soviet state and its Marxist-Leninist ideology remained our basic reference point. The spontaneous literature that is now emerging in English translations presents a very different picture. Here the focus is on the struggle of humans and nations to regain a sense of moral integrity, self-respect, and personal reality long obscured by repeated clichés.

II

THE GREAT VALUE of Boris Josifovich Shragin's soul-searching study, *The Challenge of the Spirit*, both for the Russian reader for whom it was written and for the Western observer privileged to read it in translation, is that it penetrates behind the ideological facade to the living reality of the Russian nation. Shragin is Russian to the marrow of his bones, as Russian as Dostoyevsky, Tolstoi, or Solzhenitsyn. But he is also a Jew and, in a society as deeply anti-Semitic as the Russian, this inevitably makes him an outsider, no matter how totally he identifies with the country. Shragin knows that. He writes with the intimate understanding of an unreservedly committed insider—but with a critical perspective of one never fully accepted.

Shragin's basic recognition is that the Soviet Union's "peculiar institutions" owe far less to Karl Marx than to the spirit of Russia itself. The Soviet system, that strange combination of paternalism and despotism tinged with xenophobia and cruelty, may be an alien imposition on the Western nations under Soviet rule; but, in the Russian heartland of the empire, it is a faithful expression of the spirit of a nation that, overtly, may even reject it.

Russia, together with the Ukraine and Krivia ("White" or "Lesser" Russia), is unique among the lands of the Western heritage in never having passed through either a renaissance or a reformation. Those two terms indicate less discrete historical events than fundamental movements of the European spirit. The universal significance of the Renaissance is not its classical scholarship but rather its separation of morality from *mores*. To medieval Europe—witness John of Salisbury—that distinction would have been incomprehensible. Here *mores* seemed totally synonymous with morality. What we today call modernization became possible only when the Renaissance, in the name of reason and classical culture, posited morality as radically autonomous of *mores* and so made a moral critique of "our way of life" possible and acceptable. The Reformation, now less as a historical event than a metaphor, represents a culmination of the Renaissance in the internalization of the autonomous moral law as individually binding. The Renaissance alone would lead to anarchism or despotism. If the moral law is not binding as *mores*—that is, in terms of communal coercion—it is not binding at all unless each individual recognizes it as intimately his own, as Kant's "moral law within." Modernization—the possibility of a free society—is totally contingent, first, on the autonomization of the moral law from *mores*, breaking the omnipresent tyranny of custom and, second, on the internalization of the moral law, which makes order without coercion possible.

In Europe, such a free society in fact developed fully only in the lands that passed both through a renaissance and a reformation, the autonomization and the internalization of morality. In countries where the Renaissance was not followed by an internalization of the moral law but was cut short by some form of external imposition of social order—as in France, Austria, or Italy—democracy remained problematic, a slogan of anarchic autonomy in a perennial dialectic with a countervailing tyranny. But Russia never passed through either a renaissance or a reformation, through either the autonomization or the internalization of the moral law. Here, morality and *mores* remain fused. Any critique of *mores* appears intrinsically immoral—while the authority of *mores*/morality remains wholly external, binding only where it can be made so by the vigilance of the community or the authorities.

Boris Shragin gives a penetrating description of the consequences. In Russia, any morality—including, ironically, the Marxist—necessarily tends to become totalitarian because it can only be understood as *mores*. There is no room for individuality because there is no room for an individual moral identity: criticism is not a legitimate form of social participation. The communalism of the Russian society made it uniquely susceptible to Communism—while making sure that such Communism would inevitably turn into a stifling communalism. But where morality is communal rather than individually internalized, the individual, as individual, remains lawless and social coexistence possible only under the constraint of despotism. Russia not only suffers from its "peculiar institutions," it also needs them. It is the misfortune of the modernized lands under its rule—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—that such

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peculiar institutions cannot be applied selectively.

Boris Shragin's book is brilliant, bitter, and full of an unspoken hope. Confession is the prerequisite to absolution. Once the Russians recognize the traits of their society that make orthodoxy and autocracy necessary they will have taken the first step toward making them obsolete. But, in the meantime, the stability of Russia's despotic paternalism does not rest simply on the undeniable efficiency of the Soviet police, army, and bureaucracy as it does in other Soviet-ruled lands. It rests on the inherent weakness of Russia's social structure. The pressing issue is not Marxism, its preservation, reformation, or destruction, but the *spiritual modernization* of Russia. Shragin's self-analysis is a crucial step toward such modernization.

Shragin's insight is also central to understanding the spectrum of Russia's spontaneous thought and literature. That spectrum is not defined by its views of Marxism, today largely irrelevant, but rather based on its attitude toward the modernization of Russian society.

Solzhenitsyn, most familiar and probably least comprehensible to the West, can be used as a symbol of the traditionalist end of the spectrum. Solzhenitsyn rejects the entire notion of modernization together with the Russian Marxism that he sees not as all-too-Russian but as too Western. To Solzhenitsyn, the disruption of the social fabric required by the autonomization of morality seems inherently destructive. Like Rousseau before him, Solzhenitsyn sees modernization solely as social disintegration. His call is to reintegrate what the Westernizing Marxist regimes disintegrated, by a return to the traditional values and structures of Russia.

Seen through Western eyes or through the eyes of Russian modernizers, Solzhenitsyn may appear hopelessly reactionary. But that is less than fair. Solzhenitsyn is posing a serious question that the West has so far confronted only hesitantly: is modernization really "progress"? Is the reintegration represented by the internalization of the moral law really possible—or will we move only as far as the disintegration represented by its autonomization? We of the democratic left are committed to the proposition that a society that is both free and moral is possible, but this, after all, is an act of faith that, in the last decade, has become increasingly hard to sustain. In Russia, should some Chinese miracle bring on an abrupt demise of the Soviet regime, Solzhenitsyn's conception of a moral orthodoxy and autocracy may prove the only viable alternative to the present Marxist one and, while perhaps better, it would not be good.

III

SHOULD THE DEMISE of the Soviet regime take the form of a gradual devolution, the model most appropriate might prove to be that symbolized by Solzhenitsyn's most persistent intellectual critic, Roy Medvedev. Medvedev, interestingly, agrees with Solzhenitsyn on one crucial point: he, too, regards Marxism as essentially or at least potentially a modernizing movement, albeit deeply corrupted by Stalin and his successors. It is Medvedev and his intellectual kin who come closest to what Western ideological loyalists hope for in a "reformed" Marxism.

Twenty years ago, such an approach seemed most promising and even received some passing official sanction. That, after all, was Khrushchev's policy: revitalizing Marxism by reforming its Stalinist deformations. But Khrushchev's attempt was stifled by the Soviet system. The deformations proved too deeply ingrained to be removed without radical surgery. As Peter the Great found out earlier, it is not possible to foster modernity, the autonomization and internalization of the moral law, while preserving autocracy. The Czechoslovak experiment, moving along Krushchev's lines, accepted the consequence of surrendering autocracy—and was promptly crushed by Soviet tanks. Transplanted to the West as Eurocommunism, Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face" is now enjoying its Indian summer behind the NATO shield. But the fatal contradiction remains. Eurocommunism can survive only behind the NATO shield, as the occupation of Czechoslovakia proved beyond the shadow of a doubt. Yet, the Eurocommunists are commited to dismantling that shield. Their success would be their demise. Today, the possibility for an internal reformation of Marxism seems highly problematic.

This internal contradiction marks the writings of authors who, very loosely, might be grouped with Medvedev's legitimist approach, among them Aleksandr Nekrich's *The Punished Peoples*. Nekrich opens one of the many skeleton-filled closets of the Soviet empire, that of the mass deportations of entire nations from the Caucasus during the Second World War. Such deportations, to be sure, are nothing new in imperial history. The Czars followed a policy of deportation and resettlement to secure marginal regions, Cromwell did it in Ulster, the Americans used a similar policy

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in dealing with the Indian population, Hitler planned a similar treatment for the Czech lands. The Caucasian deportations are important, less because they are unique than because they are typical.

Nekrich, writing, at the time, within the Soviet Union, deserves great credit both for his courage in speaking out and for his deep, humanistic sympathy for the nations he describes. Though himself a Russian, he writes with a genuine compassion of the "punished peoples'" love for their land, their pride in their language, and of the utter brutality of the deportation. If you have read Mari Sandoz's *Cheyenne Autumn*, you know the scenario, here rendered more horrifying by the anonymous brutality of the Soviet system and the gratuitous cruelty of its agents. In the whole sad story, only the tenacious loyalty of even the second and third generations of the deportees to their land and language offers a ray of hope for all the peoples trapped in the Soviet prison house of nations.

Nekrich's book is even more interesting as an illustration of the promise and the limitations of the "reformist" approach. Nekrich shows a genuine love for the victims, the Kalmyks, the Balkars, the Chechens, the Kazaks. He is convinced that they should have every bit as full a right to be loyal Soviet citizens as if they were Russian. He counters the stock argument that the deportations were a punishment for collaboration with convincing evidence of the deported nations' loyalty to the Soviets at the time of the German onslaught.

But therein lies the rub. Why should loyalty to the Soviet state be a condition of self-determination? The Russians came to these lands as conquerors. They robbed the subject peoples of the most precious heritage humans have on this earth, their language and their land. The Russians settled as masters among them, reduced their language to a kitchen vernacular, and transformed them into "ethnic minorities" in their own lands. How much self-respect could a person or a nation retain if they accepted such treatment and repaid it with loyalty to their masters? The conquered people owe the Soviets nothing. The problem is not only that Soviet rule in the conquered territories has been harsh and at times genocidal but that even the most benign Soviet rule is in principle unjust.

The Soviet legitimists cannot, in principle, carry their recognition that far. All they can ask is humane rather than arbitrary injustice. Their approach may in fact be the only feasible strategy of transition from the present harsh rule to eventual independence for all the conquered nations, including my own. But it is a strategy of transition, not a long-range alternative.

IV

THE SAME essentially transitional character marks Roy Medvedev's collection of essays, *The Samizdat Register*. The book covers a wide spectrum of topics. Three authors, Sergei Elagin, German Andreev, and Lev Z. Kopelev, each focusing on his specialty, address themselves to Solzhenitsyn's thesis that the only authentically Russian heritage is Russian Orthodox. Together they make a convincing case that even Russia's Christian heritage provides a legitimate basis for modernization, not only for a reaffirmation of the premodern Russia. But the modernity of which they speak is in no recognizable sense Marxist.

Neither is A. Zimin's historiographical contribution. Zimin's critique of Stalin's monopolization of power would apply to Lenin as well. His positive demand is for legality, but that is again less than neo-Marxism, especially in view of Zimin's recognition that the total state monopoly of initiative is incapable of regeneration. The perfunctory bow to Lenin does not dull the edge of criticism.

What emerges from *The Samizdat Register* is that neo-Marxism is not a viable alternative, even though it might be the most viable strategy of transformation—if the Soviet state were seeking such strategies, which it emphatically is not. The neo-Marxists' great contribution is their recognition of the legitimacy of the basic socialist impulse of the Soviet revolution, but what they propose is a vaguely socialist alternative to, rather than a modification of, the state that revolution has produced. In the case of a gradual rather than an abrupt demise of the Soviet state, a legitimist strategy might well be in order, but it would be vain to pretend that it represents a revitalization of Marxism.

The most viable alternative might well come not from the people who reject Marxism or from those seeking to reform it but from those who simply *ignore* it, focusing their effort on fostering a rule of law and a recognition of human rights as the basis for social coexistence. Among the Soviet empire's other subject nations with a tradition of modernity this emphasis has clearly come into the focus of spontaneous thought and action, as in the Czech Charter 77 or the Polish Committee for the Defense of the Society. In Russia the representatives of human rights face a harder task: they

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have to be modernizers of their nation as well as protesters against their state. They cannot count on the automatic sympathy of their compatriots. Still, even among the Russians, this emphasis, represented by Andrei Sakharov, is coming increasingly to the forefront, both as the common platform of all free thought and as its cutting edge.

It would be misleading to describe Sakharov as pro- or anti-Marxist or, for that matter, as pro- or anti-Soviet. He and the people loosely associated with him regard themselves as loyal subjects of the Soviet state, operating strictly within the limits of its laws and even in harmony with its stated aims of freedom and justice, even though not with its feudal spirit.

V

THE COLLECTION of Sakharov's occasional writings, *Alarm and Hope*, is a "slice-of-life" book, a day—really, a year—in the life of a Russian humanist. Perhaps that is why it is so fascinating. Not all parts of it are equally so—not even the most prominent "dissident" can be interesting 24 hours a day. But it is that much more revealing, for it shows the day-by-day reality of a Russian who has chosen to eschew easy conformity and live in truth.

In the process, Sakharov answers most of the practical questions Western observers raise—about the importance of the West for the protesters in the Soviet Union, about the possibilities and limitation of Soviet legality, about the impact of the Czech and the Yugoslav experiments, about the significance of the human rights movements in the West but, most significantly, about the future of the Soviet Union.

In Sakharov's writing, the problem of modernization emerges most clearly. Soviet society does not suffer only from inadequate laws or an archaic ideology—though both are in evidence—but even more fundamentally from backwardness of spirit. Sakharov unwittingly confirms Shragin's analysis. Russia has never passed through a renaissance and a reformation. It has retained a byzantine mentality, which would transform any ideology and any system into yet another version of caesaropapism. What Sakharov is trying to do is not to change the system but to change the mentality that rules it, insisting on the autonomy and internal validity of the moral law.

In light of the reality of which Shragin and Sakharov write, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, if the Soviet Union has a future, Sakharov's approach is a key to it. A violent destruction of Soviet Marxism could at best create a vacuum that only an analogous orthodoxy could fill. A gradual transformation of Soviet Marxism into a socialist democracy is highly unlikely. Such hope as there may be is for a modernization of the Russian spirit. Insistence on human rights and on an equitable application of the law is the concrete means of such transformation.

Is it a realistic hope? It hardly seems to be. The inertia of the system is such that Amalrik's scenario could overtake in a rush such progress as Russia's modernizers might achieve.

VI

BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE that these efforts are not without effect—and one bit of evidence is the growing use of psychiatric hospitals as a means of coercion.

Anywhere else in the world that would hardly be progress. But the punitive use of therapy, already "pioneered" by the Czar against Chadaayev in 1854, has played a special role in Russian history. A commitment to a mental hospital can be accomplished with a minimum of fuss and publicity. If the courts were unnecessary or completely docile, this would make little difference. If the Soviet authorities increasingly resort to involuntary confinement in mental institutions as a means of silencing nonconforming thinkers, it suggests that they no longer feel free to ignore or manipulate the legal system as Stalin once did with utter impunity. That, ironically, is progress.

Still, this is a horrifying phenomenon, and it is more than disquieting that it has not aroused a storm of indignation in the West. In part, as Bloch and Reddaway, two British scholars with insiders' knowledge of Soviet therapeutic practice, recognize in *Psychiatric Terror* (an abominable and most inappropriate title), the problem may be a lack of confidence in the state of the psychiatric art. Lacking a clear vision of moral humanity—or, more antiseptically, of "mental health"—psychiatry the world over tends to fall back on a vague notion of "adjustment"—basically, conformity to prevailing *mores*. Unscrupulous authors and film directors have been quick to exploit this and to claim that psychiatry is simply a tool for making sane persons conform to an insane society. The author and the director of *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* have rendered the Soviets yeoman service: Westerners feel too unsure of their own psychiatry to be indignant about that of the Soviets.

Yet, there is a difference, and Bloch and

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Reddaway document it scrupulously, citing not only their own experiences and the testimony of the dissidents but also official Soviet sources. The difference is not only the primitive state of Soviet psychiatry—committed, by official edict, to the teachings of Pavlov and to dealing with all mental disorders as either overstimulation or understimulation, to be countered by massive doses of sedatives or stimulants. Nor is it simply the use of such concepts as "sluggish schizophrenia," a disease characterized by a total absence of visible symptoms and serving as convenient grounds for the involuntary commitment of anyone whom the authorities do not want to put on trial but prefer not to have around. Basically, the difference is that what in the West occurs as an unintended by-product of the state of the art recognized as a deformation, is, in the Soviet Union, a conscious and systematic policy. The Soviet Union has two types of mental institutions: one operated by the public health service, the second by the ideological police, two psychiatric staffs with a similar double allegiance, and two sets of patients, one recognized as "really" ill, the other acknowledged as imprisoned.

Bloch and Reddaway's book makes ominous reading, both as an examination of the kind of threat that anyone who choses to live in truth in the Soviet Union must face and as a reflection on Western therapeutic practice. It is, however, also a testimony to the courage of the few Russians who, in spite of the threat, do refuse to participate in the comfortable lie.

VII

IN FACE of the total monopoly of initiative at the disposal of the Soviet state, how significant can the phenomenon of spontaneous thought in Russia be?

It has some obvious weaknesses. Its very existence depends on detente—the sense of the Soviet authorities that the West is watching them and that it is crucial not to make too flagrantly a bad impression. The history of the '30s and the '50s—as well as the fate of free thinkers foo obscure to be visible in the West—shows what the Soviet system can do. Its second weakness is its lack of popular support. The Russian in-the-street may have no great love for the authorities, but he has no understanding for people who deviate from the *mores* or disrupt the prevailing pattern of paternalism. The civil rights movement in Czechoslovakia, though minute, can count on the tacit sympathy of the overwhelming majority of its fellow citizens. Its Russian counterparts cannot. Certainly, as an opposition or even as a dissident movement in any traditional sense, those who speak the truth in the Soviet Union would be wholly insignificant.

But the Russians who choose the truth are not an opposition or a dissident movement. They are, if anything, a "counterculture"—and the strength of any countercultural movement, presenting no doctrine, serving no interest but refusing to go along with pretense, is not in numbers but in the weakness of the "establishment" it opposes. The "counterculture" in America had only marginal impact because American society was far sounder than the counterculture gave it credit for being. The condition of the Soviet system is far more problematic. The Bolshevik regime, lacking either evident massive popular support or the dynastic legitimacy of the Czars, could base its legitimacy only on its orthodoxy as the sole representative of the "scientific world view," Marxism-Leninism. As reality increasingly deviated from ideology, it could not give up its ideology without giving up its legitimacy. It had, instead, to silence the reality. After threescore years of elaborate ideological construction, the Soviet empire presents a vision of an almost total alienation of theory from practice. The cynicism of leading Soviet Marxists about Marxism—if vodka or blood ties loosen their tongues—is shocking even to a non-Marxist.

The Soviet state is powerful: it leaves no room for opposition or dissent. But the Emperor may well be wearing fewer clothes than we realize and, in the *samizdat*, there has arisen a boy either naive or honest enough to say so. He is small and alone, but his voice might well prove to have the strength of truth.

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We the Czechs and the Slovaks, are the powerless ones who yet decide the fate of our land. We cannot decide who will rule over us, but we can decide over *whom* they will rule, whether over a nation of serfs or over free humans in transient bondage. . . . What kind of a nation will grow up in our land is up to us, the powerless ones.

Translated from Erazim Kohák, *Národ v nás*, circulating as *samizdat* in Czechoslovakia. Emigré edition. Toronto: '68 Publishers, 1978, p. 190.

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Robert F. Hall

Those Southern Liberals

IN SEARCH OF THE SILENT SOUTH: SOUTHERN LIBERALS AND THE RACE ISSUE, by Morton Sosna. New York: Columbia University Press. 261 pp. $13.00.

This is an exercise in empathy with that highly articulate group of white Southerners, mostly writers, who were strongly committed to justice for Negroes and who appealed for support—it was not forthcoming—from what they believed was a reservoir of racial liberalism among their fellow Southerners. It is also a sad record of futility, because the improvement in the status of blacks in the South came as the result of militant movements by blacks and Northern whites, the assertion of political power by blacks nationwide, and by action in Washington—all resented or objected to by most of the Southern liberals.

The conception of a "Silent South" was first posited in 1885 by George Washington Cable, who was convinced that the majority of Southern whites were sympathetic to or would accept justice for Negroes—held back only by their fear of the loud-mouth bigots who established post-Reconstruction Jim Crow laws. This conception was invoked repeatedly by the liberals about whom Sosna writes; in the period from the early 1930s to the early 1950s when the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education* mandated school desegregation, rejecting the "separate but equal" concept to which these liberals had so long appealed. The decision posed the issue of civil rights not merely for the South but for the whole nation, where it properly belonged. Thereby an error in perspective was corrected, which from the beginning had hampered the Southern liberals.

The goals of the liberals were cramped and limited. Though unspoken, their aim was to achieve a status for blacks in the South comparable to that in the North that, in the 1930s, was hardly one of equality. Very few of the liberals embraced the objective of desegregation, fearing the charge that they desired "social equality." Some, like Virginia Dabney, could not relinquish Old South prejudices, and some justified themselves through a mistaken notion of strategy.

This was a fatal flaw. If there had been a Silent South in the 1880s, shortly after Reconstruction, it had long been obliterated by the separation of the races through the rigidly enforced Jim Crow laws that made it difficult if not impossible for white and black to know each other except in a master-servant relationship. Only integration and social equality could assure a normal interplay between white and black, an intermingling in schools, churches, work, and politics.

The book stops almost ten years short of the cataclysmic demonstrations of 1963, which saw Governor Wallace "stand in the schoolhouse door" at the University of Alabama to protest the enrollment of a black student. That year also saw Martin Luther King, Jr. lead thousands of Birmingham blacks in a militant confrontation with Bull Connor's police dogs. It was the year of the Freedom Marchers, the assassination of Medgar Evers in Jackson, Mississippi, and of a white civil rights crusader from Baltimore on a roadside near Attala, Alabama. The Southern Regional Council reported that 75 Southern cities experienced demonstrations with more than 13,000, mostly blacks, arrested. More than 200,000 white and Negro citizens converged on Washington and heard King's famous "I have a dream" oration.

Most of Sosna's liberals were by then old and tired. Many had died. The record for the three decades covered by Sosna finds his liberals consistently pitted against black militancy and "outside interference."

One may then wonder about the writing and publication of a whole book on what at most is a footnote to an important development in American democracy. The answer lies, I think, in that Southern mystique that makes Southern whites regard themselves as members of an exclusive club with its own traditions and nostalgia. Sosna loved and admired his Southern white liberals, and I join him in admiration and affection for some of them whom I knew and with whom I worked.

I SUSPECT that here I must establish my credentials to speak about Sosna's liberals. I was born in 1906 in Mississippi. My mother came from a slave-owning family in Monroe county, Alabama. Both my grandfathers served in the Confederate Army. I lived and worked in Mobile until 1929 when I came north to Columbia College.

I could have qualified as a Southern liberal under Sosna's implied definition. As a cub reporter

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on the *Mobile Register* at the age of 18, I covered a meeting of Negroes addressed by Oscar De Priest, then the only black congressman, and wrote of it sympathetically. A couple of years later I publicly called on the district attorney, Nicholas Stallworth, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce that he was addressing, to endorse the right to vote for Mobile's black citizens. But when I finished at Columbia and returned to the South as Southern secretary of the Communist party at Birmingham in 1933, I and my comrades were apparently a nameless embarrassment to the liberals and therefore do not qualify for mention in this book.

Given the circumscribed subject of the book, Communist activity may seem extraneous. But the book suffers by this circumscription. It underplays the role of the blacks in the South, struggling for their liberation, as well as actions, minor though they may be, in the trade unions and churches that demonstrated instances of Negro-white activity.

As for the Communists, we were highly critical of most of Sosna's white liberals for their failure to attack segregation. But we had friendly relations, sometimes working relations, with most of them.

As Sosna relates, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare was conceived by Joseph S. Gelders, who left his post as physics professor at the University of Alabama to head the National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners. He was busy getting me out of Bull Connor's jail when he was kidnapped and beaten by goons of the Tennessee Coal & Iron Co., a subsidiary of U.S. Steel. The beating permanently injured his heart and he died in California in 1950.

Gelders made contact with President and Mrs. Roosevelt not through Lucy Randolph Mason, as Sosna reports, but through two ILGWU organizers from Tupelo, Mississippi, whose youth and dedication had attracted Mrs. Roosevelt's attention. I was one of those whom Gelders consulted as to the nature of the help he would request from the Roosevelts. We agreed it would be helpful for Mrs. Roosevelt to endorse and address a conference of Southern liberals. It was FDR himself who emphasized that the conference program should include resolutions demanding abolition of both the poll tax and restrictions on the franchise.

The conference was held in the municipal auditorium in Birmingham in November 1938 with an impressive list of Southern leaders in industry, education, government, labor, religion, and journalism in attendance. The skeptical attitude of some of the Negroes present was dramatized a few minutes after it opened, when Mrs. Louise O. Charlton, presiding, introduced Mrs. Mary McLeod Bethune, president of Bethune-Cookman College, as "Mary." Mrs. Bethune corrected the chairman: "I don't know you well enough for you to call me by my first name. I am *Mrs.* Bethune."

Paul Robeson, whom Mrs. Bethune called "the tallest tree in our forest," sang and spoke briefly, calling for a resolution for clemency for the Scottsboro Boys and the end of Jim Crow. There were protests in private to Eleanor Roosevelt who responded, "Paul is a special person. He has earned the right to say whatever he wishes."

The mixed seating of black and white in the auditorium violated the city's segregation ordinance and Bull Connor's police showed up to enforce the law. A blue string was stretched down the center aisle to separate the sections occupied by white and black. Eleanor Roosevelt dramatized her position by placing her chair in the middle aisle between the two sections. The audience accepted the separation under protest and adopted a strong resolution attacking this segregation. Senator John Bankhead resigned from the organization because of the resolution.

The SCHW was to function for several years under the leadership of Clark Foreman, Dr. Frank Graham, and Virginia Foster Durr. Its program, as laid down at Birmingham, was by far the most progressive of any Southern liberal organization. It called for outlawing the poll tax, for federal antilynching legislation, opposition to wage differentials, equal educational opportunities, and "full rights and privileges of American citizenship for all people under the law." The "separate but equal" concept, however, still underlay the entire program.

In 1940, the SCHW financed an unsuccessful appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse its 1937 decision upholding the Georgia poll tax. Yet, as Sosna points out, when the Supreme Court outlawed the white primary in 1944, Southern liberals failed to exploit that decision.

Frances Pickens Miller resigned from SCHW because of the presence of Communist party members at the Birmingham conference. (Of 1,200 attending, there were all of six of us.) Communist influence was repeatedly charged, and although Chairman Graham insisted that Communists had never determined its policies, Barry Bingham, Mark Ethridge, and Louise Charlton used this charge as their reason for resigning in 1941. Actually, none of us exerted any influence in SCHW except for our small part in its launching.

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But the red scare was used by conservatives to oppose the relatively progressive policies of the organization, and in 1954 Mrs. Durr and Aubrey Williams were summoned to testify about it by the witchhunting committee of Senator James O. Eastland.

The charge of communism was an ever recurring nightmare to the liberals. There is the very shocking case of Will Alexander who early in the Scottsboro case learned from the Huntsville police that Ruby Bates and Victoria Price, whom the young men were charged with raping, were prostitutes. But he never released that information for fear of being charged with aiding the Communists.

C. Vann Woodward, a Southern historian whom I have long admired, once wrote me a very angry letter in which he charged that my very existence in the South played into the hands of anti-Negro firebrands.

I AM NOT at all disposed to apologize for such militant activity as the Communist party practiced in the South up to the end of World War II (although I blush to recall the party's 1930 manifesto demanding the establishment of a Negro Republic in the Black Belt). Neither do I wish to exaggerate the effects of our activity. But if the courage of the white liberals, though ineffective, is worth a book, the courage of Southern Communists during those three decades justifies some footnotes.

One such footnote would be the battle of Camp Hill in December 1932, where black members of the Alabama Sharecroppers Union fought a pitched battle with the sheriff's forces and vigilantes to prevent the seizure for debt of a member's livestock. With directions from Nat Ross, then the party's organizer in Birmingham, two of us drove into that Black Belt community one night that summer to lay the basis for what was to become the first organization of tenants and sharecroppers in the Deep South. A tough, fearless black from Harlem, an unsung hero named Al Murphy, met us and arranged the meeting with about 20 sharecroppers, which resulted in a delegation coming to Washington for what we called a Farmers National Committee for Action. Clyde Johnson, a brave young white from Minnesota, was later to live and work underground, risking his life daily, to build that union. Johnson and I met later with H.L. Mitchell and Howard Kester, the Socialists who headed the Southern Tenant Farmers Union in Arkansas (both mentioned by Sosna as liberals), but no merger ever took place. Although Sosna seems unaware of the AlabamaSharecroppers Union, it was the subject of an important work by Theodore Rosengarten, entitled *All God's Dangers: the Life of Nate Shaw*, published in 1974. It also served as a chapter in *Seeds of Revolt*, by Mauritz Hallgren, published in 1933.

I recall the white president of a local of the United Textile Workers Union who, at a state CIO convention in Gadsden, had to defend himself with his fists for supporting resolutions on civil rights. I attended that convention and submitted the resolutions to Walter Jones, the Negro assistant to District President Bill Mitch of the United Mine Workers. Unfortunately, Jones put them in the hands of Noel Beddow, a Birmingham lawyer John L. Lewis had hired to head the state CIO. Beddow was a reactionary to whose lips the phrase "syphlitic communists" came as easily as "damnyankee." He denounced the resolutions and me, but a textile worker, a member of the Socialist party, took the floor in their defense. For this he was physically attacked by some white unionists.

These incidents suggest that to focus exclusively on white liberals during the early struggles for civil rights in the South is so limiting as to be misleading.

With Sosna we can respect the Southern white liberals for their courage and commitment, but we can identify the reason for their failure—which was their inability to see the picture as a whole.

If this explains the failure of the liberals, how explain the failure of the Communists? Certainly, they correctly recognized black and white unity as the essential element in success. They attacked the Jim Crow laws as the major obstacle; they called for complete social equality and never fell into the "separate but equal" trap. Yet, by the 1960s when the crucial battles for civil rights began, Communists played no role.

Even before the outbreak of World War II, the Communist party's subordination to the Communist International and to the *Diktats* of Moscow compromised its image as a radical American party. With the U.S.S.R. yet to emerge as a world power, I suspect that many who invoked the red scare against Southern Communists did so more out of fear of these Communists' militant fight against Jim Crow than because of Moscow's dominance. But, as war clouds gathered, the party's easy acceptance of the Hitler-Stalin pact and, following the victory over the Axis at the end of the war, the party's continued slavish following

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of Moscow's line rendered it impotent and without influence.

An exercise in courage or militance for a worthy cause is, I believe, never wasted, even though its tangible result is impossible to measure. The tragedy of the Southern liberals and the Southern Communists is that a potential for great achievement was squandered. □

Andrew L. Giarelli

Hungry for Heritage

"Dear Master": Letters of a Slave Family, edited by Randall M. Miller. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 281 pp. $15.

First Generation, by June Namias. Introduction by Robert Coles. Boston: Beacon Press. 234 pp. $12.95.

Big Falling Snow, by Albert Yava. Edited and annotated by Harold Courlander. New York: Crown. 178 pp. $10.

"If there is nothing sublime in the commonplace," argues historian Randall Miller in his introduction to one segment of *Dear Master*, "there is continuity." How alien to our usual notions about history is such logic! More in love with story than we ever like to admit when we confront our history, we Americans nevertheless hunt for essences and stereotypes to make sense out of those stories. It is a literary urge.

History-tellers normally want to impart more than a sense of continuity. They want to make history seem meaningful; they distance themselves from their subjects in order to make events look as if they could have been meaningful even without the help of historians. Who can say, then, that the narrators of any of these three unusual histories are any less "truthful" just because they do not try to assume the normal, distanced and objective stance of "real" historians?

These books will earn mistrust because of their subject matter as well as their style. So much "ethnic history," especially the kind that promises to be told by participants themselves, scrupulously avoids provoking thought. Italian-Americans herd together at street festivals, buying carnival rides and overpriced calzone with desperate abandon. Afro-Americans stockpile their well-earned rage while watching "Roots" and then ignite it—in the high schools and outside the kung-fu movie houses. The panorama of sold-out subcultures is long and depressing. Soon, I imagine, every real ethnic group and a few invented ones will depend on TV sitcom as the fit vehicle for disseminating its story.

These three narrative compilations will help to provide a bulwark against the flood of medicated ethnic history. Their storytellers harvest commonplace details indiscriminately and lovingly, just as we do when we tell what we have accomplished at the end of the day. They let their scholarly appendages do the awkward—and I suppose necessary—dance around the issue of truth. Robert Coles, who introduces the immigrant oral histories in *First Generation*, expends some worried prose discounting hypothetical worries that the book's narratives are "skirting fibs, exaggerations, distortions, deceptions." Folklorist Harold Courlander claims that Albert Yava, the Tewa-Hopi narrator of *Big Falling Snow*, assumes the voice of an "external observer" of his own culture; the claim falls flat, however, when Yava begins to spice his account with his own views in the ongoing debate between resistance and accommodation to white culture. And Randall Miller is so charmed by the dutifully mundane "Dear Master" letters of one slave family that he occasionally judges them according to the standards of their "enlightened" owner, as if Miller had been tricked into thinking that the letters were addressed to him.

Miller's narrators are not deceptive the way scholars like to think that slaves were deceptive. They do not seem to cover anger and rebelliousness with their displays of loyalty. Rather, they lie about the influence of what we call history upon their lives. One looks in vain through *"Dear Master"* and its 31 years of correspondence for any reference to the debate over slavery. Equally vain is the attempt to locate these slaves' feelings about the outcome of the Civil War, though house servant Lucy Skipwith throws the pejorative "Yankee" into one snarling sentence and shows pity for plantation whites who have suffered for the Confederacy. But mostly these letters, all written by various members of the

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Skipwith family in Alabama and Liberia to Virginia aristocrat John Hartwell Cocke, form a surprisingly mundane tale of marling and manuring, of the progress of crops and livestock.

The Skipwiths were coddled slaves. They bought, or pretended to buy, stakes in Cocke's program of conservative reform. As baggage on their way to Liberia they were supposed to pick up notions of scientific agriculture, a hatred of liquor, and an austere Presbyterianism—besides exemplary obedience to Cocke. All of the Skipwiths, even those who went to Liberia, show in their letters how ambiguously they regarded the "reward" of exile from the only home they knew. But it was the only way out: no removal, no freedom. Cocke was truly the psychologically cruellest of masters, despite Professor Miller's talk about his "humane values, good order, and sense of noblesse oblige."

Cocke's experiment worked best on Peyton Skipwith, whose letters from Liberia open *"Dear Master."* His first panicked letter pleads with Cocke "to write to me by the first opportunity and let me no on what terms I can come back for I intend coming back as soon as I can." Two years later, in 1836, he can calmly note that "that day of awful gloom is gone and I feel satisfied with my present home and desire no other." A few years after that he is narrating details of settlement and battles against native tribes like a proper white colonist; at one point he muses that "it is something strange to think that those people of Africa are called our ancestors."

Peyton's ultimate praise of Liberia as the only proper home for American blacks, as well as his pleas for more help in civilizing that country's heathens, must also be regarded as bits of smart politicking. He is not unwilling to remind Cocke of the latter's promise to send other Skipwiths to Liberia. One of those still indentured was Peyton's brother George, entrusted with the position of slave-driver at Cocke's absentee-owned Alabama plantation. George's letters, full of innuendo against his white overseer and defensive of his ability to command the fieldworkers, provide rich insights into the nerve-wracking politics of the plantation hierarchy. He reveals himself as an accomplished jostler for a share of the power; one does not need to know of his taste for alcohol and other men's wives to see how pragmatically he regarded his role in Cocke's "school for freedom."

The book's third major group of letters, from Alabama house servant Lucy Skipwith, are mostly intriguing for what they conceal about slave emotions during the war years. Lucy seems to become more attuned to mundane rituals with each passing year of the conflict. Her lists of white men killed and captured and of black men worked to death building fortifications in Mobile are as cold as the sing-song poem she makes out of the ten commandments in one letter. Only her last letter, dated December 7, 1865, reveals a crack in the facade. She speaks haltingly of Cocke's proposal that she go to Liberia, and she explains her wish to visit Virginia. "Some of every bodys black people in this Neighbourhood have left their homes but us," she concludes. "We are all here so far but I cannot tell how it will be another year." Suddenly the seasonal continuity that rules her life is revealed as something created by whites who, like herself, do not know how it will be another year.

TOO MANY oral history projects are spoiled by interviewers already decided on what they want to hear and by timid subjects only too glad to let themselves be rehearsed. June Namias is consistently too polished and courteous an interviewer for that kind of sloppiness. Her repertoire of questions is not broad: rarely does she demand anything more speculative than "Do you miss the old country?" But she possesses the gift of provoking an extended and committed narrative.

Namias divides her interviews into three groups. *New Beginnings* contains the stories of people who arrived here before immigrant-quota laws blocked America's "Golden Door" in the '20s. The second section, "Survivors," is a much more select group. These political and ethnic refugees from the Europe of the '30s and '40s are from the upper- and upper-middle-class. Their relative wealth gave them the greater (though often mistaken) sense of freedom implied in the words of Anna Foa Yona, an Italian Jew: "Where could we go? We spread the map."

"New Generations"—those who arrived after the end of World War II—tell their stories in the book's final pages. These people form Namias's most diverse group: refugees from Communist bloc nations, illegal aliens, arrivals from United States territories, and young immigrants from many of the same places that sent millions in the first three decades of this century. Strangely, these final stories are the least interesting. Their speakers seem to have paid for small benefits like an easy adaptation of idiomatic English with the surrender of any purposeful sense of their distinction from other Americans.

Namias cultivates her most absorbing narratives

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in the earlier sections of *First Generation*. A Spanish leftist describes our government's threats and harassments against him, speaking with the wryness suitable to one who knows that his alternative was possible death in Franco's Spain. Two retired Italian-American stonecutters—one eloquent but preachy, the other a follower—hash out a mutually acceptable history of labor troubles in Barre, Vermont.

There is, however, strangely little anguish in these older voices. One gets the feeling that Philip and Theresa Bonacorsi of Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Nicholas Gerros (a "Greek Horatio Alger," says Namias) and their contemporaries in these pages do not see their stories as dramas of self-definition. They already knew who they were. Maybe they discovered too early the irony of how expendable they were despite their big dreams. And that knowledge fills their voices with—and I am unashamed to say it—a noble irony.

ALBERT YAVA'S VOICE in *Big Falling Snow* is the most ironic of all among these histories. Two factors probably contribute to that irony. The 90-year-old Yava belongs to the assertively autonomous Tewa minority within the Hopi community. He dissects Hopi myth and ritual with the combined familiarity and arrogance of one whose Tewa legends claim that Tewas will forever share the Hopi language and ceremonies but that the deal will never become reciprocal. Moreover, Yava hates empty ceremonialism and anything smacking of the "revival" of Indian tribalism more than he hates the pernicious effects of white culture. He sides with the "friendly" camp only out of the most rigid and prideful conservatism.

Yava's tales lead into wry little side-paths. He begins to tell the legend of one tribal journey and suddenly interrupts himself. "Of course, everything goes by fours, because it is a sacred number," he observes. "So there were four places on this journey that are remembered." He is not being disrespectful but is in fact showing the ultimate respect toward the myth. Not only the story is cherished but also the elements in it that make it one with other "different" stories. Yava accuses some of his predecessors who wrote books about Hopi culture of just the kind of disrespect he abhors, and he does so with scholarly precision. Yava himself, on the other hand, is one of the strangest graftings of folklore subject with folklorist that I have ever encountered. He is not ashamed to remind us that a particular myth is important because it presents the usual Hopi "theme of dissension and evil, and search for a place of harmony."

Like the letter-writers in *Dear Master*, Yava confounds our normal expectations about historic time. He simply does not observe the great distinction white culture makes between mythic and actual moments. Sometimes he shifts from the former to the latter within the same story: as soon as Masauwu the Fire Spirit allots lands to various Hopi clans, for example, Yava begins speculation on the historic claims of those clans.

Toward the end Yava comments on the death of Hopi ceremonialism. Here is none of the muted fear with which Lucy Skipwith approaches the demise of plantation life, none of the inarticulate rambling of the teenaged immigrants in *First Generation*. For a man who has spent so much of his life in ritual, his judgment against a neighboring village's attempt to revive one clan ceremony is rational and awful: "If they succeed it will only be on a superficial level."

THESE BOOKS work because they are deeply aware that whenever we tell history, we are really just telling stories. We fail when we confuse history with reality—whether we try to make too much sense out of it with grand theories, or whether we try to relive it, like Yava's culture-hungry neighbors. Is it wrong, then, to hunger for a heritage? Of course not. That is why these books are so sad. □

Greetings!

• At a time when the leading American Jewish magazines, *Commentary* and *Midstream*, increasingly inch toward the politics of William Buckley's *National Review*—though in styles less amusing—it's a pleasure to report that another American Jewish magazine is coming to life on the left. The *Jewish Frontier*, monthly organ of Labor Zionism, had seemed rather somnolent for some time, but it now has a new young editor, Mitchell Cohen, who is putting some energy into it. The June-July issue, for instance, has some strong political commentary about the Begin regime by Marie Syrkin and a revealing interview with Yitzchak Ben Aharon, former secretary-general of the Histadrut, who has the courage to speak frankly about the failures and lapses of the Israeli labor movement even as he urges its revival. It'll probably be some time before the *Frontier* can gain a readership and influence like that of the increasingly conservative magazines that dominate American Jewish life, but meanwhile it's good to see it picking up. (*Jewish Frontier*, 575 Sixth Ave., New York City.) •

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LETTERS

On "Africa: War and Revolution"

Editors:

Was the article "Africa: War and Revolution" in the spring issue of *Dissent* submitted to any member of the editorial board with some knowledge of Africa? If so, I find it hard to understand how such obvious anomalies as "Fremlino" and the French "métis" for "coloured" were not corrected, as well as the identification of the ELF rather than EPLF as the major group in Eritrea. The attempt to deal with three almost totally disparate parts of the continent resulted in very incomplete pictures of each, yet one still falling far short of the promise of the title, under which one would surely expect to read something about the wars in Zimbabwe and Rhodesia, if not Chad, Uganda, and elsewhere. But more seriously the title and to a degree the article itself implies that the New Africa is *characterized* by war and revolution. I hope you will find more competent analysts to deal with African matters in the future.

EWARD A. HAWLEY,
Executive Editor
Africa Today

[The article's author is the French scholar and journalist Serge Thion Eds.]

SERGE THION REPLIES:

It is always a pleasure for a writer to have a piece attacked. Referring to this text, some activists in France called me "an imperialist stooge" because I did not sufficiently admire the Mozambican revolution, while others labeled me a "Stalinist" because I did not condemn strongly enough Mengistu's Red Terror. Although my purpose was somewhat different, I found there was some political content in these critiques, at least an object for debate. But Mr. Hawley's disappointment is disappointing. He mentions misprints that should be corrected (the original text writes "Frelimo" and "EPLF") and says both at the same time that I cover too much ground and that I should extend my field to other areas. His only political point is whether I "*characterize*" New Africa by war and revolution. I do not know what precisely *New* Africa is. Is it just a journalistic device or a political category? Does it point to "socialist" regimes? Is Somalia still *new*? Is the Central African Empire not new? I can see that *some* wars are going on in *some* places in Africa and I try to assess their relation with the idea of social revolution. In my view, the social movement of the Ethiopian peasantry is the only one, in the areas considered, that might be characterized as revolutionary.

Significantly, the Addis regime took a recent step in trying to suppress it by ordering complete collectivization, Soviet style (*Le Monde*, July 29 and 30). The way is thus paved for a complete social and economic breakdown. True social revolutions are usually destroyed by so-called revolutionary regimes, either through patriotic wars or by the emergence of a centralized bureaucracy as a substitute for the genuine local forces. That Mozambique and Ethiopia suffer from both evils is just sad and banal. As for Mr. Hawley's last sentence, I always bow to more competent analysts as soon as they display that competence. □

One-Issue Politics

Editors:

In response to the debate about Skokie, I would express general agreement with Irving Howe on the dangers of "one-issue" politics, but also some reservations.

I cannot categorically condemn people who, on one or two issues, have such a strong gut reaction or feeling of threat that they are unable to overlook a candidate's or organization's stand on that issue. It is certainly understandable that many Jewish people cannot, even in the most indirect manner, aid a group that regards them as subhuman and advocates their mass murder, even though the group is now miniscule and poses no real threat.

I understand equally keenly how a pro-choice woman may feel it necessary to refuse support to an otherwise liberal candidate who votes against the right to abortion. The movement against the right to choose abortion directly threatens that woman's right to control her own future and make firm plans for her education, career, family timing and size; the threat frequently arises from theological concerns she does not share.

Yes, we should avoid falling into the trap of habitually demanding 100 percent "toe-the-party-line" perfection. On the other hand, we must allow for those who deeply feel that some issues are literally a matter of self-defense. Maybe we can work together toward a political era in which there is less violent rhetoric and are fewer polarizing issues, thus reducing the levels of fear and personal threat from which some of us suffer.

LORRAINE P. LEVINE
Pittsburgh, Pa. □

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A Public Service Message from the American Income Life Insurance Company of Waco, Texas—Bernard Rapoport, chairman of the board and chief executive officer.

A FREE "FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM"

by Bernard Rapoport

I am for a free democratic society, and I suspect it's what you are for too. We are beginning to lose it. You and I and all Americans share equally in being culpable. To a great extent we have lost our sense of purpose. We have lost our faith. Faith begins with a belief in God and then a belief in people. The "me first" philosophy that increasingly permeates our society precludes faith in either God or people. So while our society has produced more and more materially, the quality of life seems to be deteriorating. While the good old days were not as good as they seemed, tomorrow's may be worse if Americans are not firm in their resolve to regain the faith to which I alluded, and very quickly they must.

The despair, the lack of confidence in government, business, labor, and in almost anything has brought us to a point where we feel there is an inexorability that is overwhelming us. The conclusion: There doesn't seem to be much that anyone thinks we can do to change things.

The observable phenomenon that justifies this conclusion is the fact that Americans no longer to any meaningful degree vote in elections. The only logical conclusion for this result is that they feel it doesn't make any difference who their leaders are. Now here we have a democratic society which has as its predicate that it functions at the will of the people, and the people are expressing no will.

•

A democratic society can function efficiently only through institutions. These institutions have to justify their existence on a daily basis in order to have the support of the American people. I am pro government, pro business, and pro labor. All three form the tripod of what is requisite for a free society. I know it is fashionable to be antiunion, for example. Stop and think for a moment what unions are about. It is the attempt of a group of workers to achieve certain objectives through their collective bargaining strength, primarily better wage and working conditions. In any bargaining situation, there is always a matching of strengths. The bargaining strength of management comes about through its control of capital; and for workers, their strength comes through being organized via a labor union. This meets the requirements for a proper collective bargaining process wherein the bargainers each have equal strength, only in a different way. This process of collective bargaining is just as essential to a capitalistic, democratic society as is the right of someone to go into business for him or herself. While none of us can agree with everything that labor unions demand, neither can we agree with everything that business does. To those of us interested in preserving what we conceive to be the American way of life, we must be supportive of *both* institutions. Here's why. Whenever we deny to any essential institution or to any group of people because of their race, religion, or place of origin the same rights we want for ourselves, we begin the sad and irreversible path toward dictatorship.

The problem with the John Birchers and the Klu Kluxers is that they do not delineate between licentiousness and freedom. The former is a state where anybody can do anything they want to do and have that called freedom, which in effect is the antithesis of freedom. What we mean by freedom in the democratic sense is that citizens within the body politic freely give up certain freedoms, and in this giving up, it is then possible to achieve a meaningful free and civilized society. You and I, for example, are not free to go through a red light, to kill someone, or to defame someone.

The anomaly of our times is filled with so many contradictions. We face an economic situation in which fewer and fewer companies are dominating particular industries. Access to capital markets is increasingly difficult, and for those who want to initiate new businesses it is almost impossible. If we don't change that condition, then, of course, there is no hope for the continuance of our society as we have known it. •

(To be continued.)

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

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